Eaton v. Graham, 104 Ill. App. 296; Everhart's App., 106 Pa. 349; contra, Schultz v. Waldons, 60 N. J. Eq. 71; Von Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Col. I. And it seems that if the partnership is once established it may purchase lands, although it exists merely in parol. And it is immaterial that the title is in one of the partners. Allison v. Perry, 130 Ill. 9. It has been said that the statute is not so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in land, it being aimed simply at the creation and conveyance of estates in land. Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1. The real distinction between the cases has been stated to be whether the agreement attempts to transfer an interest in the land or is an agreement to buy and sell at a joint risk for profit and loss. Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare 383. And it seems to be the weight of authority that a partnership formed for the purpose of dealing in lands, not contemplating the creation of any estates or interests other than a pecuniary interest, may be formed by parol and proved by parol evidence. Bates v. Babcock, 95 Cal. 479; Dexter v. Blanchard, 11 Allen 361.

COUNTIES-PUBLIC PURPOSES-TAXING DISTRICTS.-STATE EX REL. BOARD OF COM'RS OF HENDRICKS COUNTY V. BOARD of Com'rs of MARION COUNTY, 82 N. E. 482 (IND.).-Held, in exercising the power of improving public highways, the Legislature may, by a general law, provide for taxing districts without regard to the boundaries of counties, townships, or municipalities.

CRIMINAL LAW-POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY.-STATE V. WRIGHT, 66 ATL. REP. (DEL.) 364-Held, that in order that possession of recently stolen property unexplained may create a presumption of guilt of the possessor, it is necessary that his possession of the property should be exclusive.

The general rule seems to be that mere possesion of the stolen property raises no presumption of guilt. State v. Jennings, 79 Iowa 513; Taliaferio v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 411, but besides being recently stolen property, Brooks v. State, 96 Ga. 353; Salrin v. State, 93 Ind. 550, for presumption is stronger or weaker as time is more recent, Satlick v. People, 40 Mich. 292, the possession must be unexplained, U. S. v. Jones, 31 Fed. Rep. 718, exclusive; Commonwealth v. Millard, 1 Mass. 6; State v. Scott, 109 Mo. 226; Personal, People v. Hurley, 60 Cal. 74, and must involve a distinct and conscious assertion of property by the defendant, Regina v. Exall, 4 F. & F. 922; Knickerbocker v. State, 43 N. Y. 177, the presumption in such case being one of fact and not law,State v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345; State v. Hodz, 50 N. H. 510.

DAMAGES-ATTEMPT TO ARREST Loss.-MOGOLLON GOLD & COPPER Co. v. STOUT, 91 PAC. 724 (N. M.).-Held, that when an injured party finds that a wrong is being done him, he should use all reasonable means to arrest the loss, and when a reasonable and bona fide attempt is made to reduce the damage, even if by such attempts the loss is increased, it does not relieve the wrong-doer from a suit for the full recovery of the damages claimed.

A person must use ordinary and reasonable care and means to prevent an injury to his property and he can only recover such damages as could not by such care and means be avoided. City of Dallas v. Cooper, 34 S. W. 321 (Tex.); Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267. The courts, in general, have held that evidence of the negligence of one injured to attend to his injuries, whereby they were aggravated, may be introduced by the defendant in mitigation of damages. City of Waxahachia v. Connor, 35 S. W. 692 (Tex.) ;

City of Goshen v. England, 5 L. R. A. 253 (Ind.). The prevailing rule concerning injuries to persons is that where a person is injured by the negligence of another party, and the injured person employs surgeons and doctors of ordinary skill and care in their profession, and the injury fails to heal properly, the party injured may recover for the unfavorable result of the injury, Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 Ill. 20; Radman v. Habersto, 1 N. Y. Supp. 561.

DAMAGES-EXCESSIVE VERDICT-INJURIES.-VESTER V. RHODE ISLAND Co., 67 ATL. (R. I.) 444-Held, that a verdict of $21,000 for personal injuries resulting in a miscarriage and an aggravation of a dislocated kidney, not causing total disability, is excessive.

An Appellate Court will not set aside a verdict on the ground of excessive damages unless it is so excessive as to suggest that the jury was actuated by bias, prejudice, pasion, or some undue influence. Jacobs v. Bangor, 16 Me. 187; Schmidt v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 186; Howland v. Oakland St. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 513. The trial judge should exercise his discretion to cut down excessive verdicts in personal injury cases. Chicago v. Leseth, 43 Ill. App. 480. In actions for personal torts the law does not fix any precise rule for the admeasurement of damages, but leaves their assessment to the good sense and unbiased judgment of the jury. Aldrich v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 513. The amount of damages awarded should be the amount awarded for injuries of a like nature and extent. Lockwood v. 23d St. Ry. Co., 7 N. Y. Supp. 663. “We cannot disturb the verdict, because it may seem to us too large." Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Tex. 470. Courts are reluctant to interfere with verdicts of juries on account of excessive damages. Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 Mont. 273. For a case somewhat similar in its nature to this one where the court did reduce the damages, see Hamilton v. Gt. Falls St. Ry. Co., 17 Mont. 334. For somewhat analagous cases where the courts refused to reduce the damages, see Groves v. Rochester, 39 Hun. (N. Y.) 5 Ga.; Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dooley, 86 Ga. 295.

DIVORCE-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.-MURPHY V. MURPHY, 113 N. W. 582. -Held, there is no hard and fast rule preventing the granting of a divorce on complainant's testimony alone, though it is undoubtedly the correct rule that where a divorce is so granted, the right thereto must be very clearly established.

DIVORCE-FAILURE TO PAY ALIMONY.-OTILLIO V. OTILLIO, 44 So. 799 (LA.).-Held, the failure of a defendant to pay promptly the alimony which he is ordered to pay by a judgment does not carry with it a contempt of court pro se and ipso facto as the result of such failure.

JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-Parties, Southern ELECTRIC SECURITIES Co. et al. v. State, 44 SOUTH. 785 (Miss.).—Held, where a corporation was not a party to a bill to restrain another corporation from voting a large amount of the first corporation's stock because the holding company was a trust, the judgment in such action would not be binding on the original company in a subsequent action by the state to forfeit its charter.

EQUITY-JURISDICTION-CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS OF CORPORATIONS.— TORREY ET AL. V. TOLEDO PORTLAnd Cement Co. ET AL., 113 N. W. 580 (MICH.).

-Held, that courts of law are inadequate to protect rights of stockholders and creditors, and equity will take jurisdiction of a suit involving such rights.

EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE-Matters of COMMON KNOWLEDGE.-AUTEN v. Board of DIRECTORS OF SPECIAL SCHOOL DIST. OF LITTLE ROCK, 104 S. W. 130 (ARK.).—Held, that the court will take judicial notice, as a matter of common knowledge, that a great majority of medical writers and practitioners advocate vaccination as an efficient means of preventing smallpox.

Courts are not limited in their researches to legal literature, but may consult works on collateral sciences or arts, touching the topic on trial. Wharton's Ev., section 282, but judicial notice will not be taken of facts stated in encyclopædias, dictionaries, or other publications unless they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. Kavlotype Engraving Co. v. Hoke, 30 Fed. 444. Common belief, in order to become common knowledge, as to be judicially noticed by the State courts, must be common in the State, although in a matter pertaining to science it may be strengthened somewhat by the general acceptance of mankind. King v. Gallun, 109 U. S. 99; Waller v. State, 38 Ark. 656. Courts will extend the scope of judicial knowledge so as to keep proper pace with the rapid advance of art, science and general knowledge, but this extension must be confined to matters of a general and public nature, Georgia Pacific R. R. Co. v. Gaines, 88 Ala. 377; Wiggin's Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 5 Mo. App. 347, and should be exercised with caution as judicial minds differ as to what should be "generally known." Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37; Miller v. Texas, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Tex. 518. Judicial notice will not be taken of scientific facts concerning which men eminent in the particular branch of learning widely differ. The St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. The American Fire Ins. Co. of Phil., 33 Mo. App. 348.

HIGHWAYS-ESTABLISHMENT-ADVERSE USE.-RIVERSIDE TP. V. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co., 66 ATL. 433 (N. J.).—Held, that mere adverse user of the locus quo, acquiesced in for twenty years, will conclusively show abandonment to the public.

Dedication as a common law method of creating public easements, People v. Dreher, 101 Cal. 271; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters 427, differs from title by prescription, in that no grant is presumed, Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 566; Stevens v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 192, and when it rests on mere user, which must be adverse, exclusive, continous and with owner's knowledge and acquiescence, Kennedy v. Cumberland, 65 Md. 514; Nelson v. Madison, 17 Fed. Cas. 10, 110, the question as to length of time such user is necessary to establish dedication is in hopeless conflict. And although some courts would let each particular case be decided acording to its own circumstances, Irwin v. Dixon, 9 Howard (U. S.) 10; Wood v. Hurd, 34 N. J. L. 91, the better and more supported doctrine appears to be that such user must exist for such length of time that the public accommodation and private rights might be materially affected by interruption, Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn. 250; People v. Jones, 6 Mich. 176; in majority of cases, such period being either the regular prescription period, usually twenty years, Hayes v. Honke, 45 Kan. 466; State v. Savannah, 26 Ga. 665, or the period prescribed by statutes as bar to real actions, Weiss v. South Bethlehem Borough, 136 Pa. St. 294.

HOMICIDE-EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS. PEOPLE V. BRECHT, 105 N. Y. SUPP. 436.-The victim of a criminal operation for abortion in answer to categorical questions by the coroner, stated that she believed she was about to die and that she hoped God would let her recover.-Held, not sufficient to establish a belief of impending death and abandonment of hope of recovery necessary for the reception of her statement as a dying declaration.

The situation attending a dying declaration is of such a character that it is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. Woodcock's Case, I Leach 500. They must be made under sense of impending death and deceased himself must be conscious of his condition. Montgomery v. State, II Ohio 424; if he has any hope of recovery they are inadmissable. Com. v. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296. He need not apprehend immediate dissolution. Com. v. Cooper, 5 Allen 495; and such apprehension may be expressed in words or implied from circumstances. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229. Such evidence is admissible only in cases of homicide. Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns 286; and where the indictment is for the murder of the party making the declarations. Brown v. Com., 73 Pa. 329.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-WIFE'S RIGHT TO SUE. —WHITE V. WHITE, 90 P. 1087 (Kan.).—Held, that the wife has a right of action for the alienation of the affections of her husband.

At common law, the legal existence of the wife was, for most purposes, suspended during coverture. I Bl. Com. 442. It was said that her right with respect to her husband's affections and companionship existed but remained in abeyance because of her disability to sue without joining her husband. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. And that the husband could not be joined with the wife in redress for a wrong in which he was a participant. Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543. But under modern statutes, giving the wife the right to sue in her own name, her disability is removed and no obstacle remains to the enforcement of her right. Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621. Some courts, however, have denied that the wife had any property right in her husband at common law. Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503. Holding that statutes giving limited property and contracting rights do not authorize the maintenance of such an action. Lonstorf v. Lonstorf, 118 Wis. 159. And that in the absence of an express statute she has no right to her husband's consortium. Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 490. Neither has she the right to maintain an action for mere alienation of the affections of her husband. Crocker v. Crocker, 98 Fed. 702. Still, a majority of the courts of this country have entertained this action on behalf of the wife, some, even, without any discussion of her right to maintain it. Bailey v. Bailey, 94 Iowa 598; Bowersox v. Bowersox, 115 Mich. 24.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-DECISIONS REVIEWABLE-FINALITY OF DETERMINATION.-VAN VLISSINGEN V. OLIVER ET AL., 113 N. W. 383 (MINN.)—Held, a judgment in favor of the defendant in a justice court, dismissing an action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer and for costs, upon the withdrawal of the plaintiff from the trial of the case, is a final judgment, and appealable by the plaintiff. Lewis, J., dissenting.

An appeal will lie only from a final judgment. Denslow v. Dodendorf, 47 Neb. 328. And a party cannot appeal from the general findings of a justice of the peace to the District Court, where no final judgment has been

rendered, Butt v. Herndon, 36 Kan. 370. But in Morse v. Brownfield, 27 Mo. 224, where a judge entered on his docket the verdict of the jury, but omitted to render judgment, the other party was allowed to appeal to the Circuit Court. And a verdict for costs merely is not final and no appeal lies therefrom. Riddle v. Yates, 10 Neb. 510. Nor can an appeal be taken from a judgment of a justice of the peace, rendered upon default. Smith v. French, 46 Conn. 239. But a judgment, dismissing the case, at the costs of the plaintiff, is a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. Fuerman v. Ruhle, 16 S. W. 536 (Tex.).

MASTER AND Servant-Rules-DelegaTION OF DUTY to Make RULES.— Gaska et al. v. AMERICAN Car & FOUNDRY Co., 105 S. W. 3 (Mo.).—Held, the duty of a master to use ordinary care in regulating his business and prescribing proper rules for its conduct is a personal non-delegable duty.

NEW TRIAL-VERDICT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.-SLUSHER ET AL. V. PENNINGTON, 104 S. W. 354 (Ky.).—Held, where the jury, in disregard of the evidence, which entitled defendant to a verdict, found for the plaintiff, the court should grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.

Where the verdict is not supported by the evidence, it is the duty of the trial court to award a new trial. Lawson v. Mills, 130 Mo. 170. And even, if the judges give the case to the jury under instructions, which permit them to find a verdict which the evidence does not sustain, the other party is entitled to a new trial, although the instructions in the abstract were correct. Brightman v. Eddy, 97 Mass. 478. But whenever there is any legal and competent evidence submitted to the jury by the court, and a verdict is found, the court has no legal authority to set aside and grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict of the jury was without evidence, Warner v. Robertson, 13 Ga. 370. And when the proof, though slight, supports the verdict and is uncontradicted, the court will not disturb it. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 44 Ill. 176.

NUISANCE-PRIVATE NUISANCE-SMOKE AND ODOR-LAIRD ET AL. V. ATLANTIC COASt Sanitary Co., 67 Atlantic REP. 387.-Held, that the operation of a crematory in such a manner as to render uncomfortable for habitation, houses within a distance of 2,000 to 2,500 feet, constitutes a nuisance.

Every business should be carried on in a suitable and convenient place, and by convenient is meant, not a place which may be convenient to the party himself, but a place suitable and convenient when the interests of others are considered. Bamford v. Turnley, 3 Best & S. 65. The apparent divergency of decisions in this country, McKeon v. See, 51 N. Y. 300; Huckenstein's Appeal, 70 Penn. St. 102, may be attributed to local or special circumstances. Cooley on Torts, 709. A brewery is sometimes a nuisance. Jones v. Williams, 11 M. & W., 176, but a distillery is more likely to be one. Smith v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517. An offensive smell need not be unwholesome to constitute a nuisance. Davidson v. Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. 189.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-HILLMAN v. HULETT, 112 N. W. (MICH.) 918. A member of a lodge in Michigan affiliated with a lodge in Nevada. The chief officer of the latter lodge on the death of the member notified the Michigan lodge and a daughter thereof.