which have been founded since 1783. Why should we then suppose that any peculiar and magical effects are to be attributed to concentration; and why should we attempt, by legislative provisions, to enforce a concentration, which private interest would not induce? why should we coop people within a rigid circle of restraint, who desire to follow the suggestions of their own hopes and anticipations and, under the influence of this powerful stimulus, to brave all the difficulties of the wilderness, and to extend the area of a civilization, imperfect if you will, yet still far superior to anything which these wild regions ever yet knew? There There may be loss, there may be folly, there may be disappointment— yet, after the struggle, there will be found a town, a district, a people of civilized beings, securely placed, and enjoying happiness which they could not hope for in their ancient state-and there will be seen to be the broad foundations of a thriving, self-supporting, and constantly improving community. These surely are great results, sufficient to compensate us for the petty inconveniences to which, undoubtedly, the inhabitants of every rising community are subject, in which land is cheap, and labour highly rewarded. We should, however, remember the fable of the lion and the man.

Ask

a working man what he thinks of this state of things. Having thus described the administrative and legislative machinery, we proceed to the next step in the government destined for our new community.

142

SECTION III.

PROVINCE-DECLARED -TRIPARTITE CONSTITUTION

OF WHAT

COMPOSED-POWERS OF CIVIL LIST-LAND FUND-TRADEDISPUTES RESPECTING POWERS-THE CHURCH-EDUCATION.

Now, let us suppose our SETTLEMENT to have existed five years, and that, its census having been at the legal time completed, the number of its inhabitants is found already to exceed ten thousand. It now becomes the duty of the governor, in obedience to the provisions of our Act of Parliament, to notify to the Secretary of State that the population of the SETTLEMENT of (

now

amounts to the number, say, of eleven thousand souls.

The Secretary of State, also, in obedience to the Act, publishes that fact in the next Gazette, and notifies that, in consequence of this increase of the population, and in pursuance of an Act passed in the year of our Lady

the now Queen, the said SETTLEMENT of now become the PROVINCE of (

) has

(

), and entitled

to all the rights and privileges by the said Act conferred. The Settlement is now the PROVINCE of (

).

We have seen that, in the case of the territory of the United States passing from the condition of a Territory to that of a State, and becoming a portion of the great federal Union, an act of Congress is needed; and the people themselves frame their constitution. This mode of proceeding is hardly compatible with the relative position of a colony and its mother country; and would, besides, be in some measure disagreeable to the people of this country, because opposed to their customary habits

of feeling and of conduct. I therefore propose to obviate every difficulty arising from this source by providing beforehand, and by Act of Parliament, for the case which I have here supposed. I would so provide by general provisions-provisions cautiously considered, and applicable to every colony planted by Englishmen, as I have already supposed, whether in British North America, Australasia, or South Africa. To New Zealand, also, these provisions ought to apply.

The fact of the Colony becoming a PROVINCE has not severed the relation between the colony and the mother country—it has merely modified the forms, and changed some of the incidents of that relation.

Secretaries of State for the Colonies, and the Colonial Office, (very different things, by-the-bye,) are much in the habit of reasoning upon colonial constitutions, after forced analogies between them and that of the mother country. They make two houses of parliament, and call one the upper, the other the lower house; and the governor they will talk of as if he were the King. Now, none of these analogies will bear examination. The so-called upper house, which they are ever talking of as a House of Lords, has none of the attributes of a House of Lords. The members of this upper chamber are not an aristocracy of wealth or birth; they have none of the social importance which wealth. gives, neither have they that which is derived from a long line of ancestry, and the prestige of noble birth. They are men suddenly lifted by the Crown from the situation of plain subjects, and gifted with legislative powers; but they exercise no influence over the people, neither are they the objects of such respect as we see

paid to noblemen, or men of large landed possessions. So, again, with the governor-no man in a colony looks upon the governor as the King. There is no personal regard felt towards him, like that which is called loyalty, and which is really entertained for the Queen; and which Englishmen feel for the King of England, though he may be individually wholly unworthy of respect. The King of England-the Sovereign represents, for certain great purposes, the great nation of England bowing to him, respecting him, is really bowing to and respecting England, and England's mighty power. But who looks upon Governor Thomson, or Governor Johnson, as any thing but Thomson and Johnson? Very good men, perhaps, in their way, but representing no idea, no feeling, associated in men's minds with a long line of royal ancestors-with a mighty power with a wide-spreading dominion. Let us not be led into the use of idle analogies-let us keep our minds intent upon the real difficulty of the problem to be solved, and the peculiarity of the case with which we have to deal. The peculiar relation we have to maintain is that of mother country and colony. The two things we have to keep in harmony, are the two interests of the one country and the other. We have to provide a good government for the colony, and yet preserve undiminished the metropolitan power of England.

In England, we are accustomed to our tripartite constitution; and we have not only imported it into our colonies, but we have inculcated the feelings we ourselves entertain upon the minds of the citizens of the United States. Nowhere will you find stronger supporters of

A re

two legislative chambers than in America. markable instance of the growing strength of the opinion in favour of two houses, or chambers, has been afforded lately in the instance of Rhode Island. By the charter granted by Charles II., a constitution was devised for the new colony, and, in that constitution, there was only one legislative house; and Rhode Island, when she renounced her allegiance to England, retained her old constitution under the charter of Charles II. But a few years since, she altered her model, and made her constitution similar to that of all the other states, by instituting another legislative chamber; she, up to that moment, having been the sole state of the whole thirty with a legislature of one legislative body only. I therefore yield to the feeling which I find so stoutly maintained in England and America.* The example of the National Assembly of France, I own, has given me no confidence in my own preconceived opinion, that one chamber was sufficient, and that two chambers were merely a clumsy addition. The facility with which the people of France change opinions, feelings, institutions,

* During the late discussions in France on the subject of a single, as compared with two chambers, I have reason to know that many intelligent Americans were greatly interested in the matter, and urged with great earnestness the national assembly to adopt the plan of two chambers. One of the most distinguished of the Americans, now in England, wrote warmly to me on the subject, because, by an expression I had used, he had reason to believe that I approved of the plan adopted, which is, as we all know, that of one chamber. He cited the experience and feelings of his own country, and naturally dwelt upon it as most weighty testimony in favour of two legislative bodies.

L