controversy (United States v. California, pp. 26-29), now claims its paramount rights in this domain.

There is one difference, however, between Louisiana's claim and California's. The latter claimed rights in the three-mile belt. Louisiana claims rights twentyfour miles seaward of the three-mile belt. We need note only briefly this difference. We intimate no opinion on the power of a State to extend, define, or establish its external territorial limits or on the consequences of any such extension vis à vis persons other than the United States or those acting on behalf of or pursuant to its authority. The matter of state boundaries has no bearing on the present problem. If, as we held in California's case, the three-mile belt is in the domain of the Nation rather than that of the separate States, it follows a fortiori that the ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly related to the national defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and world commerce than is the marginal sea. Certainly it is not less so. So far as the issues presented here are concerned, Louisiana's enlargement of her boundary emphasizes the strength of the claim of the United States to this part of the ocean and the resources of the soil under that area, including oil.

4

Louisiana's motion for a jury trial is denied. We need not examine it beyond noting that this is an equity action for an injunction and accounting. The Seventh Amendment and the statute, assuming they extend to cases under our original jurisdiction, are applicable only to actions at law. See Shields v. Thomas (18 How. 253, 262); Barton v. Barbour (104 U. S. 126, 133–134).

We hold that the United States is entitled to the relief prayed for. The parties, or either of them, may before September 15, 1950, submit the form of decree to carry this opinion into effect.

So ordered.

Mr. JUSTICE JACKSON and Mr. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[For opinion of Mr. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER in this case and in No. 13, Original, United States v. Texas, see post, p. 723.]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 12 Orig., October Term, 1950

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA

DECREE

(340 U. S. 899)

This cause came on to be heard on the motion for judgment filed by the plaintiff and was argued by counsel.

For the purpose of carrying into effect the conclusions of this Court as stated in its opinion announced June 5, 1950, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:

1. The United States is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico, lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of Louisiana, and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward twenty-seven marine miles and bounded on the east and west, respectively, by the eastern and western boundaries of the State of Louisiana. The State of Louisiana has no title thereto or property interest therein.

2. The State of Louisiana, its privies, assigns, lessees, and other persons claiming under it, are hereby enjoined from carrying on any activities upon or in the submerged area described in paragraph 1 hereof for the purpose of taking or removing therefrom any petroleum, gas, or other valuable mineral products, and from taking or removing therefrom any petroleum, gas, or other valuable mineral products, except under authorization first obtained from the United States. On appropriate showing, the United States may obtain the other injunetive relief prayed for in the complaint.

See note 1, supra.

3. The United States is entitled to a true, full, and accurate accounting from the State of Louisiana of all or any part of the sums of money derived by the State from the area described in paragraph 1 hereof subsequent to June 5, 1950, which are properly owing to the United States under the opinion entered in this caseo n June 5, 1950, this decree, and the applicable principles of law.

4. Jurisdiction is reserved by this Court to enter such further orders and to issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed advisable or necessary to give full force and effect to this decree.

DECEMBER 11, 1950.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

(339 U. S. 707)

NO. 13, ORIGINAL

Argued March 28, 1950.—Decided June 5, 1950

1. In this suit, brought in this Court by the United States against the State of Texas under Art. III, § 2, Cl. 2 of the Constitution, held: The United States is entitled to a decree adjudging and declaring the paramount rights of the United States as against Texas in the area claimed by Texas which lies under the Gulf of Mexico beyond the lowwater mark on the coast of Texas and outside the inland waters, enjoining Texas and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in violation of the rights of the United States, and requiring Texas to account to the United States for all money derived by it from the area after June 23, 1947. Pp. 709–720.

2. Even if Texas had both dominium and imperium in and over this marginal belt when she existed as an independent Republic, any claim that she may have had to the marginal sea was relinquished to the United, States when Texas ceased to be an independent Nation and was admitted to the Union “on an equal footing with the existing States" pursuant to the Joint Resolution of March 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797. Pp. 715-720.

(a) The "equal footing" clause was designed not to wipe out economic diversities among the several States but to create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty. P. 716.

(b) The “equal footing" clause negatives any implied, special limitation of any of the paramount powers of the United States in favor of a State. P. 717.

(c) Although dominium and imperium are normally separable and separate, this is an instance where property interests are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty. P. 719.

(d) If the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward of low-water mark, its use, disposition, management, and control involve national interests and national responsibilities, thereby giving rise to paramount national rights in it. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, P. 719.

(e) The "equal footing" clause prevents extension of the sovereignty of a State into the domain of political ond sovereign power of the United States from which the other States have been excluded, just as it prevents a contraction of sovereignty which would produce inequality among the States. Pp. 719-720.

3. That Texas in 1941 sought to extend its boundary to a line in the Gulf of Mexico 24 marine miles beyond the three-mile limit and asserted ownership of the bed within that area and in 1947 sought to extend the boundary to the outer edge of the continental shelf do not require a different result. United States v. Louisiana, ante, p. 699. P. 720. 4. The motions of Texas for an order to take depositions and for the appointment of a special master are denied, because there is no need to take evidence in this case. Pp. 715, 720.

5. In ruling on a motion by the United States for leave to file the complaint in this case, 337 U. S. 902, and on a motion by Texas to dismiss the complaint for want of original jurisdiction, 338 U. S. 806, this Court, in effect, held that it had original jurisdiction under Art. III. § 2, Cl. 2 of the Constitution, even though Texas had not consented to be sued. Pp. 709–710.

The case and the earlier proceedings herein are stated in the opinion at pp. 709-712. The conclusion that the United States is entitled to the relief prayed for is reported at p. 720.

Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Attorney General McGrath, Assistant Attorney General Vanech, Arnold Raum, Oscar H. Davis, Robert E. Mulroney, Robert M. Vaughan, Frederick W. Smith and George S. Swarth.

Price Daniel, Attorney General of Texas, and J. Chrys Dougherty, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the defendant. With them on the brief were Jesse P. Luton, Jr., K. Bert Watson, Dow Heard, Walton S. Roberts, Claude C. McMillan, Fidencio M. Guerra, and Mary K. Wall, Assistant Attorneys General and Roscoe Pound and Joseph Walter Bingham.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit, like its companion, United States v. Louisiana, ante, p. 699, decided this day, invokes our original jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2, Cl. 2 of the Constitution and puts into issue the conflicting claims of the parties to oil and other products under the bed of the ocean below low-water mark off the shores of Texas. The complaint alleges that the United States was and is

"the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico, lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of Texas and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf and bounded on the east and southwest, respectively, by the eastern boundary of the State of Texas and the boundary between the United States and Mexico."

The complaint is in other material respects identical with that filed against Louisiana. The prayer is for a decree adjudging and declaring the rights of the United States as against Texas in the above-described area, enjoining Texas and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in violation of the rights of the United States, and requiring Texas to account to the United States for all money derived by it from the area subsequent to June 23, 1947.

Texas opposed the motion for leave to file the complaint on the grounds that the Attorney General was not authorized to bring the suit and that the suit, if brought, should be instituted in a District Court. And Texas, like Louisiana, moved to dismiss on the ground that since Texas has not consented to be sued, the Court had no original jurisdiction of the suit. After argument, we granted the motion for leave to file the complaint. 337 U. S. 902. Texas then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the suit did not come within the original jurisdiction of the Court. She also moved for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars and for an extension of time to answer. The United States then moved for judgment. These various motions were denied and Texas was granted thirty days to file an answer. 338 U. S. 806.

Texas in her answer, as later amended, renews her objection that this case is not one of which the Court has original jurisdiction; denies that the United States is or ever has been the owner of the lands, minerals, etc., underlying the Gulf of Mexico within the disputed area; denies that the United States is or ever has been possessed of paramount rights in or full dominion over the lands, minerals, etc., underlying the Gulf of Mexico within said area except the paramount power to control, improve, and regulate navigation which under the Commerce Clause the United States has over lands beneath all navigable waters and except the same dominion and paramount power which the United States has over uplands within the United States, whether privately or state owned; denies that these or any other paramount powers or rights of the United States include ownership or the right to take or develop or authorize the taking or developing of oil or other minerals in the area in dispute without compensation to Texas; denies that any paramount powers or rights of the United States include the right to control or to prevent the taking or developing of these minerals by Texas or her lessees except when necessary in the exercise of the paramount federal powers, as recognized by Texas, and when duly authorized by appropriate action of the Congress; admits that she claims rights, title, and interests in said lands, minerals, etc., and says that her rights include ownership and the right to take, use, lease, and develop these properties; admits that she has leased some of the lands in the area and received royalties from the lessees but denies that the United States is entitled to any of them; and denies that she has no title to or interest in any of the lands in the disputed area.

As an affirmative defense, Texas asserts that as an independent nation the Republic of Texas had open, adverse, and exclusive possession and exercised jurisdiction and control over the land, minerals, etc., underlying that part of the Gulf of Mexico within her boundaries established at three marine leagues from shore by her First Congress and acquiesced in by the United States and other major nations; that when Texas was annexed to the United States the claim and rights of Texas to this land, minerals, etc., were recognized and preserved in Texas; that Texas continued as a State to hold open, adverse, and exclusive possession, jurisdiction, and control of these lands, minerals, etc., without dispute, challenge, or objection by the United States; that the United States has recognized and acquiesced in this claim and these rights; that Texas under the doctrine of prescription has established such title, ownership, and sovereign rights in the area as preclude the granting of the relief prayed.

As a second affirmative defense. Texas alleges that there was an agreement between the United States and the Republic of Texas that upon annexation Texas would not cede to the United States but wou'd retain all of the lands minerals, etc., underlying that part of the Gulf of Mexico within the original boundaries of the Republic.

As a third affirmative defense, Texas asserts that the United States acknowl edged and confirmed the three-league boundary of Texas in the Gulf of Mex co as declared, established, and maintained by the Republic of Texas and as retained by Texas under the annexation agreement.

Texas then moved for an order to take depositions of specified aged persons respecting the existence and extent of knowledge and use of subsoil minerals within the disputed area prior to and since the annexation of Texas, and the uses to which Texas has devoted parts of the area as bearing on her alleged prescriptive rights. Texas also moved for the appointment of a special master to take evidence and report to the Court.

The United States opposed these motions and in turn moved for judgment asserting that the defenses tendered by Texas were insufficient in law and that no issue of fact had been raised which could not be resolved by judicial notice, We set the case down for argument on that motion.

We are told that the considerations which give the Federal Government paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the marginal sea off the shores of California and Louisiana (see United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19; United States v. Louisiana, supra) should be equally controlling when we come to the marginal sea off the shores of Texas. It is argued that the national interests, national responsibilities, and national concerns which are the basis of the paramount rights of the National Government in one case would seem to be equally applicable in the other.

But there is a difference in this case which, Texas says, requires a different result. That difference is largely in the preadmission history of Texas,

The sum of the argument is that prior to annexation Texas had both dominium (ownership or proprietary rights) and imperium (governmental powers of regulation and control) as respects the lands, minerals, and other products underlying the marginal sea. In the case of California we found that she, like the original thirteen colonies, never had dominium over that area. The first claim to the marginal sea was asserted by the National Government. We held that protection and control of it were, indeed, a function of national external sovereignty, 332 U. S. 31-34. The status of Texas, it is said, is different: Texas, when she came into the Union, retained the dominium over the marginal sea which she had previously acquired and transferred to the National Government only her powers of sovereignty-her imperium--over the marginal sea. This argument leads into several chapters of Texas history.

The Republic of Texas was proclaimed by a convention on March 2, 1836.1 The United States and other nations formally recognized it. The Congress of Texas on December 19, 1836, passed an act defining the boundaries of the Republic. The southern boundary was described as follows: "beginning at the mouth of the Sabine river, and running west along the Gulf of Mexico three leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande." Texas was admitted to the Union in 1845 “on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever." Texas claims that during the period from 1836 to 1845 she had brought this marginal belt into her territory and subjected it to her domestic law which recognized ownership in minerals under coastal waters. This the United States contests. Texas also claims that under international law, as it had evolved by the 1840's, the Republic of Texas as a sovereign nation became the owner of the bed and sub-soil of the marginal sea vis-à-vis of r

nations. Texas claims that the Republic of Texas acquired during that period the same interest in its marginal sea as the United States acquired in the marginal sea off California when it purchased from Mexico in 1848 the territory from which California was later formed. This the United States contests. The Joint Resolution annexing Texas' provided in part:

"Said State, when admitted into the Union, after ceding to the United States, all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy yards, docks, magazines, arms, amaments, and all other property and means pertaining to the public defence belonging to said Republic of Texas, shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind, which may belong to or be due and owing said republic; and shall also retain all the vacant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts and liabilities of said Republic of Texas, and the residue of said lands, after discharging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may direct; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the Government of the United States." [Italics added.]

The United States contends that the inclusion of fortifications, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy yards, and docks in the cession clause of the Resolution demonstrates an intent to convey all interests of the Republic in the marginal sea, since most of these properties lie side by side with, and shade into, the marginal sea. It stresses the phrase in the Resolution "other property and means pertaining to the public defence." It argues that possession by the United States in the lands underlying the marginal sea is a defense necessity. Texas maintains that the construction of the Resolution both by the United States and Texas has been restricted to properties which the Republic actually used at the time in the public defense.

The United States contends that the "vacant and unappropriated lands" which by the Resolution were retained by Texas do not include the marginal belt. It argues that the purpose of the clause, the circumstances of its inclusion, and the meaning of the words in Texas and federal usage give them a more restricted meaning. Texas replies that since the United States refused to assume the liabilities of the Republic it was to have no claim to the assets of the Republic except the defense properties expressly ceded.

In the California case, neither party suggested the necessity for the introduction of evidence. 332 U. S. 24. But Texas makes an earnest plea to be heard on the facts as they bear on the circumstances of her history which, she says, sets her apart from the other States on this issue.

The Court in original actions, passing as it does on controversies between sovereigns which involve issues of high public importance, has always been liberal in allowing full development of the facts. United States v. Texas, 162 U. S. 1; Kansas v. Colorado, 185, U. S. 125, 144, 145, 147; Oklahoma v. Texas, 253 U. S. 465, 471. If there were a dispute as to the meaning of documents and the answer was to be found in diplomatic correspondence, contemporary construction, usage, international law and the like, introduction of evidence and a full hearing would be essential.

We conclude, however, that no such hearing is required in this case. We are of the view that the "equal footing" clause of the Joint Resolution admitting Texas to the Union disposes of the present phase of the controversy,

The "equal footing" clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to sovereignty. See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 245. It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing. There has never been equality among the States in that sense. Some States when they entered the Union had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Federal Government ; others were sovereigns of their soil. Some had special agreements with the Federal Government governing property within their borders. See Stearns v. Minnesota, supra, pp. 243-245. Area, location, geology, and latitude have created

11 Laws, Rep. of Texas, p. 6.

2 See the Resolution passed by the Senate March 1, 1837 (Cong. Globe, 24th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 270), the appropriation of a salary for a diplomatic agent to Texas (5 Stat. 170), and the confirmation of a chargé d'affaires to the Republic in 1837. 5 Exec. Journ. 17. 3 See 2 Gammel's Laws of Texas, 655, 880, 889, 905, for recognition by France, Great Britain, and The Netherlands.

41 Laws. Rep. of Texas, p. 133.

5 The traditional three-mile maritime belt is one marine league or three marine miles in width. One marine league is 3.45 English statute miles,

See Joint Resolution approved December 29, 1845, 9 Stat. 108.

7 Joint Resolution approved March 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797.