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and some were otherwise contradicted; and yet there seems to be substantial testimony showing that petitioner was born in San Francisco and has never been outside of the United States, and, particularly in view of the corroborative effect of the testimony of the teacher of Cleveland, that petitioner is entitled to credence.

However, it is not meant to pass upon the credibility of any of these witnesses; for, in determining the question whether a full and fair trial was given, it is enough to know that on the vital issues the government secured the benefits of cross-examination of petitioner and his witnesses alike, while the petitioner has received no corresponding advantages and has been deprived even of the opportunity to meet and explain the ex parte statements mentioned of the government's witnesses. Surely, if the testimony of petitioner and his witnesses is not true, this ought to be shown by substantial evidence and under circumstances that would give to petitioner reasonable opportunity to meet it. It is true, as counsel claim, that the inspector who investigated into the conditions of petitioner's presence in Cleveland also sat in hearing of such testimony as was produced in the presence of both sides; and although he did not in terms recommend that petitioner be deported, his "summary" of the evidence is, we think, in material respects immoderate and calculated to create erroneous impressions. Inspector in Charge Fluckey made the recommendation to deport.

[3] It is a recognized rule that while a decision of an executive officer clothed with power to deport aliens will not be subjected to technical tests, yet the guaranty of due process forbids the deportation of a respondent without according to him a full and fair hearing. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 300, 34 Sup. Ct. 488, 58 L. Ed. 967. We think this was not done here, and consequently that the case has sufficient analogy to the class of decisions like Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 756, 138 С. С. А. 199 (C. C. A. 8), to require that the decree be reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions so to modify the order from which the appeal was taken as to retain jurisdiction and custody of the petitioner, subject, however, to bail, and to hear and determine the case on its merits, de novo, on such evidence and proofs as the parties may offer under the warrant of arrest. We are the more content to adopt this course since a question of citizenship is involved here (Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 13, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; United States v. Petkos, 214 Fed. 978, 980, 131 С. С. А. 274 [C. C. A. 1]; and see Ex parte Chin Loy You [D. C.] 223 Fed. 833, 839), and an order will be entered accordingly.

(243 Fed. 143)

THEO. HAMM BREWING CO. et al. v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. et al. STATE OF IOWA v. THEO. HAMM BREWING CO. et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. April 10, 1917. Rehearing Denied May 31, 1917.)

No. 2369.

1. COMMERCE 14-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Webb-Kenyon Act March 1, 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8739), prohibiting transportation of intoxicating liquor from one state into another, which is intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of any law of such state, does not simply forbid the introduction of liquor into a state for a prohibited use, but takes the protection of interstate commerce away from all receipt and possession of liquor prohibited by state law.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 30, 92.]

2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 111-STATUTORY REGULATIONS.

While Code Iowa, § 2419, prohibiting the transportation or conveyance of intoxicating liquors to any person within the state, was ineffective and invalid as to interstate shipments, in the absence of congressional authority, since the enactment of the Webb-Kenyon Act it is in full force, unless repealed by some later statute.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 121.]

3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 111-STATUTORY REGULATIONS.

Code Iowa, § 2419, prohibiting the transportation or conveyance of intoxicating liquor to any person within the state, was not repealed by implication by Code Supplemental Supp. 1915, § 2421b, requiring railroad companies transporting intoxicating liquor to keep a record thereof, and providing that no such liquors shall be delivered to the consignee until he enters his name and residence or place of business upon such record book, and certifies that the liquor is for his own lawful purpose or private consumption, since the purpose of the later act was to make more stringent regulations, and any inconsistency with section 2419 is explained by the fact that, when it was enacted, there was grave doubt whether the federal statute had effectually removed the impediment to the full operation and enforcement of section 2419.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 121.] 4. INTOXICATING LIQUORS112, New, vol. 20 Key-No. Series-REGULATION -TRANSPORTATION.

Though Code Iowa, § 2419, prohibits merely the transportation or conveyance of intoxicating liquor, the receipt of the liquor from the carrier is a violation of the law, so as to bring the transportation of the liquor by an interstate carrier within the condemnation of the Webb-Kenyon Act, since, while the recipient of the liquor may not, as such, be a violator of the law, his receipt of the liquor from the carrier necessarily involves the violation of the law by the carrier.

5. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 112 New, vol. 20 Key-No. Series-REGULATION -TRANSPORTATION.

A carrier of intoxicating liquor has an interest therein within the Webb-Kenyon Act, prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of any law of the state into which it is transported.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

Suit by the Theo. Hamm Brewing Company and others against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company and others, in which the State of Iowa intervened. From a decree granting a permanent injunction, the intervener appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

See, also, 215 Fed. 672.

George Cosson and C. A. Robbins, both of Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.

Frederick W. Zollman, of St. Paul, Minn., for appellees.

Before KOHLSAAT, MACK, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

MACK, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal by the intervener, the state of Iowa, from a decree of the District Court making permanent its preliminary mandatory order directing the receiver for the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company to receive, transport, and deliver any beer or other fermented malt liquors, sold and consigned in Minnesota, Wisconsin, or Illinois by the complainants, the Hamm Brewing Company, the Heilman Brewing Company, and the Rock Island Brewing Company, or any other person similarly situated, to persons residing in the state of Iowa, who shall have purchased the liquor for their own lawful purposes and private consumption, whenever the purchaser shall in writing authorize the delivery of the liquor by the carrier to some designated person for the purpose of carrying it from the railway station to the residence of the purchaser, provided the writing certifies that the beer or fermented malt liquor is for the purchaser's own consumption.

After the granting of the temporary injunction, the state of Iowa intervened, alleging that shipments specified in the complainants' bill would be in violation of the Webb-Kenyon Law (Act Cong. March 1, 1913, с. 90, 37 Stat. 699 [Comp. St. 1916, § 8739]) of section 2419 of the Iowa Code of 1897, and sections 2421a-2421c of the Supplemental Supplement of the Iowa Code 1915. The essential parts of these acts are set out in the margin.1

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1 Section 2419 of the Iowa Code of 1897: "If any railway company shall transport or convey to any person within this state any intoxicating liquors, such company shall, upon conviction, be fined in the sum of one hundred dollars. The offense herein created shall be held committed and complete and to have been committed in any county in the state in which the liquors are received for transportation, through which they are transported, or in which they are delivered. Webb-Kenyon Law:

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cating liquor

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The shipment or transportation intoxifrom one state * into any other state, * intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such state

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Section 2421 of the Supplemental Supplement of Iowa 1915: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any railroad company, to carry any intoxicating liquor into the state or from one point to another within the state for the purpose of delivering, or to deliver same to any person, com

In Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700, the power of the state of Iowa to prohibit the importation of intoxicants from another state was denied. A few years later, in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128, it was held, contrary to the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256, that, in the absence of congressional permission, Iowa was powerless to interfere in any way with the movement of intoxicants in interstate commerce or with their sale in original packages thereafter.

In 1890 the Wilson Law (Act Cong. Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313 [Comp. St. 1916, § 8738]) provided that intoxicating liquor shipped into a state should be subject to the laws of the state upon its arrival therein. Thereby the state prohibitions were permitted to affect interstate shipments by forbidding the otherwise lawful sale of imported liquor in original packages. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572. But because the jurisdiction of the state attached only on arrival, and because arrival was construed not as arrival at the state line, but only at the point of destination within the state, and after delivery there to the consignee, the latter's right to receive an interstate shipment of liquor could not be prohibited by the state; section 2419 of the Iowa Code was therefore held invalid in so far as it conflicted with this right. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. Ed. 1088. See, too, Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48, 36 Sup. Ct. 510, 60 L. Ed. 880, and cases there cited.

[1] In 1913, however, the right of the states was enlarged by the Webb-Kenyon Act. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, settles the consti

pany or corporation within the state, except for lawful purposes." Section 2421a, Supplemental Supplement 1915.

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"(b) It shall be the duty of any railroad company, who shall for hire carry any intoxicating liquor into the state, or from one point to another within the state, for the purpose of delivery, and who shall deliver such intoxicating liquor to any person, company, or corporation, to keep, at each station or office where it employs an agent or other person to make delivery of freight and keep records relative thereto, a record book, wherein such carrier shall promptly upon receipt, and prior to delivery, enter in ink, in legible writing, in full, the name of the consignor of each shipment of intoxicating liquor to be delivered from or through such station, from where shipped, the date of arrival, the quantity and kind of liquor, so far as disclosed by lettering on the package or by the carrier's records and to whom and where consigned, and the date delivered. No shipment billed in whole or in part as intoxicating liquor shall be delivered to the consignee until such consignee upon such record book enters in ink, in legible writing, his full name and residence or place of business, giving the name of the town or city, and the street name and number where there is such, and certifies that such liquor is for his own lawful purposes or private consumption." Section 2421b, Supplemental Supplement 1915.

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"(c) It shall be a misdemeanor for any railroad company, liver any intoxicating liquor to any person other than the consignee, or without same having been receipted for as herein required, or where there is reasonable ground to believe that such liquor is intended for unlawful use.

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Section 2421c, Supplemental Supplement 1915.

tutionality as well as the broad scope of this legislation; the plea of interstate commerce no longer avails as against a shipment of liquor into a state "intended, by any person interested therein, to be received,

possessed, sold, or in any manner used

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law of such state." As the Supreme Court says:

in violation of any

"That act did not simply forbid the introduction of liquor into a state for a prohibited use, but took the protection of interstate commerce away from all receipt and possession of liquor prohibited by state law."

The question before us, therefore, is: Did Iowa forbid the receipt or possession of intoxicating liquor?

[2] Section 2419 of the Iowa Code, which punishes the transportation or conveyance of intoxicating liquor to any person within the state, was ineffective and invalid as to interstate shipments in the absence of congressional authority. But when and to the extent that lowa legislation was freed by the Webb-Kenyon Act from the restrictions that prevented it from regulating interstate commerce in liquors, earlier legislation falling within the now untrammeled state power, unless repealed by some later statute, would be in full force. In re Rahrer, supra; State v. Express Co., 164 Iowa, 112, 113, 145 N. W. 451. See note, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349.

[3] While there is some force in the contention that section 2421b of the Iowa Supplemental Supplement of 1915 impliedly repeals section 2419 of the Iowa Code, in so far as it applies to the transportation of liquor for individual use, based upon the argument that, if the liquor is not to be delivered until the consignee certifies that it is for his lawful purposes and private consumption, the shipment and receipt for such purposes cannot be illegal, in our judgment, this is not the fair construction of the act or of its effect. Repeals by implication are not favored; and as the dominant purpose of the later act was to make more stringent regulations of the traffic in alcoholic beverages, a purpose to relax existing restrictions is not so clear or unequivocal as to justify the implication of the repeal of the earlier statute. Although section 2421b of the Supplemental Supplement of 1915 was enacted after the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act, yet in view of the decisions in several state courts, as well as the holding in Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190, 35 Sup. Ct. 824, 59 L. Ed. 1267, L. R. A. 1916C, 273, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1167, there was grave doubt at that time as to whether the federal statute did effectually remove the impediment to the full operation and enforcement of section 2419 of the Code. The 1915 legislation may well have been based upon the view that the impediment had not been removed; it was thus projected upon a background that had, however, actually ceased to exist. These facts only strengthen the conclusion that a repeal of the earlier act is not to be implied.

[4] What, then, is the sound construction of section 2419? In express terms, it prohibits only the transportation or conveyance to any person of intoxicants; it does not expressly prohibit their possession or receipt by him. But such a receipt necessarily implies a conveyance to, a delivery by, another. And while the recipient as such may not be a violator of the law, his receipt of the liquor from

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