A dead body is not property in the strict sense of the common law, but it is a quasi property, and those having it in charge hold it as a trust which a Court of Equity will regulate, Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538, but there is not any universal rule as to the burial of the dead applicable alike to all cases, and each case must be considered in equity upon its own merits, though the paramount right is in the surviving husband or wife. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. St. 313. The majority of cases show that the surviving husband or wife has the superior right to the body before or after burial, as in the case of Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray. 248, where the relatives of the deceased placed a tombstone over the grave, without the consent of the surviving husband, and it was held that he could remove it, though this right is subject to statutory provisions in some states, as in the case of Young v. The School of Physicians and Surgeons, 81 Md. 358, where, under a local law of Baltimore City, the coroner had power to hold inquests and to order autopsies, and he ordered the autopsy and mutilated the body without the consent of the widow, he was held not liable for the same.

DEEDS-PRESUMPTION AS TO DElivery.-Crabtree v. CRABTREE, 113 N. W. (IOWA) 123.-Held, where a deed bears one date and the certificate of acknowledgment a later date, the date of the certificate is presumed to be the time of delivery.

Generally, the date of the deed is presumptively the date of delivery. Wickham v. Morehouse, 16 Fed. 324; Smith v. Porter, 10 Gray. 66. The burden of proof is on the party alleging the contrary. Williams v. Armstrong, 130 Ala. 389. Possession of deed by grantor subsequent to date of deed refutes presumption. Harris v. Norton, 16 Barb. 264. By weight of authority this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the certificate of acknowledgment bears a later date. Biglow v. Biglow, 56 N. Y. Supp. 794; Hardin v. Crote, 78 Ill. 533. Some courts, nevertheless, hold that date of acknowledgment is presumptively the date of delivery. Atlantic City v. New Auditorium Pier Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 644. But in some jurisdictions this is because acknowledgment is necessary to a valid execution of the deed. Bailey v. Selden, 124 Ala. 403.

DIVORCE-DECREE-SETTING ASIDE.-WOOD v. WOOD, 113 N. W. (Iowa) 492.-Held, that a decree in a divorce suit may be assailed the same as any other judgment where property interests are directly affected, and may be vacated after the death of the parties.

In England, sentences of divorce could not at first be re-examined after death of one of the parties, Robertson v. Stollage, Cro. & Jac. 186, but the rule now is that it can be opened when fraud is charged. Harrison v. Southampton, 21 Eng. L. Eq. 343. Early American cases recognized the right, but were doubtful as to procedure, Wren v. Moses, 7 Ill. 72, but the authorities are practically unanimous now, that, in the absence of statutory qualifications, a decree of divorce may be vacated after death of parties, Fidelity Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 242, Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H. 388, when obtained by fraud, Brown v. Grove, 116 Md. 84; but not for mere gratification of personal feeling, Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 60, or for purely sentimental reasons, Lawrence v. Nelson, 113 Iowa 277; but there must be property rights involved, Johnson v. Coleman, 23 Wis. 452, Bousta v. Johnson, 38 Minn. 230. Tennessee, Colorado and Washington seem to be the only exceptions. Tennessee Statute provides that the only method of reviewing

a decree of divorce shall be by appeal and time had expired in this case. Ownes v. Sims, 3 Caldwell (Tenn.) 544. In the California case the decree of divorce was silent as to property rights. Kirschmer v. Dietrich, 110 Cal. 502. The Washington case is really the only one directly in conflict, court holding that parties affected had other avenues for determination of such property rights as were affected. Nolan v. Duryea, I L. R. A. (Wash.) N. S. 551.

EMINENT DOMAIN-ESTABLISHMENT OF STREET GRAde-Sallden V. CITY of Little Falls, 113 N. W. (Minn.) 884. Under amendments of state constitution providing that private property shall not be taken or "damaged" for public use without just compensation, held, that a property owner in a municipal corporation is entitled to compensation for injuries occasioned to his property by reason of the first establishment of a street grade.

At Common Law a municipality is not liable to property holders for consequential damages from grading, unless the property is actually invaded or the work of improvement negligently done. Radcliffe Exrs. v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195. Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135. A municipality is liable where grade is once established and a subsequent change is made with damage. City v. Herman, 72 Miss. 211. However, there is a difference of opinion as to whether there is liability for damages resulting from the first establishment of a grade. The better opinion holds that there is. Hendrick's Appeal, 103 Pa. 358. Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. R. Co., 103 Cal. 614. The recent case of Manning v. City of Shreveport, 44 So. 882, discusses the question and adheres to this opinion. A contrary decision was given in the case of Leiper v. Denver (Colo.), 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 108, where Judge Dillon is cited as holding the same doctrine. (See Dillon's Municipal Corporations, 4th Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 995b.)

EQUITY-LACHes—Essentials of Bar.-Doncourt v. Denton, 105 N. Y. SUPP. 906.-Held, that while equity does not favor state claims, it will not condemn a claim because of laches in enforcing it, where defendant has voluntarily conceded its existence.

The matter of laches is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor in each case, Chapman v. Bank of Cal., 97 Cal. 159; nothing can call forth a Court of Equity into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence. Golden v. Kimmel, 99 U. S. 201; Price's Appeal, 54 Pa. 472. Courts of Equity act not so much in analogy to, as in obedience to, statutes of limitation of legal actions, because, when the legal remedy is barred, the spirit of the statute bars the equitable remedy also. Calhoun v. Millard, 121 N. Y. 69. Some courts have held that even when the Statute of Limitations has run that laches cannot be brought in as bar, Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U. S. 387; Hovey v. Bradbury, 112 Cal. 620; others, that although a party may bring his suit within the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, he may yet be guilty of such laches as will debar his right to relief in strictly equity cases, Wolf v. Great Falls W. P. P. T. Co., 15 Mow. 49; Delavan v. Duncan, 49 N. Y. 488; but continued acknowledgment by defendant of plaintiff's right is generally sufficient to account for delay by plaintiff in instituting suit to enforce it. Higgins v. Lansingle, 154 Ill. 301; Robertson v. DuBose, 76 Tex. 1.

EQUITY-TRADE MARK AND TRADE NAME-FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS.-MEMPHIS Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. KEELEY Co., 155 FED. 964.— Plaintiff brings a bill in equity against defendant, falsely claiming to use

gold in his cure, and making such representations on his labels. Held, that where plaintiff falsely represents his goods on his labels, he cannot maintain a suit in equity to protect his business of selling such remedy from invasion and injury by another.

He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Bispham on Equity, Section 42; Milhous v. Sally, 43 S. C. 324; McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 654. There is under this doctrine a distinction between enforcing an illegal contract and getting an accounting of money in the hands of a partner as the result of such a transaction. Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70; Hardy v. Jones, 63 Kan. 8. Courts of Equity will not interfere by injunction where there is any lack of truth in plaintiff's case, i. e., where there is any misrepresentation in his trade mark or label. Browne on Trade Marks, Section 474, et seq.; Siegart v. Abbot, 61 Md. 276; Clotworthy v. Shepp, 42 Fed. 62; Josephs v. Macowsky, 96 Cal. 518; Koeler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65. Nor will Chancery interfere by injunction at the suits of the vendor of one quack patent medicine against another, such controversies having too little merit to be commended on either side. Heath v. Wright, Fed. Cas. No. 6310. If the plaintiff has been guilty of unconscientious, inequitable or immoral conduct in or about the same matter, whereof he complains of his adversary, or if his claim to relief grows out of or depends upon, or is inseparably connected with his own wrong, he will be repelled at the threshold of the court. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 73 Tenn. 84.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-POLICE POWER-MUNICIPAL REGULATION.-INTERNATIONAL TEXT-BOOK V. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF AUBURN.-A city ordinance provided that "no person shall distribute in any public street or from any buildings, handbills, cards, circulars or papers of any sort, except newspapers."-Held, that such an ordinance is a lawful police regulation, to protect people on the street from annoyance, and not unlawful as an interference with interstate commerce as against a concern doing business in another state, and desiring to distribute on the public street circulars advertising such business.

No state has the power to impose a tax upon the occupation or business of any person or company engaged in carrying on interstate commerce. Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; Osborne v. Florida, 33 Fla. 162; Com. v. Smith, 92 Ky. 38; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 92 Ky. 38. A power exercised in good faith for public order and comfort will be recognized by U. S., although it may bear on the agencies of commerce. Freund on Police Power, Section 159. The power of the state to protect the lives, health and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and public morals is a power originally and always belonging to the states, and not surrendered by them to the general government. Cooley on Const. Law, 3rd Ed., p. 79; U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. I, II. The states have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal police. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 683.

JUDGMENTS-DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE-ACTIONS AT Law and in EQUITY.-SMITH ET AL. v. Cowell, et al., 92 PAC. 20.-Held, that a decree of dismissal without prejudice to any "action at law" rendered by a Federal Court or sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in equity on the grounds that the plaintiff was not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for, is a bar

to a subsequent suit in a state court setting up a like equitable cause of action, the quoted words meaning a cause of action at law, notwithstanding the Code abolishes the different forms of action.

In most of the states the distinction between the different forms of action is abolished by statute, and either equitable or legal relief may be sought and obtained, and the rules of either law or equity, or both, enforced in the same court. Hulbutt v. Spalding Saw Co., 93 Cal. 55. But the essential principles of equitable actions and relief, as distinguished from legal actions and remedies, are as clearly marked and defined as before the enactment of such statutes. Lackland v. Garesche, 56 Mo. 267. And although there is only one form of action, the character of the action is determinable from the pleadings. Lerdersdorf v. Flint, 50 Wis. 401. It is true that an action brought in a state court in the first instance will not be dismissed if the facts set up in the complaint entitled the plaintiff to any relief at all, merely because he has mistaken his remedy or asked for the wrong relief. White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279. Still, if a Federal Court has jurisdiction of the cause, full faith and credit must be given to its decision, and the plaintiff can no more invoke again the equitable jurisdiction of, and demand equitable relief in a state court, than he can in a United States court. Knowlton v. Hanbury, 117 Ill. 471. And although a decree of dismissal from equity "without prejudice to an action at law" would leave the parties free to seek their legal remedy, Cramer v. Moore, 36 Ohio St. 347; it would be as effective a bar to a subsequent action setting up a like equitable cause of action as if the quoted words were omitted. Strang v. Moog, 72 Ala. 460.

MANDAMUS-WHEN GRANTED-HUGHES v. NORTH CLINTON BAPTIST CHURCH OF East Orange, 67 ATL. 66 (N. J.).-Held, that mandamus is a proper remedy to secure the reinstatement of one who has been unlawfully deposed from membership in a church without cause, without charges, and without opportunity for hearing.

The New Jersey courts alone seem to have held this point; the courts of the other states have refused mandamus on grounds that mandamus will not lie to restore to membership in a church when no temporal rights are involved. Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234; People v. Ger. A. Ev. Ch., 53 N. Y. 103. The rights of a person who has been expelled from a religious society are to be determined by the constitution of the society, Grosvenor v. Un. Soc. of Believers, 118 Mass. 78; Merster v. Ansher Chised Congregation, 37 Mich. 542; an expulsion by the church is not a corporate act and does not affect any property interest or other valuable civil right of the expelled member. Sales v. Baptist Church, 62 Iowa 26; Soares v. Hebrew Congregation, 31 La. Ann. 205. In cases of voluntary incorporated societies the courts will grant mandamus to settle controversies when the facts are important on public grounds, but first of all there must be a penal decision by the proper authorities in the society. Lamphere v. United Workmen, 47 Mich. 429; McNeill v. Bibb St. Church, 84 Ala. 23.

PARTITION-DECREE-CONCLUSIVENESS.-SCHULER V. MURPHY, 44 So. (Miss.) 810.-Held, where in partition no issue was raised between defendants as to the interest of one previously conveyed to the others, and a pro confesso was taken against all of them, the decrees do not preclude defendants, to whom their co-defendant's interest was conveyed, from asserting

their title to the proceeds of that interest as against him or his garnishing creditor.

Partition was at first considered a mere possessory action which left the title as it found it. Pierce v. Oliver, 13 Mass. 211; Gourdie v. Northampton Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 238, and would not bar maintenance of writ of right between same parties. Waller v. Foxcroft, 1 Story's C. C. 475, but in most of the states it has come to involve the right as well as possession. Whittemore v. Shaw, 8 N. H. 397, and a decree is binding as to all the rights which the parties had in the premises at the time of partition, Shaw v. Prettyman, I Houston (Del.) 334; Christy v. Spring Valley Water Works, 68 Cal. 73, based on the theory of estoppel, Kane v. The Rock River Canal Co., 15 Wis. 205; but this does not follow unless questions of title were put in issue. Finley v. Cathcart, 149 Md. 470. One exception seems to be Missouri, where judgment of partition is conclusive as to the title of the land which is the subject of the suit, Ferder v. Davis, 38 Mo. 115; but this is based on statutory requirements, compelling all titles to be set forth and requiring the court to declare interests of defendants as well as petitioners.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-RATIFICATION-PREJUDICE.-NORDEN V. DUKE, 104 N. Y. SUPP. 854.-Held, that where the unauthorized contract made by an agent in the name of his principal had been fully executed before the principal learned of the transaction, his failure to notify the parties who contracted with his agent that the transaction was unauthorized, did not render him liable, upon the theory of ratification, since they had not been prejudiced by his silence.

Where the act of the agent is unauthorized, the principal must acquiesce to be bound, Ward v. Williams, 26 Ill. 447; in order to raise the inference of acquiescence from silence of the alleged principal, it is necessary that he should be fully informed of the unauthorized transaction. Un. G. M. Cr. v. Rocky Mt. Nat. Bank, 2 Col. 565. On the subject, when silence will constitute a ratification, the courts are divided; some hold that the mere silence of a principal may, under some circumstances, be deemed a ratification of the acts of a pretended agent, yet a mere failure to disavow such acts instantly upon being approved of them, will not, ipso facto, be a ratification, Swartwout v. Evans, 37 Ill. 442; Miller v. Excelsior Stone Co., 1 Ill. App. 273; but, others hold, that repudiation must be at once on receiving knowledge. Kehlor, Updike & Co. v. Kemble, 26 La. Ann. 713; Bredin v. Dubarry, 14 Serg. P. R. 27 (Pa.). A few courts have held that where the agent exceeds his authority, the principal to avoid the act is not obliged to give notice by repudiation, Powell's Adm'r v. Henry, 27 Ala. 612; but the better opinion is, that the principal must repudiate the unauthorized acts of his agent within a reasonable time after he has knowledge of them, or he will become bound. Abbe & Colt v. Rood & Rood, 6 McLean 106.

RAILROADS-ACCIDENTS-DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN.-ELGIN, J. & E. RY. Co. v. Lawlor, 82 N. E. (ILL.) 407.-Held, that the failure of one driving across railroad tracks to look and listen is not negligence as a matter of law, as there may be circumstances excusing such failure.

A person about to cross a railroad track, to be free from negligence, must take such precautions as could be reasonably expected of an ordinarily prudent man, under like circumstances. Chicago, etc., Co. v. Hedges, Admr., 105 Ind. 398. The failure of a person approaching a railroad track to look