Interior for administrative purposes, pending the enactment of legislation in regard thereto. Neither this Order nor the aforesaid proclamation shall be deemed to affect the determination by legislation or judicial decree of any issues between the United States and the several states, relating to the ownership or control of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf within or outside of the 3-mile limit.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September 28, 1945.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9634

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONES

By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Interior shall from time to time jointly recommend the establishment by Executive orders of fishery conservation zones in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States, pursuant to the proclamation entitled "Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas," this day signed by me, and said Secretaries shall in each case recommend provisions to be incorporated in such orders relating to the administration, regulation, and control of the fishery resources of and fishing activities in such zones, pursuant to authority of law heretofore or hereafter provided.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

September 28, 1945.

TEXT OF SUPREME COURT DECISION IN U. S. VS. CALIFORNIA (332 U. S. 19), DECIDED JUNE 23, 1947

UNITED STATES V. CALIFORNIA

NO. 12, ORIGINAL

Argued March 13–14, 1947.—Decided June 23, 1947

1. That complaint filed in this case by the United States against the State of California to determine which government owns, or has paramount rights in and power over, the submerged land off the coast of California between the low water mark and the three-mile limit and has a superior right to take or authorize the taking of the vast quantities of oil and gas underneath that land (much of which has already been, and more which is about to be, taken by or under authority of the State) presents a case or controversy over which this Court has original jurisdiction under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Pp. 24-25.

2. The fact that the coastal line is indefinite and that its exact location will involve many complexities and difficulties presents no insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the highly important jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Pp. 25-26. 3. Congress has neither explicitly nor by implication stripped the Attorney General of the power to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in this federal-state controversy, pursuant to his broad authority under 5 U. S. C. § § 291, 309, to protect the Government's interests through the courts. Pp. 26-29.

4. California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast; and the Federal Government rather than the State has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil. Pp. 29–39.

(a) There is no substantial support in history for the view that the thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership to the threemile belt beyond the low-water mark or the soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English crown by their revolution against it. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, distinguished. Pp. 29-33.

(b) Acquisition of the three-mile belt has been accomplished by the National Government, and protection and control of it has been and is a function of national external sovereignty. Pp. 33-35.

(c) The assertion by the political agencies of this Nation of broad dominion and control over the three-mile marginal belt is binding upon this Court. Pp. 33-34.

(d) The fact that the State has been authorized to exercise locai police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared boundaries does not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights in and power over this area. P. 36.

(e) Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240; Louisiana v Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1; .The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, distinguished Pp. 36-38.

5. The Federal Government's paramount rights in the three-mile belt have not been lost by reason of the conduct of its agents, nor by this conduct is the Government barred from enforcing its rights by reason of principles similar to laches, estoppel or adverse possession. Pp. 30-40.

(a) The Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property. P.40.

(b) Officers of the Government who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act. P. 40.

6. The great national question whether the State or the Nation has paramount rights in and power over the three-mile belt is not dependent upon what expenses may have been incurred by public or private agencies upon mistaken assumptions. P. 40.

7. It is not to be assumed that Congress, which has constitutional control over Government property, will so execute its powers as to bring about injustices to states, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their permission. P. 40.

8. The United States is entitled to a decree declaring its rights in the area in question as against California and enjoining California and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in violation of the rights of the United States. Pp. 22-23, 41. The case is stated in the first paragraph of the opinion, and the conclusion that the United States is entitled to the relief prayed for is reported at page 41. Attorney General Clark and J. Howard McGrath, then Solicitor General, were for the United States on the motion for leave to file the complaint, and on the complaint and other pleadings, including a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Robert W. Kenny, then Attorney General of California, was for the defendant on its answer and other pleadings.

Attorney General Clark and Arnold Raum argued the cause for the United States. With them on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Babelon, Stanley M. Silverberg, J. Edward Williams, Robt. E. Mulroney, Robert M. Vaughan, Abraham J. Harris and Thomas L. McKevitt.

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General of California, and William W. Clary, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the defendant. With them on the brief were C. Roy Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Homer Cummings, Max O'Rell Truitt, Louis W. Myers and Jackson W. Chance,

By special leave of Court, Price Daniel, Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for National Association of Attorneys General, as amicus curiae, urging dismissal of the complaint. With him on the brief were Walter R. Johnson, Attorney General of Nebraska; Clarence 1. Barnes, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Nathan B. Bidwell and George P. Drury, Assistant Attorneys General: Hugh S. Jenkins, Attorney General of Ohio; Fred S. LeBlanc, Attorney General of Louisiana, John L. Madden, Special Assistant Attorney General; Edward F. Arn, Attorney General of Kansas; A. B. Mitchell; Elton M. Hyder, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Texas; Grover Sellers and Orrin G. Judd,

By special leave of Court, Leander I. Shelley argued the cause for the American Association of Port Authorities, as amicus curiae, urging dismissal of the complaint. With him on the brief was Eldon S. Lararus and Reuben Satterthwaite.

James E. Watson and Orin deM. Walker filed a brief for Robert E. Lee Jordan, ¤× amicus curiae, in support of the United States.

Briefs of amici curiae in support of the defendant were filed by Nathaniel 1.. Goldstein, Attorney General, and Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General, for the State of New York; T. McKeen Chidsey, Attorney General, M. Vashti Burr, Deputy Attorney General, and Harry F. Stanbaugh for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Herman C. Wilson, Horace H. Edward, Walter J. Mattison, Ray L. Chesebro and Charles S. Rhyne for the National Institute of Minicipal Law Officers; Ray L. Chesebro, W. Reginald Jones, Irving M. Smith and Hugh M. MacDonald, for the California Association of Port Authorities; Archibald N. Jordan for the Lawrence Wards Island Realty Co.; and A. L. Weil and Thomas A. J Dockweiler.

MR. JUSTICE BIACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States by its Attorney General and Solicitor General brought this suit against the State of California invoking our original jurisdiction under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution which provides that "In all Cases • * * in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." The complaint alleges that the United States "is the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in and powers over, the lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary low water mark on the coast of California and outside of the inland waters of the State, extending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of California." It is further alleged that California, acting pursuant to state statutes, but without authority from the United States, has negotiated and executed numerous leases with persons and corporations purporting to authorize them to enter upon the described ocean area to take petroleum, gas, and other mineral deposits, and that the lessees have done so, paying to California large sums of money in rents and royalties for the petroleum products taken. The prayer is for a decree declaring the rights of the United States in the area as against California and enjoining California and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in violation of the rights of the United States.

California has filed an answer to the complaint. It admits that persons holding leases from California, or those claiming under it, have been extracting petroleum products from the land under the three-mile ocean belt immediately adjacent to California. The basis of California's asserted ownership is that a belt extending three English miles from low water mark lies within the original boundaries of the state, Cal. Const. Art. XII (1849),' that the original thirteen States acquired from the Crown of England title to all lands within their bound-¦ aries under navigable waters, including a three-mile belt in adjacent seas; and that since California was admitted as a state on an “equal footing" with thei original states, California at that time became vested with title to all such lands. The answer further sets up several "affirmative" defenses. Among these are that California should be adjudged to have title under a doctrine of prescription; because of an alleged long-existing Congressional policy of acquiescence in California's asserted ownership; because of estoppal or laches; and, finally, by application of the rule of rex judicata.”

After California's answer was filed, the United States moved for judgment as prayed for in the complaint on the ground that the purported defenses were not sufficient in law. The legal issues thus raised have been exhaustively presented by counsel for the parties, both by brief and oral argument. Neither has suggested any necessity for the introduction of evidence, and we perceive no such necessity at this stage of the case. It is now ripe for determination of the basic legal issues presented by the motion. But before reaching the merits. of these issues, we must first consider questions raised in California's brief

1 The Government complaint claims an area extending three nautical miles from shore; the California boundary purports to extend three English miles. One nautical mile equals 1.15 English miles, so that there is a difference of 45 of an English mile between the boundary of the area claimed by the Government, and the boundary of California. See Cal Const. Art. XXI, § 1 (1879).

*The claim of res judicata rests on the following contention. The United States sued in ejectment for certain lands situated in San Francisco Bay. The defendant held the Lands under a grant from California This Court decided that the state grant was valid because the land under the bay had passed to the state upon its admission to the Union. United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391 There may be other reasons why the judgment in that case does not bar this litigation; but it is a sufficient reason that this case involves land under the open sea, and not land under the inland waters of San Francisco Bay.

and oral argument concerning the Government's right to an adjudication of its claim in this proceeding.

First. It is contended that the pleadings present no case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. The contention rests in the first place on an argument that there is no case or controversy in a legal sense, but only a difference of opinion between federal and state officials. It is true that there is a difference of opinion between federal and state officers. But there is far more than that. The point of difference is as to who owns, or has paramount rights in and power over several thousand square miles of land under the ocean off the coast of California. The difference involves the conflicting claims of federal and state officials as to which government, state or federal, has a superior right to take or authorize the taking of the vast quantities of oil and gas underneath that land, much of which has already been, and more of which is about to be, taken by or under authority of the state. Such concrete conflicts as these constitute a controversy in the classic legal sense, and are the very kind of differences which can only be settled by agreement, arbitration, force, or judical action. The case principally relied upon by California, United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463, does not support its contention. For here there is a claim by the United States, admitted by California, that California has invaded the title or paramount right asserted by the United States to a large area of land and that California has converted to its own use oil which was extracted from that land. Cf. United States v. West Virginia, supra, 471. This alone would sufficiently establish the kind of concrete, actual conflict of which we have jurisdiction under Article III. The justiciability of this controversy rests therefore on conflicting claims of alleged invasions of interests in property and on conflicting claims of governmental powers to authorize its use. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646, 648; United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 194; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 608.

Nor can we sustain that phase of the state's contention as to the absence of a case or controversy resting on the argument that it is impossible to identify the subject matter of the suit so as to render a proper decree. The land claimed by the Government, it is said, has not been sufficiently described in the complaint since the only shoreward boundary of some segments of the marginal belt is the line between that belt and the State's inland waters. And the Government includes in the term "inland waters" ports, harbors, bays, rivers, and lakes. Pointing out the numerous difficulties in fixing the point where these inland waters end and the marginal sea begins, the state argues that the pleadings are therefore wholly devoid of a basis for a definite decree, the kind of decree essential to disposition of a case like this. Therefore, California concludes, all that is prayed for is an abstract declaration of rights concerning an unidentified three-mile belt, which could only be used as a basis for subsequent actions in which specific relief could be granted as to particular localities. We may assume that location of the exact coastal line will involve many complexities and difficulties. But that does not make this any the less a justiciable controversy. Certainly demarcation of the boundary is not an impossibility. Despite difficulties this Court has previously adjudicated controversies concerning submerged land boundaries. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361, 295 U. S. 694; Borax Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 21–27; Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 602. And there is no reason why, after determining in general who owns the three-mile belt here involved, the Court might not later, if necessary, have more detailed hearings in order to determine with greater definiteness particular segments of the boundary. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 582. Such practice is commonplace in actions similar to this which are in the nature of equitable proceedings. See e. g. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 602, 608-609; 260 U. S. 606, 625, 261 U. S. 340. California's contention concerning the indefiniteness of the claim presents no insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the highly important jurisdiction conferred on us by Article III of the Constitution.

Second. It is contended that we should dismiss this action on the ground that the Attorney General has not been granted power either to file or to maintain it. It is not denied that Congress has given a very broad authority to the Attorney General to institute and conduct litigation in order to establish and safeguard government rights and properties. The argument is that Congress

35 U. S. C. §§ 291. 309: United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 279, 284 ; Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 147, 154-55; Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 425-426; see also In re Debs. 158 U. S. 564. 584; United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 24; United States v. Wyoming, 323 U. S. 669, 329 U. S. 670.

has for a long period of years acted in such a way as to manifest a clear policy to the effect that the states, not the Federal Government, have legal title to the land under the three-mile belt. Although Congress has not expressly declared such a policy, we are asked to imply it from certain conduct of Congress and other governmental agencies charged with responsibilities concerning the national domain. And, in effect, we are urged to infer that Congress has by implication amended its long-existing statutes which grant the Attorney General broad powers to institute and maintain court proceedings in order to safeguard national interests.

An Act passed by Congress and signed by the President could, of course, limit the power previously granted the Attorney General to prosecute claims for the Government. For Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution vests in Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. . . ." We have said that the constitutional power of Congress in this respect is without limitation. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30. Thus neither the courts nor the executive agencies could proceed contrary to an Act of Congress in this congressional area of national power.

But no act of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the Attorney General the authority and the duty to protect the Government's interests through the courts. See In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 502-503. That Congress twice failed to grant the Attorney General specific authority to file suit against California,* is not a sufficient basis upon which to rest a restriction of the Attorney General's statutory authority. And no more can we reach such a conclusion because both Houses of Congress passed a joint resolution quitclaiming to the adjacent states a three-mile belt of all land situated under the ocean beyond the low water mark, except those which the Government had previously acquired by purchase, condemnation, or donation. This joint resolution was vetoed by the President. His veto was sustained. Plainly, the resolution does not represent an exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to dispose of public property under Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2.

Neither the matters to which we have specifically referred, nor any others relied on by California, afford support for a holding that Congress has either explicitly or by implication stripped the Attorney General of his statutorily granted power to invoke our jurisdiction in this federal-state controversy. This brings us to the merits of the case.

Third. The crucial question on the merits is not merely who owns the bare legal title to the lands under the marginal sea. The United States here asserts rights in two capacities transcending those of a mere property owner. In one capacity it asserts the right and responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary to protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquility of its people incident to the fact that the United States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean. The Government also appears in its capacity as a member of the family of nations. In that capacity it is responsible for conducting United States relations with other nations. It asserts that proper exercise of these constitutional responsibilities requires that it have power, unencumbered by State commitments, always to determine what agreements will be made concerning the control and use of the marginal sea and the land under it. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 403–408; United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 194. In the light of the foregoing, our question is whether the State or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited.

'S. J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. J. Res. 83 and 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). S. J. Res. 208 passed the Senate, 81 Cong. Rec. 9326 (1937), was favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee, H. R. Rept. 2378, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), but was never acted on in the House. Hearings were held on S. J. Res. 83 and 92 before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, but no further action was taken. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys on S. J. Res. 83 and 92, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). In both hearings objections to the resolutions were repeatedly made on the ground that passage of the resolutions was unnecessary since the Attorney General already had statutory authority to institute the proceedings. See Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 3d sess., 42-45, 59-61 (1938); Hearings on S. J. Res, 83 and 92, supra, 27-30.

H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); 92 Cong. Rec. 9642, 10316 (1946). 92 Cong. Rec. 10660 (1946).

192 Cong. Rec. 10745 (1946).