Adams vs. Clem. supposing said gentleman would get her trunk for her, but that he did not; and on Friday following, she sent her son for it, and he did not get it. He swore that Adams told him that after Mrs. Clem left, another lady left, and he supposed that she took Mrs. Clem's trunk. Adams testified that he supposed said trunk had been taken away by said gentleman, till the son called for it, and then supposed said lady had taken it; but since, was satisfied that that lady did not, because he took the lady to the boat, and her trunk was not marked. It was conceded that Mrs. Clem did not pay anything, and was not to pay anything, for the care of her trunk after she left the inn. The Court charged the jury that an inn-keeper was bound to extraordinary diligence in keeping the baggage of his guests, entrusted to his care, and were liable for the same if lost, if the guest complied with all reasonable rules of the inn; that in case of loss, the law presumes the want of proper diligence by the inn-keeper; he might relieve himself by proof that the loss was occasioned by the fault or negligence of the guest; that his liability begins from the delivery of the baggage to the inn-keeper or his servants, and continues until redelivery to the actual custody and control of the guest. He was requested to charge that if she had paid her bill and left the inn, without any agreement charging Adams with the further care of her baggage, and without paying him for such care, he was not bound for extraordinary care; that if she left with no intention of returning as a guest, the relation of inn-keeper and guest ceased; that this species of bailment depended on a contract and some sort of consideration to support it, and without consideration and agreement, it is a naked bailment, and the inn-keeper is not bound to extraordinary care. He refused so to charge. The jury found for plaintiff for $150 00 and costs. Adams moved for a new trial upon the grounds that the Court erred in charging as he did, and in refusing to charge as requested, and because the verdict was strongly and decidedly against the weight of the evidence. Adams vs. Clem. The new trial was refused, and that refusal is assigned as error on said grounds. JOHN C. WELLS, by S. WISE PARKER, for plaintiff in error. H. FIELDER, for defendant. By the Court-BROWN, C. J., delivering the opinion. When Mrs. Clem departed from the inn, kept by the plaintiff in error, where she was entertained as a guest for pay, she left her trunk in the possession of the inn-keeper, with his consent, stating that a person named by her, would call for it in ten minutes. The person who was to have carried the trunk into the country for her, disappointed her, and on the following Friday she sent her son to the inn for it, and the plaintiff in error had lost it in the meantime, and could not deliver it, nor did he show any diligence in taking care of it. Upon this state of facts she brought this suit, and recovered $150 00, the amount which it was shown by the evidence to have been worth, and this bill of exceptions is brought to reverse that judgment. An inn-keeper is bound to extraordinary diligence in preserving the property of his guests entrusted to his care, where they have complied with all reasonable rules of the inn. This is admitted by the plaintiff in error. But he insists that his liability as an inn-keeper ceased when his guest departed, leaving her trunk in his care, and that from that time, he was a bailee without compensation, and was only liable for gross negligence. We think in such case, that the innkeeper with whom the baggage of his guest is left with his consent, though he gets no additional compensation for taking care of it, is still liable for it, as inn-keeper, for a reasonable time, to be estimated according to the circumstances of the case, after which he would be only a bailee without hire, and liable as such. And we are not prepared to say that the time was unreasonable which intervened in this case, before the guest sent back for her baggage. Rives vs. Thompson. But if we treat the plaintiff in error as a naked depositary, he is still liable, as the evidence shows that he was guilty of gross negligence, by which the baggage was lost. Indeed, he does not pretend to show diligence in taking care of it. Judgment affirmed. ROBERT RIVES, plaintiff in error, vs. JAMES D. THOMPSON, defendant in error. The fraudulent alteration of a deed by the grantee which voids it, may, in an action of ejectment, be shown at law without going into a Court of Equity. When the deed is drawn from the defendant by notice, and the plaintiff introduces it in evidence, he may show that it has been fraudulently altered by the defendant, the grantee, when he seeks to recover on a breach of a condition subsequent. The deed in such case is a necessary link in his title, and the plaintiff may show that it has been altered by the defendant. Ejectment. Conveyances. Before Judge HARRELL. Randolph Superior Court. May Term, 1870. Rives brought ejectment against Thompson for two acres of land. The possession by Thompson, that he went in under purchase from Rives were shown, and it also appeared that Thompson had often sold spirituous liquors on said land. Plaintiff's counsel had served on Thompson notice to produce Rives' deed under which he held. It was produced and read in evidence by plaintiff's attorney. It was in the usual form, except that to the habendum and tenendum clause, after the words "to his and their proper use," and as a full conclusion of the sentence were added these words: "Upon the express terms that if the said James D. Thompson, his heirs and assigns, shall at any time, sell or allow to be sold, any intoxicating liquors on said lot, that this conveyance to be valid and the lot not returned to its original owner." Plaintiff's counsel then proved that the deed when signed and delivered was exactly as the deed read in evidence, ex Rives vs. Thompson. cept that said "valid" was " void," and said "not" was not in it, and that Thompson knew it, etc., and closed his case. Defendant's counsel moved to rule out this evidence of alteration, on the grounds that plaintiff could not attack the deed after he had read it in evidence, and could not thus attack it in a Court of law. The Court rejected this evidence and granted a non-suit. The rejection of said evidence is assigned. as error. WEST HAINES, H. FIELDER, for plaintiff in error. L. CHRISTIAN, and B. S. WORRELL, for defendant. The plaintiff in this case had sold the land to the defendant. And he claims that the deed contained a provision. that it was to become void, and the land to be returned to the original owner, if the grantee should either sell or allow others to sell, any intoxicating liquors on said lot. And this action was instituted to recover back the land on the breach of the condition subsequent above named. Notice was served by the plaintiff upon the defendant, requiring him to produce on the trial, the original deed. When produced, plaintiff introduced it in evidence, and claimed that it had been fraudulently altered by the defendant, so as to make it read, that in case of such sale of spirituous liquors by the grantee, the conveyance shall be valid and the lot not returned to the original owner. Plaintiff also introduced evidence of the truth of his allegation, that the deed had been fraudulently altered. A motion was then made by counsel for the defendant, to rule out this evidence, on the ground that plaintiff having introduced the deed in evidence can not attack it, and on the further ground that plaintiff could not, in this manner, attack the deed in a Court of law. The Court sustained the motion, and ruled out the evidence going to show the fraudulent alteration of the deed, by the defendant, and this is assigned as error. We think the Court erred on both grounds. Rives vs. Thompson. The action was predicated on an alleged breach of the condition subsequent in the deed. The deed was an important link in plaintiff's title, and it was necessary for him to introduce it to show the condition subsequent, upon which the action was founded. It was the evidence of the contract between the parties, and we think it was the right of the plaintiff to put it in evidence, and then to show, if he could, that while in the hands of the defendant, it had been fraudulently altered by him with a view to defeat plaintiff's right. The general rule that a party will not be heard to impeach his own witness, does not apply in this case, any more than it would apply in an action of debt, where the plaintiff sues on a promissory note, and on the trial, after the introduction of the note, produces evidence to show that it was made by the defendant as it is declared upon, but has since fallen into his possession, and been fraudulently altered by him so as to lessen his liability. In that case as in this, the plaintiff must introduce the instrument, as the foundation of his action. But he is not on that account deprived of the right to show the fraudulent alteration made to his injury, by the other party. We see no reason why the plaintiff should be driven into a Court of Equity to establish the fraudulent alteration of this deed, when he is prepared to establish the fact by proof in the Court of law, where the action is pending. The Court of law has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Equity in granting relief in cases of fraud, and we know of no rule requiring the party to go into equity when he can establish his right at law. This was not a proceeding to reform a written contract, so as to make it conform to the intention of the parties. But it was a proceeding to enforce the contract as originally agreed upon, and reduced to writing by the parties. If the plaintiff had filed his bill for discovery, and had alleged the fraudulent alteration of the deed by the defendant, the Court of Equity would have had no power to compel a discovery. A defendant can not be compelled to discover what will |