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CLEAN AIR ACT-Continued.
agencies conclude matters “within a reasonable time,” EPA is not barred
from bringing suit to enforce an existing SIP if it unreasonably delays ac-
tion on a proposed revision. General Motors Corp. v. United States,
COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Taxes.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, V, 1.
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law,
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER MILITIA CLAUSES. See
Constitutional Law, VI.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2;
I. Appropriations Clause.
Estopping Government from denying benefit payments not authorized
by law. – Appropriations Clause limits payments of money from Federal
Treasury to those authorized by statute; thus, erroneous advice given by a
Government employee to a benefits claimant cannot estop Government
from denying benefits not otherwise permitted by law. Office of Person-
nel Management v. Richmond, p. 414.
II. Due Process.
Unconstitutional state tax scheme-Postpayment relief.- If a State pe-
nalizes taxpayers for failing to remit their taxes in a timely fashion, thus
requiring them to pay first and obtain review of a tax's validity in a refund
action, Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires State to af-
ford them meaningful postpayment relief for taxes paid under an uncon-
stitutional tax scheme. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Bever-
ages and Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation of Florida, p. 18.
III. Establishment of Religion.
Equal Access Act-Student group meetings at public high schools. –
Court of Appeals' ruling that Act - which prohibits public secondary
schools receiving federal assistance and maintaining a “limited open forum”
from denying equal access to students wishing to meet within forum on
basis of “religious, political, philosophical, or other content" of speech
at such meetings - does not violate Establishment Clause, is affirmed.
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, p. 226.
IV. Freedom of Expression.
Flag desecration. — Appellees' prosecution for burning a United States
flag in violation of Flag Protection Act of 1989 is inconsistent with First
Amendment. United States v. Eichman, p. 310.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW –Continued.
V. Freedom of Speech.
1. Commercial speech-Certification statement on attorney's letter-
head. — Illinois Supreme Court's ruling that attorney's professional letter-
head, which stated that he was certified by National Board of Trial Advo-
cacy as a civil trial specialist and that he was licensed to practice in specific
States – was not protected by First Amendment because public could
confuse State and NBTA as sources of his license to practice and of his
certification and because certification could be read as a claim of superior
quality, is reversed. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Com-
mission of Illinois, p. 91.
2. Use of compulsory bar dues payments to finance political and ideo-
logical activities. -State Bar's use of petitioners' compulsory dues to fi-
nance political and ideological activities with which petitioners disagree vi-
olates their First Amendment right of free speech when such expenditures
are not necessarily or reasonably incurred for purpose of regulating legal
profession or improving quality of legal services; Supreme Court declined
to address freedom of association claim in first instance. Keller v. State
Bar of California, p. 1.
VI. Militia Clauses.
National Guard— Training outside United States.- Article I's plain lan-
guage establishes that Congress may authorize members of National Guard
of United States – which is composed of all individuals enlisted in State Na-
tional Guards - to be ordered to active federal duty for purposes of training
outside United States without either consent of a State Governor or dec-
laration of a national emergency. Perpich v. Department of Defense,
VII. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
1. Drunken-driving suspect – Incriminating utterances made while in
police custody. - Where respondent made incriminating statements while
being booked for drunken driving, a police question whether he knew the
date of his sixth birthday required a testimonial response and admission of
his response at trial violated his privilege against self-incrimination; how-
ever, his incriminating utterances during his sobriety and breathalyzer
tests were not prompted by an interrogation and should not have been sup-
pressed; in addition, State Superior Court's ruling that his responses to
routine "booking” questions should be suppressed is vacated. Pennsylva-
nia v. Muniz, p. 582.
2. Questioning by undercover police officer posing as inmate. – An un-
dercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, to an incarcer-
ated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating re-
sponse. Illinois v. Perkins, p. 292.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— Continued.
VIII. Searches and Seizures.
1. Investigatory stop-Reasonable suspicion. – An anonymous tip-
which detailed what respondent's activities would be and that she would
have cocaine in her possession-as corroborated by independent police
work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspi-
cion to make an investigatory stop. Alabama v. White, p. 325.
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, Discovery not inadvertent. –
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless seizure of evidence in
plain view even though discovery of evidence was not inadvertent, since
inadvertence, although a characteristic of most legitimate plain-view sei-
zures, is not a necessary condition. Horton v. California, p. 128.
3. Sobriety checkpoints.–State Police Department's highway sobriety
checkpoint program is consistent with Fourth Amendment. Michigan De-
partment of State Police v. Sitz, p. 444.
COURTS OF APPEALS. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Social
Security Act, 2.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law, IV; VII; VIII.
DAMAGES. See Antitrust Acts.
DESECRATION OF AMERICAN FLAG. See Constitutional Law, IV.
DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS. See Social Security Act, 2.
DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS BY STATE BAR. See Constitutional
Law, V, 1.
DISCRIMINATION IN PRICES. See Antitrust Acts.
DISTRICT COURTS. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED. See Constitutional Law, VII, 1;
DRUNKEN DRIVING. See Constitutional Law, VII, 1; VIII, 3.
DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.
DUES FOR STATE BAR MEMBERSHIP. See Constitutional Law,
EDUCATION. See Constitutional Law, III; Equal Access Act.
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. See Jurisdiction.
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR AID TO FAMILIES WITH
DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM. See Social Security
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS. See Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974.
Restoration of terminated pension plans. - Where Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation, in order to protect insurance program from risk of large
losses, terminated LTV's pension plans after LTV represented that it
could no longer provide complete funding, PBGC's subsequent decision to
restore plans on ground that LTV's new pension arrangements were abu-
sive of insurance program because they were designed to wrap around
PBGC insurance benefits to provide substantially same benefits as would
have been received had no termination occurred was not arbitrary and ca-
pricious or contrary to law under Administrative Procedure Act. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., p. 633.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Energy Reorganization Act of
ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974.
Pre-emption of state law–Tort claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.- Where employee, frustrated by employer's failure to ad-
dress her concerns about several perceived nuclear-safety violations at
facility where she worked, marked, rather than cleaned, a contaminated
work area and was ultimately discharged for that conduct, her state-law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not pre-empted by
federal law, either on theory that Congress has pre-empted field of nuclear
safety or on theory that her specific claim conflicted with particular aspects
of Act. English v. General Electric Co., p. 72.
ENTITLEMENT TO AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHIL-
DREN BENEFITS. See Social Security Act, 1.
ENTITLEMENT TO SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS.
See Social Security Act, 2.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. See Clean Air Act.
EQUAL ACCESS ACT. See also Constitutional Law, III.
Denial of religious groups' request to meet on public high school
premises. - Equal Access Act – which prohibits public secondary schools
receiving federal assistance and maintaining a "limited open forum” from
denying equal access to students wishing to meet within forum on basis of
“religious, political, philosophical, or other content" of speech at such meet-
ings – prohibited petitioners from denying a student religious group per-
mission to meet on school premises during noninstructional time. Board
of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, p. 226.
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT.
Attorney's fees for fee litigation—“Substantial justification.”—Equal
Access to Justice Act's “substantial justification” requirement establishes a
clear threshold for determining a prevailing party's eligibility for fees;
thus, a finding that Government's position in fee litigation itself was not
substantially justified is not required before fees are awarded for services
rendered during fee litigation. Commissioner, INS v. Jean, p. 154.
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION. See Constitutional Law, III.
ESTOPPEL AGAINST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. See Constitu-
tional Law, I.
EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, VIII, 2.
EXCISE TAXES. See Bankruptcy.
FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SCHOOLS. See Constitu-
tional Law, III; Equal Access Act.
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT. See Patents.
FEDERAL MILITARY DUTY. See Constitutional Law, VI.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 11–Jurisdiction-Standard of review – Attorney's fees. — A district
court has jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions on a plaintiff who has
voluntarily dismissed his complaint under Rule 41(a)(1)(i); a court of ap-
peals should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects
of a district court's decision in a Rule 11 proceeding; Rule 11 does not au-
thorize a district court to award an attorney's fee incurred on appeal.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., p. 384.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 2.
FEDERAL TAXES. See Bankruptcy.
FEDERAL TREASURY. See Constitutional Law, I.
FEE LITIGATION. See Equal Access to Justice Act.
FIELD PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW BY FEDERAL LAW. See
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.
FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VII.
FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III; IV; V.
FLAG DESECRATION. See Constitutional Law, IV.
FLAG PROTECTION ACT OF 1989. See Constitutional Law, IV.
“FOLLOW-ON” PENSION PLANS. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974.