with definitions of the word "support" from other dictionaries. Ibid. But where a phrase in a statute appears to have become a term of art, as is the case with "child support" in Title IV, any attempt to break down the term into its constituent words is not apt to illuminate its meaning.

Congress' use of “child support" throughout Title IV shows no intent to depart from common usage. As previously noted, the provisions governing eligibility for AFDC benefits, including the "disregard" provision in issue here, are contained in Title IV of the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-679a (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV, as its heading discloses, establishes a unified program of grants "For Aid and Services to Needy Families With Children and For Child-Welfare Services" to be implemented through cooperative efforts of the States and the Federal Government. Part D of Title IV is devoted exclusively to "Child Support and Establishment of Paternity." See §§ 651-667. The first provision in Part D authorizes appropriations

"[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such children are living, [and] locating absent parents . . . ." 42 U. S.C. §651 (1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).

The remainder of Part D, 42 U. S. C. §§ 652-667 (1982 ed. and Supp. V), abounds with references to "child support" in the context of compulsory support funds from absent parents. See, e. g., §§ 652(a)(1), 652(a)(7), 652(a)(10)(B), 652(a)(10)(C), 652(b), 653(c)(1), 654, 654(6), 654(19)(A), 654(19)(B), 656(b), 657(a), 659(a), 659(b), 659(d), 661(b)(3), 662(b). Section 653, indeed, creates an absent parent "Locator Service."

The statute also makes plain that Congress meant for the Part D Child Support program to work in tandem with the AFDC program which constitutes Part A of Title IV, §§ 601-615. Section 602(a)(27) requires state plans for AFDC participation to "provide that the State has in effect a

plan approved under part D. . . and operates a child support program in substantial compliance with such plan." Section 602(a)(26) requires State AFDC plans to

“provide that, as a condition of eligibility for [AFDC benefits], each applicant or recipient will be required— "(A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, . . . [and]

"(B) to cooperate with the State . . . (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed . . . ."

Part D, in turn, requires state plans implementing Title IV Child Support programs to

“provide that (A) in any case in which support payments are collected for an individual with respect to whom an assignment under section 602(a)(26) [in Part A] of this title is effective, such payments shall be made to the State for distribution pursuant to section 657 [in Part D] of this title . . .." §654(5).

These cross-references illustrate Congress' intent that the AFDC and Child Support programs operate together closely to provide uniform levels of support for children of equal need. That intent leads to the further conclusion that Congress used the term "child support" in § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), and in Part A generally, in the limited sense given the term by its repeated use in Part D. The substantial relation between the two programs presents a classic case for application of the "normal rule of statutory construction that ""identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.""" Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934) (in turn quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932))).

478

BLACKMUN, J., dissenting

Since the Secretary's interpretation of the § 602(a)(8)(A) (vi) disregard incorporates the definition of "child support" that we find plain on the face of the statute, our statutory inquiry is at an end. The disregard, accordingly, does not admit of the interpretation advanced by respondents and accepted by both courts below. Though Title II child's insurance benefits might be characterized as "support" in the generic sense, they are not the sort of child support payments from absent parents envisioned in the Title IV scheme. The Title II payments are explicitly characterized in § 402(d) as "insurance" benefits and are paid out of the public treasury to all applicants meeting the statutory criteria. Thus no portion of any § 402(d) payments may be disregarded under § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi).

The Court of Appeals construed the statute the way it did in part because it felt the construction we adopt would raise a serious doubt as to its constitutionality. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. We do not share that doubt. We agree with the Secretary that Congress' desire to encourage the making of child support payments by absent parents, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602(a)(26)(B)(ii) and 654(5) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (requiring AFDC recipients to assist in the collection of child support payments for distribution by the States under Part D)), affords a rational basis for applying the disregard to payments from absent parents, but not to Title II insurance payments which are funded by the Government. This sort of statutory distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S., at 601.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Today the Court holds that the plain language of a statute applicable by its terms to "any child support payments" com

BLACKMUN, J., dissenting

496 U.S.

pels the conclusion that the statute does not apply to benefits paid to the dependent child of a disabled, retired, or deceased parent for the express purpose of supporting that child. Because I am persuaded that this crabbed interpretation of the statute is neither compelled by its language nor consistent with its purpose, and arbitrarily deprives certain families of a modest but urgently needed welfare benefit, I dissent.

I

I begin, as does the majority, with the plain language of the disregard provision. It refers to "any child support payments received . . . with respect to the dependent child or children in any family applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children (including support payments collected and paid to the family under section 657(b) of this title)."1 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). This language does not support the majority's narrow interpretation. The word "any" generally means all forms or types of the thing mentioned. When coupled with the parenthetical phrase "including " it indicates that "support payments collected and paid" by the State constitute one type within the larger universe of "child support payments." As the majority recognizes, § 602(a)(26)(A) requires all applicants for AFDC to "assign the State any rights to support from any other person. . . .” Thus, support payments from absent parents will almost always fall within the parenthetical clause referring to "support payments collected and paid" by the State. The plain words of the disregard provision indicate that such payments are only one of various types of child support payments; limiting the meaning of child support to an absent

1Title 42 U. S. C. § 657(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V) provides that, when a state agency collects child or spousal support payments on behalf of a family receiving Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), it shall pay to the family the first $50 of each month's payment and retain the rest to reimburse the Government for AFDC benefits.

478

BLACKMUN, J., dissenting

parent's payments renders the statutory language "any child support payments . . . including . . ." meaningless.

The majority's insistence that the ordinary meaning of the term "child support" excludes Title II payments makes little sense. Title II is a program of mandatory wage deductions, designed to ensure that a worker's dependents will have some income, should the worker retire, die, or become disabled. Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 283 (1979) (Title II "attempts to obviate, through a program of forced savings, the economic dislocations that may otherwise accompany old age, disability, or the death of a breadwinner"). Thus, the worker is legally compelled to set aside a portion of his wages in order to earn benefits used to support his dependent children in the event he becomes unable to do so himself. A child is entitled to Title II payments only if he or she lived with, or received financial support from, the insured worker-that is, only if the relationship between the child and the insured worker would (or did) give rise to a legally enforceable support obligation. 42 U. S. C. §402(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The sole and express purpose of Title II children's benefits is to support dependent children. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 634 (1974) (“[T]he primary purpose of the... Social Security scheme is to provide support for dependents of a disabled wage earner"); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 507 (1976) (“[T]he Secretary explains the design of the statutory scheme. . . as a program to provide for all children of deceased [or disabled] insureds who can demonstrate their 'need' in terms of dependency"); see also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185-186, and n. 6 (1976). It is unlawful to use Title II payments for any other purpose. 42 U. S. C. § 408(e) (1982 ed.).2

2 The overwhelming majority of state courts that have passed on the question have concluded that a parent's court-ordered child support obligations may be fulfilled by Title II payments, recognizing the functional equivalence of the two types of payments. See, e. g., Stroop v. Bowen,