Samuel Austin, President of the University of Vermont.
Josiah Masters, Member of Congress from New York.
Jedediah Morse, author of the American Geography.

George Bliss, a distinguished Jurist and first Judge of the County of Hampden in Massachusetts.

Among the scholars embraced in the period I have mentioned, and still living, and who have been selected to high public trusts, or been preeminently distinguished for their literary productions, are the names of

Ezekiel Gilbert, Member of Congress.

Ebenezer Sage, Member of Congress.

Noah Webster, author of the American Dictionary.

Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury of U. S.; a Judge, and Governor of Connecticut.

Jonathan Brace, Member of Congress.

Elizur Goodrich, Member of Congress and Professor of Law.

Jonathan Ogden Moseley, Member of Congress.

Simeon Baldwin, Member of Congress and Judge of the Superior Court of Connecticut.'

Stephen Titus Hosmer, Chief Justice of the Sup. Court of Connecticut. Asher Robbins, Senator in Congress.

Lewis Burr Sturges, Member of Congress.

David Daggett, Senator in Congress, Judge of the Sup. Court of Connecticut, Professor of Law."

Abiel Holmes, author of American Annals.

John Cotton Smith, Member of Congress, Judge of the Sup. Court of Connecticut, Governor of that State, President of the Board of Foreign Missions.

Ray Greene, Senator in Congress.

The college, and even the State and nation, have reason to be proud of such a roll of illustrious names. The individuals were nurtured amidst the excitements and tumult of the American war. There were other scholars educated within that period, who proved to be men of sound learning and sterling worth, without having attracted attention by their ardent ambition or proud elevation. They have been contented to pass down the stream of life in a gentle current, without noise or éclat. But in the various walks of private life, and in the discharge of the more quiet duties of professional employment, or as humble and devoted ministers of the gospel, they have been of great utility, and the source of inestimable blessings diffused around the sphere in which they have moved.

1. Supra, p. 315.

2. Judge Daggett-United States Senator 1813-1819; Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut 1832, and First Kent Professor of Law at Yale 1826-1848. He was the great-grandfather of Mr. David Daggett (Yale 1879), one of the most highly esteemed citizens of New Haven, and the genial, beloved and efficient presiding genius of the Graduates' Club. A History/of the/Class of Seventy-nine/Yale College/During the thirty years from its admission/into the Academic Department/1875-1905/by its secretary/F. W. Williams/Published for the class/1906/The University Press, Cambridge, U. S. A.

In the "Kent Manuscripts" the Chancellor gives a journal of his "Excursion to New Haven" for the purpose of attending the semicentenary of the graduation of his class, and this I also feel to be so interesting and enlightening that it can in no manner be omitted from this paper, and it therefore follows in full:

Monday, September 12, 1831, I left the dock at the foot of Maiden Lane in N. York in the steam-boat Hudson, Captain Beecher for New Haven at 12 o'clock noon. It was a cool, pleasant day. Young Franklin Miller went with me, and I found on Board Mrs. Dodge (widow), Isaac Lawrence, Esq., Mr. Mix of New Haven, young Dwight, M. Joaquin Morqueva, the Colombian President, & a great crowd. I arrived at New Haven at dusk & went up to Professor Silliman's, where I had been invited to stay.

Tuesday, September 13th. A fine day. I arose early and walked around the Town and it appeared enchanting. It is a large and elegantly built Town in large Squares and adorned with thick and lofty trees, being elms and sycamores. It is rus in urbe.

At II a.m. I attended the meeting of the Ph. B. K. in the 3d story of the old chapel. R. M. Sherman, Esq., was President. There I saw Ed. Everett and a crowd of the civilians and clergy and Professors. The question was on abolishing the secrets of the Society. Professor Silliman, Doctor Ives, Revd. Mr. Robbins, the Revd. Mr. Bacon of the 1st Presbyterian Congregation & Judge Daggett spoke. The rule of secrecy was abolished with acclamation. We then marched in procession to the North Church on the Green [a picture of the church and Green bearing a manuscript note by the Chancellor will be given in the second part of this paper in the April issue. -ED.] which I found full of Ladies and Gentlemen. The President of the Society and the chaplain and I ascended the pulpit and after a short prayer I delivered my address. It consumed an hour and 12 minutes. We then went and dined at the Franklin House which is a superb Establishment. We then went to the College Lyceum and there was a large and general meeting of the Alumni of Yale College and I presided. The object was upon raising $100,000 by subscription, the sums payable in 4 annual instalments, the first to be paid on 1. Jan'y. 1832. President Day, Professor Silliman, the Minister of the 1st Congregation, Mr. Pilkin, Lucius C. Duncan, Esq. of N. Orleans, La., spoke. [I subscribed $400.]

Wed. Sep. 14th. I took my early morning walk around Town. I attended commencement and sat on the stage with the dignitaries in the Forenoon and then I dined at Judge Baldwin's with my old classmates. There were eight of us who dined together, viz: Baldwin, Boardman, Huntley, Kent, Noyes, Stebbins, Tomlinson, Wells. Channing, Isaacs, Williams and Wright were absent but alive and in health. Judge Baldwin read us an excellent letter from Wright who lives in the state of Ohio in the N. East part in a flourishing Country, and he is very richly and neatly settled. He writes like a very pious man.

That evening I was at a Party at President Day's and there was another at Professor Silliman's. There I saw the Revd. Mr. Stewart, the Naval Chaplain, and conversed with Joaquin Morqueva and with the Revd. Mr. Bacon of the 1st Congregation, who is a very fine mercurial little fellow. The

1. Kent Manuscripts, Journal No. 10-1829-31.

Revd. Mr. James Noyce of Wallingford lodged with me. I was introduced to Gov. Peters, Lieut. Gov. Fairchild, Judge Boardman and a great many Reverend Divines, and I became quite familiar with Professor Everett.

Thursday, Sep. 15th. I visited Judge Daggett, Mrs. Tucker, old Mr. Hillhouse who resides with his son in an elegant seat; & Mr. Silliman took Professor Everett & me over the Bridge to East Haven, and showed us geological detritus & fine views and Fair Haven full of Oyster Beds.

I entered on Board the Steam Boat Superior at 1 P.M. It was crowded with near 400 passengers & it rained. There were visitors and scholars returning from Commencement. There were the Patrone' and his children, Prof. Everett, Pres. Wheland, Prof. Westerle, Franklin Miller, Zacharias Lewis, Isaac Lawrence, Major Hoops, Young Mrs. Dwight. We arrived after dark.

Total of my Expenses $7.

(To be concluded in the April issue of the Journal.-Ed.)

1. Undoubtedly either the Hon. Stephen Van Rensselaer III (1764-1839) or his son, General Stephen Van Rennselaer IV (1789-1868). Both were successively known as Patroon of Rensselaerwick. The former, it will be noted, was just one year younger than the Chancellor. He was graduated at Harvard in 1782, just one year after the Chancellor's graduation at Yale. He, however, was one of the contributors to the fund raised in 1822 for the establishment of the Dwight Professorship (Baldwin's History of Yale College, (1831) p. 316. For the grant creating the Patroons of the New Netherlands, July 19, 1640, see New York Colonial Manuscripts, Vol. I, p. 119. Original in the Royal Archives at the Hague. File West Indie.

VOID, ILLEGAL OR UNENFORCEABLE CONSID

ERATION.

The subject of consideration in contracts presents many interesting phases, but no questions connected with the subject are more interesting or more difficult of satisfactory solution than those arising where part of the consideration is void, illegal or unenforceable, the other part of the consideration being valid.

The distinction between void, illegal and unenforceable considerations must be noted, as the results where one is found may be entirely different from those produced by another.

It should also be remembered that the term "illegal" is not always used by the courts in the same sense, but is sometimes intended to stand for that which is simply void, sometimes for that which is only malum prohibitum, and again for that which is malum in se.

In the discussion of the questions growing out of this subject one naturally begins with Pigot's Case, II Coke Rep. 27b, decided in 1615, where it was held that if some of the covenants of an indenture or of the conditions endorsed upon a bond are against law, and some good and lawful, the covenants or conditions which are against law are void ab initio and the others stand good.

This principle of law which comes down through the cases is no better stated in recent decisions than in Widoe v. Webb, 20 O. S. 435. The court there said that where for a legal consideration a party undertakes to do one or more acts and some of them are unlawful, the contract is gocd for so much as is lawful and void for the residue. Whenever the unlawful part of the contract can be separated from the rest it will be rejected and the remainder established.

The same court, later quoting and approving this proposition, Ohio ex rel. v. Board of Education, 35 O. S. 519, points out the danger of inaccurate thinking along this line and the necessity of clearly distinguishing this rule from another closely related, but leading to a different result.

It is there said: "Care must be taken not to confound this rule with another equally well-settled, that where one of two considerations is illegal, and the other legal, the illegality of the one avoids the promise founded on both.

"In the former case there is one lawful and valuable consideration to support two promises, one legal, the other illegal, which are separable. In the latter case there are two considerations, one legal, the other illegal, to support one promise. The reason for this wellmarked distinction is that, in the latter case, the promise being supported by two considerations, one lawful, the other unlawful, is an entirety based upon both, and cannot be apportioned, and it is against public policy to enforce a promise so supported. In such case, both considerations as a whole are the basis of the entire promise.

"Where, however, the whole consideration is lawful, and the promisor undertakes to do two things, one that is lawful and the other unlawful, and they are clearly distinguishable, the good consideration will support the lawful promise."

While the court's conclusion is correct it is assumed that there must of necessity be two contracts of different kinds to illustrate the two rules under consideration.

This view is the basis for the somewhat inaccurate language in a portion of the opinion. If, for illustration, a single contract is taken, wherein A promises to do two or more distinct things, one of which is legal and the other illegal or void, in consideration of which promise B agrees to pay $1,000, B, upon performing his promise, may waive the void or illegal promise of A and enforce A's valid promise, although both stand as the consideration for B's promise. On the other hand, A will not be able to enforce the contract against B, since the void or illegal as well as the legal portion formed a part of the consideration. He cannot make a valid tender of all he agreed to do and hence, cannot so place B in default as to have a right of action against him.

The courts are not clear concerning the nature or extent of the illegal promise, so combined with a legal promise, which may be waived by the other party to the contract, but it would seem that such illegal promise must not be malum in se, or of a criminal

nature.

It was decided in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 221, Mr. Justice Swaine delivering the opinion, that where some parts of a contract are illegal while others are legal, the legal may be separated from the illegal if there be no imputation of malum in se; and if the good part show a cause of action, that it is error to sustain a demurrer to the whole. Referring to counsel's contention that certain provisions of the contract were invalid, he said: "Conceding this to be so, they are clearly separable and severable from the parts which are relied upon. The rule in such cases, where