The telegram to the daughter was delivered to her husband, who authorized the operator to have the body shipped to Michigan at his expense. The operator did so and a casket was furnished and the body sent to Michigan, the undertaker incurring the expenses on the faith of the lodge in Nevada, and it in turn looked to the Michigan lodge, which guaranteed the charges of shipment. Held, that the undertaker was entitled to hold the husband responsible as the undisclosed principal for whom the two lodges acted. Blair, Hooker and Montgomery, JJ., dissenting.

An undisclosed principal, subsequently discovered, may be held liable on a contract made by agent. Frank v. Olin, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 161; Schendel v. Stevenson, 153 Mass. 351; subject to the qualification that the state of the account between the principal and the agent is not altered to the detriment of the principal, 1 Parsons on Contracts, 63; or where the plaintiff elects to sue agent after discovering principal. Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178. As principal receives a benefit, he should bear burden. Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625. The Common Law doctrine of privity of contract is not followed, but the principle is probably the otucome of a common law equity. Huffcut on Agency, 120. The agency must first be proved before the principal can be affected by the declarations or acts of the agent. Coon v. Curley, 49 Ind. 199.

RAILROADS-INJURIES TO ANIMALS ON TRACK-FENCES-EVIDENCE.— SMITH V. CHICAGO & R. RY. Co., 105 S. W. 10 (Mo.).—Held, evidence in an action against a railroad company for killing and injuring stock which entered on its right of way through a gap in the fence left no doubt that defendant's servants knew of the gap, and tended to show that it was made with the section boss' consent.

RAILROADS TRESPASSER ON TRACKS-LOOKOUT.-FRYE v. ST. LOUIS I. M. & S. R. R. Co., 200 Mo. 377.-Held, that those in charge of a railroad locomotive are under no obligation to keep a lookout for pedestrians on the track between points where they have a right to expect a clear track.

Crossing a railroad track, whether in town or country, is not a trespass, but walking along a railroad track is a trespass. Glass v. Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co., 94 Ala. 581; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Webb, 90 Ala. 185. In most jurisdictions the rule, when not modified by statute, is that railroads are not bound to be on the lookout for trespassers except in places where they have reason to anticipate their presence. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Logsden's Admr., 78 S. W. 409 (Ky.); Embry v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 18 Ky. L. 434; Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. Womack, 84 Ala. 149. A railroad company is not bound to any act or service in anticipation of trespassers on its track, nor is the engineer obliged to look out for them, and a trespasser, venturing upon the track for purposes of his own, assumes all risk of conditions which may be found there, including the operation of engines and cars. Sheehan v. St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 76 Fed. 201; Wright v. Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 440; Railroad Co. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. St. 375. The liability of a railroad company for the death of a trespasser upon its track depends upon the failure to exercise the highest possible degree of care to avoid the accident after the peril is discovered. Gregory, Admr., v. Wabash Ry. Co., 126 Iowa 230; Kelly v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 387. Some courts have held that the same rule applies to children as well as to adults, Ala. G. S. Ry.

Co. v. Moorer, 116 Ala. 642, but the better opinion is contrary. Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Logsden's, Admr., supra.

RAPE-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.-STATE V. KATON, 91 PAC. (WASH.) 250. There was practically no direct evidence in favor of the prosecution, and the prosecutrix on the cross-examination admitted that the defendant was not the father of her child. Held, that the conviction for rape of a female under the age of consent will be upheld, notwithstanding the impeachment of the prosecutrix by her own conduct and admissions, and the testimony of other witnesses. Root, J., dissenting.

The jury can convict for rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the injured party. Bishop's Crim. Proc. 3d edition, section 968; State v. Fetterly, 33 Wash. 599; People v. Mayes, 66 Cal. 597; State v. Lattin, 29 Conn. 389; Bennett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, and it is so held in ten other states. The jury should be cautioned against conviction on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone, uncorroborated by other testimony or by direct circumstances. People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221. Statute requires that the testimony of the prosecutrix must be corroborated. State v. Bartlett, 127 Io. 689. And likewise in several other states, although not regulated by statute. Davis v. State, 120 Ga. 433. As a general rule, the reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity may be impeached, but not by proof of particular instances of unchastity. Shirwin v. People, 69 Ill. 55; McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435; Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236. In Vermont, particular instances of unchastity may be shown. State v. Reed, 39 Vt. 417. Where crime charged is rape on a female child under the age of consent, testimony as to her general reputation for chastity is not admissible. State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27; Plunkett v. State, 72 Ark. 409; State v. Whitesell, 142 Mo. 467. But to refute corroborative evidence it may be shown that the prosecutrix has had intercourse with certain other men. People v. Flaherty, 29 N. Y. Sup. 641.

SHIPPING DUTY OF STEAMERS WITH RESPECT TO SWELL-STRUCTURES At DOCK, JAMES SHEWAN V. NEW ENG. NAVIGATION Co., 155 FED. 860.-Held, the duty of a passing steamer with respect to causing dangerous swells is the same toward a floating dry dock permanently located alongside of a pier as toward vessels in the same situation, and she is bound to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing injury to such dock, having regard to the character of the structure and its greater liability to injury from its size, and therefore, longer subjection to the action of the swells; and it is also the duty of the owner of the dock to take into account the same liability to injury from swells and to make reasonable provisions against it.

TRADE UNIONS-STRIKES-INJUNCTIONS.-SEARLE MFG. Co. v. TERRY ET AL., 106 N. Y. Supp. 438.-Held, that an injunction against striking members of a labor union will not be granted so as to prevent defendants from peacefully picketing, in reasonable numbers for the purpose of observation only, the premises of their former employer from the highways or streets in the vicinity of the employer's place of business and endeavoring, by argument, persuasion or appeal only, to prevent other persons from becoming employees.

The narrow doctrine, which is still held in a number of states, is that picketing by a labor organization in a strike, in and of itself, when properly conducted, is lawful, but when accompanied by violence or any manner of

coercion or intimidation, to prevent others from entering or remaining in the service of their employer, is unlawful, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef et al., 120 Fed. 102; Butterick Pub. Co. v. Typog. Union, No. 6, 100 N. Y. Supp. 292; Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Supp. 101; but a broader and better doctrine that there may be a moral intimidation was announced by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; this was among the first of the judicial steps taken in this country towards overturning the rule permitting peaceable picketing and was a forerunner of the later rule that there can be no such thing as peaceable picketing and consequently, that all picketing is illegal. Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355; Beck v. Railway Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497. Picketing will be enjoined as a continuing injury to business, notwithstanding it may be punishable as a crime, and the right to injuction against it has been based upon the ground that the aggrieved person is entitled to protection of his "probable expectancy," which is defined as the right to enjoy a free and natural condition of the labor market. Consolidating Steel, etc., Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. 811; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310.

TRIAL-REMARKS OF COUNSEL-EXCEPTIONS.-PRESSY V. RHODE ISLAND Co., 67 ATL (R. I.) 447.—Held, an exception does not generally lie to the remark of counsel, but to the refusal to charge the jury in regard thereto, when reasonably requested so to do.

This is rather an odd way of stating the rule which is usually put thus: "The remark must be objected to or called to the attention of the court in some way when made, or at least during the trial, that opportunity may be given to the court to prevent or correct any abuse." Ill. v. Evanston, 150 Ill. 616; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153; State v. Waters, 63 Me. 128. When no exception is taken to the remarks of counsel, and no motion is made to exclude them, objection to them will not be considered on appeal. Nelson v. Shelby, etc., Co., 96 Ala. 515. If the court interferes and the objectionable remark is promptly withdrawn, the error will generally be deemed to be cured. Dunlap v. U. S., 165 U. S. 486, 498. An abuse of attorney's privilege in this regard may be so flagrant as to warrant reversal, although the court and opposite counsel neglected to discharge their duty. Klink v. People, 16 Colo. 467. It has been held that it is error for the court to allow counsel to discuss irrelevant matter before the jury, and that this error is not cured by the failure of opposite counsel to interpose objection at the time. Willis v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465; Prather v. McClelland, 26 S. W. (Ct. of Civ. App., Tex., 1894) 657. It has been held that it is not necessary for the counsel to present point of objection, and if he does not do so, the duty is where it properly belongs, on the judge. Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511.

TROVER AND CONVERSION-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-Medina GAS AND ELECTRIC LIGHT Co. v. BUFFALO Loan, Trust & SafE DEPOSIT Co., 104 N. Y. SUPP. 625. Plaintiff corporation executed to defendant, as trustee, a mortgage to secure the payment of certain bonds, depositing the bonds with defendant. Subsequently, one of the officers of the plaintiff, who owned practically the entire stock of the corporation, agreed with the defendant that the bonds in its possession should be pledged to it for his own individual indebtedness. Held, that the subsequent delivery of the bonds by the defendant to another constituted a conversion by the defendant of the bonds. Scott and Laughlin, JJ., dissenting.

The gist of the action of conversion has been said to be the deprivation of the plaintiff's property. Keyworth v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Ald. 685. But it is also necessary that the bailee claim some title in himself or in a third person. Heald v. Cary, II C. B. 976. The mere wrongful asportation does not amount to a conversion unless there is an intent to convert it to one's own use or the use of a third person. Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 540. However, the wrongful intent is not always an essential element in a conversion. It is enough if the rightful owner has been deprived of his property by some unauthorized act of another assuming control over it. Boyce v. Brockway, 31 N. Y. 490. It has been said that when a bailee comes into possession lawfully there is no apparent inconsistency between his possession and the plaintiff's ownership until a demand and refusal. Pease v. Smith, 61 N. Y. 477; Polk's Adm'rs v. Allen, 19 Mo. 467. But as a demand and refusal are only evidences of a conversion, if an actual conversion is proved, there is no necessity to prove a demand in order to sustain an action. State v. Pattern, 49 Me. 383; Baker v. Lothrop, 155 Mass. 376. It has been held that a mere paper sale of another's goods without transferring possession is no evidence of a conversion. Davis v. Buffum, 51 Me. 160. It is otherwise, however, where the defendant has the actual possession of the goods to which he asserts ownership or undertakes to sell. And it would seem, in such a case, that the conversion takes place when the defendant takes upon himself the right and assumes control of the property. Gentry v. Madden, 3 Ark. 127. There can be no doubt that there would be an actual conversion if the defendant wrongfully parted with possession of the property. St. John v. O'Connell, 7 Port. 466; Hotchkiss v. Hunt, 49 Me. 213.

WILLS-TESTamentary Capacity-BelIEF IN SPIRITUALISM.-OWEN V. CRUMBAUGH, 81 N. E. (ILL.) 1044-Held, that a mere belief in spiritualism is no evidence of monomania or insane delusion.

Belief in spiritualism is a conviction arising from evidence or information, Middleditch v. Williams, 48 L. R. A. (N. J.) 738, Humphreys v. McCall, 9 Cal. 62, which, if permitted to constantly occupy his mind, might have the effect of unbalancing it, Addington v. Wilson, 5 Md. 137, but is never insanity nor evidence of an insane delusion, Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa 23; In re Smith's Will, 52 Wis. 543; Lyon v. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. 655, except when they are such beliefs as a reasonable man would not, under the circumstances, entertain, Kimberlys' Appeal, 68 Conn. 428, thus differing from an insane delusion, which is a pigment of the imagination, Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369; Am. Seamen's Friend Society v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619, springing only from a diseased and morbid mind, having no foundation in reality, Banks v. Goodfellow, L. R. 52 B. 500; Taylor v. Trick, 165 Pa. 586.

REVIEWS

Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy with special reference to The Hague Conferences and Conventions and other General International Agreements. By Sir Thomas Barclay of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law, Member of the Institute of International Law, Vice-President of the International Law Association, Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals at Brussels, of the Independent State of the Congo, etc. London and Boston (Boston Book Co.) 1907, pp. 383.

Some months before the meeting of the Hague Conference of 1907, Sir Thomas Barclay sent to a number of those particularly interested in studies in international law in different parts of the world, as well as to the foreign offices of the various governments, a considerable body of suggestion and discussion concerning_the main topics which were scheduled for the work of that body. Suggestions in return were invited and received from many of his correspondents. Later, on the eve of the meeting of the Conference, he published these and other papers, with some reference to the criticisms upon them which had been sent him, in the volume now under review, and put them at the service of the members as they assembled.

They must have proved of essential service to them, and were by far the most valuable contribution towards facilitating their labors received from any single source. At the same time, being in the English language, they were a sealed book to very many and probably to a majority of the delegates. The leading publicists and diplomatists of the present day may be expected to have at least a reading knowledge of French, but hardly of English.

Of the subjects treated by the author some, as it proved, received scant attention from the Conference, and others, none at all. Several, on the contrary, which he treated in a cursory manner, occupied much of its time.

This was particularly true of the project of an International Prize Court, to which he devoted but four pages. Sir Thomas Barclay naturally approached its discussion from the standpoint of a subject of a great naval power. England is more interested in securing prizes which her ships have captured, than in releasing captures of her own ships; more concerned in protecting belligerents than in protecting neutrals. He, therefore, inclined against a World Prize Court of the first instance (Chapter XVI) and had little to say in favor of one of appellate jurisdiction.

Perhaps the most important work of the Conference, however, was their recommendation of such a court. Following the lead of