ing offenses under section 215, the proof of which established the conspiracy charged, as an offense separate from those charged and proved under section 215. Applying the rule laid down in the Ryan Case, it follows there was here no double conviction.

While we have confined our discussion to those contentions we deemed most important, we have given consideration to all the points raised, and from a perusal of the record and study of the extended briefs and the arguments, oral, printed and written, we conclude no error appears which would justify disturbance of judgment as to any of the defendants.

Judgments affirmed.

tionary with the court. There is another class, in which the petitioner claims a lien upon or an interest in the specific property in the exclusive jurisdiction and subject to the exclusive disposition of a court, and his lien or interest therein can be established, preserved, or enforced in no other way than by the determination and action of that court. In this second class of cases, the petitioner has an absolute right to intervene in the proceeding, and permission for him to do so is not discretionary with the court, and its order refusing permission is reviewable by appeal.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; Ralph E. Campbell, Judge.

Suit in equity by the United States against Bessie Wildcat and others. From an order granting an interlocutory injunction obtained by the Black Panther Oil & Gas Company, George M. Swift appeals. Affirmed.

Malcolm E. Rosser, of Muskogee, Okl. (J. R. Miller and T. R. Dean, both of Sapulpa, Okl., F. F. Lamb, of Okmulgee, Okl., Geo. S. Ramsey, of Muskogee, Okl., and Edgar A. De Meules, of Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.

A. C. Cruce, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (C. B. Stuart, M. K. Cruce, J. R. Keaton, Frank Wells, and D. I. Johnston, all of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and AMIDON, District Judge.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. George M. Swift appeals to this court from an interlocutory decree of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma which enjoins him from enforcingagainst the three-fourths working interest, or the proceeds thereof derived, or to be derived, during the receivership in the suit of United States v. Bessie Wildcat and others in that court by the Black Panther Oil & Gas Company, a corporation, hereafter called the Panther, from the operation for oil and gas on the northwest quarter of section 9, township 18 north, of range 7 east, in Creek county, Okl., under the lease thereof to the Panther made by the receiver by order of the federal court on April 20, 1914—the judgment or decree of the state district court of Creek county, Okl., in the suit of Swift, Trustee, v. Panther, rendered January 15, 1916, for Swift's recovery of the Panther out of the said three-fourths working interest of $113,330.56 and one-eighth of the oil derived from the land subsequent to December 15, 1915, either by writs of execution, or garnishments, or injunctions in or issued out of the state court.

Before the issue of the injunction of the federal court challenged, Mr. Swift, for the purpose of enforcing his decree, had caused the state court to issue a writ of execution, and had caused the sheriff to levy it upon and to advertise for sale thereunder the interest of the Panther in the land and in the oil and gas produced therefrom, had caused certain third parties to be garnisheed as creditors of the Panther, and had obtained an order from the state court on March 29, 1916, forbidding the Panther from paying out any money or doing anything of any kind that might prevent it from paying over all the money it then had, or might thereafter obtain, from any banks, or from the sale of any oil or gas or other of its property, to the clerk of the state court, to apply upon Swift's judgment in case such court, or any other court, should subsequently order such judgment to be so paid. In this state of the case the Panther presented to the federal court in the Wildcat suit, to which it was a party defendant from its commencement, a petition for its injunction against Swift's interference by means of the execution, garnishments, or injunction of the state court with the ownership or disposition by the Panther of the three-fourths working interest in the oil and gas derived under the receiver's lease, or in the proceeds thereof, on the ground that Swift was estopped by the proceedings in the Wildcat suit, to which his assignor and predecessor in interest was a party before Swift obtained his claim, from in any way enforcing that claim against that three-fourths interest or any of the proceeds thereof. Swift answered the petition of the Panther, evidence was introduced by each of the parties, and after a full hearing the court sustained the position of the Panther and ordered the issue of its injunction.

[1] The first reason urged upon our attention by counsel for Mr. Swift for the reversal of the interlocutory decree of the federal court for the issuance of its injunction is that the national court had no jurisdiction to issue its injunction, because section 720 of the United States Revised Statutes, which is now section 265 of the Judicial Code, reads:

"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."

1

In support of this contention counsel cite Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179, 2 L. Ed. 587, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 623, 624, 625, 12 L. Ed. 841, Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254, 23 L. Ed. 345, Whitney v. Wilder, 54 Fed. 554, 4 C. C. A. 510, and other cases of like character wherein the state court first acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy. In cases of this class this act of Congress undoubtedly controls, and the federal courts may not interfere by injunction or otherwise with the proceedings of the state courts which have first acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter. But it is equally true that in a case in which a federal court first obtains jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, and where it acts in aid of its own jurisdiction to render its orders or decrees, or the title or disposition under them of the property within that jurisdiction, effectual, it may, notwithstanding section 720, Revised Statutes, now section 265 of the Judicial Code, enjoin or restrain all proceedings in the state court which would have the effect of defeating or impairing its jurisdiction, or the orders, decrees, or titles it has made or is making in the exercise thereof. Sharon v. Terry (C. C.) 36 Fed. 337; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, note, 22 L. Ed. 857; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494, 26 L. Ed. 497; Julian v. Central Trust Company, 193 U. S. 93, 112, 24 Sup. Ct. 399, 48 L. Ed. 629; Starr v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 110 Fed. 3, 6; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 23 Sup. Ct. 398, 47 L. Ed. 584; Lang v. Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co., 160 Fed. 355, 359, 360, 87 С. С. А. 307, 311, 312; Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City (D. C.) 198 Fed. 500, 526; Guardian Trust Co. v Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 171 Fed. 43, 49, 96 С. С. А. 285, 291, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 620; Western Union Tel. Co. v. U. S. & Mexican Trust Co., 221 Fed. 545, 553, 137 С. С. А. 113, 121; McKinney v. Landon, 209 Fed. 300, 305, 306, 126 С. С. А. 226, 231, 232. The law upon this subject has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court and by this court. In Lang v. Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co., 160 Fed. 359, 360, 87 С. С. А. 311, 312, the rule was thus stated by this court:

"The court which first acquires jurisdiction of specific property by the lawful seizure thereof, or by the due commencement of a suit in that court, from which it appears that it is, or will become, necessary to a complete determination of the controversy involved, or to the enforcement of the judgment or decree therein, to seize, charge with a lien, sell, or exercise other like dominion over it, thereby withdraws that property from the jurisdiction of every other court and entitles the former to retain the control of it requisite to effectuate its judgment or decree in the suit free from the interference of every other tribunal. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company v. Lake Street Railroad Co., 177 U. S. 51, 61, 20 Sup. Ct. 564, 44 L. Ed. 667; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 12 L. Ed. 841; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L. Ed. 749; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 14 Sup. Ct. 1019, 38 L. Ed. 981; Central Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432, 18 Sup. Ct. 403, 42 L. Ed. 807; Williams v. Neely, 67 С. С. А. 171, 185, 134 Fed. 1, 15, 69 L. R. A. 232; Barber Asphalt Co. v. Morris, 66 C. С. А. 55, 58, 132 Fed. 945, 948, 67 L. R. A. 761; Gates v. Bucki, 53 Fed. 961, 969, 4 C. C. A. 116, 128, 129. * The jurisdiction of a court over a subjectmatter or a cause once lawfully acquired includes the power to enforce its judgment or decree, and to protect the title of those holding under it from every attempt to avoid or annul it. Chicot Co. v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 533, 534, 13 Sup. Ct. 695, 37 L. Ed. 546; Julian v. Central Trust Company, 193 U. S. 93, 112, 24 Sup. Ct. 399, 48 L. Ed. 629; Wabash Railroad Company v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 28 Sup. Ct. 182 [52 L. Ed. 379]; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Morris, 132 Fed. 945, 949, 66 C. C. A. 55, 59, 67, 67 L. R. A. 761; Brun v. Mann, 80 С. С. А. 513, 151 Fed. 145 [12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 154]."

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The foregoing rules are no longer debatable, and by them the injunctive order of the federal court must be tested. The exact subjectmatter in controversy between the two courts is the three-fourths working interest in the oil and gas and in the proceeds of that interest derived and to be derived by the Panther, during the receivership in the federal court, from the land leased to the Panther by the receiver by order of that court on April 20, 1914, and the first question is: Which court first lawfully obtained jurisdiction of that subject-matter? The answer is found in the claims of the parties and the history of the proceedings in the two courts.

[2] Prior to May, 1903, the land here in question had been allotted and patented under the acts of Congress to Barney Thlocco, a Creek Indian. On November 1, 1913, the United States commenced a suit in equity against Bessie Wildcat, the Panther, Martha Jackson, a minor, Saber Jackson, as her guardian and next friend, and others, to avoid the allotment and patent to Thlocco, and to exclude the defendants in that suit from any right or title to the land and to the oil and gas that might be derived therefrom. The defendants Martha Jackson and her guardian, Saber Jackson, answered, and claimed that Thlocco died in 1904 intestate, that Annie Nevy was his sole heir, that Saber Jackson married her, that Martha Jackson was their daughter, that Annie Jackson, formerly Annie Nevy, her mother, has also died, and that consequently Martha Jackson is the sole heir and the owner of the land, and Saber Jackson has a life estate in the land as tenant by the curtesy consummate. On November 13, 1913, Saber Jackson made an oil and gas lease of this land to J. Coody Johnson, whereby the lessee agreed, among other things, to pay to Jackson as rental one-eighth of all the oil and gas that should be produced and saved from the land. Johnson's interest under the lease was subsequently assigned to and became vested in the Panther on February 4, 1914. The Panther also became the lessee of Martha Jackson, by her guardian, Saber Jackson, under an oil and gas lease whereby it agreed to pay as rental to her oneeighth of all the oil and gas produced and saved from this same land.

On April 17, 1914, on the petition of the plaintiff in the Wildcat suit and some of the defendants therein, including Martha Jackson and Saber Jackson, as her guardian, and with the consent of all the other defendants, the federal court appointed a receiver to cause and direct the production of oil and gas from this land and ordered and directed him to make a formal agreement with the Panther for the development of the land and the production of oil and gas therefrom on the following terms, among others: That the Panther should deliver or pay to the receiver one-fourth of all the oil and gas produced from the land, that the Panther should give to the receiver for the benefit of the parties to the suit a satisfactory bond to perform the provisions of its agreement, that the receiver was

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"authorized and directed to release to the said Black Panther Oil & Gas Company, and its assigns, free from any claim of any party to this action, the working interest in the oil and gas produced by the said company from the above described land, that is to say, all the oil and gas so produced in excess of the royalty portion of one-fourth of the gross amount of production."

Thereafter, pursuant to this order and direction of the court, the receiver and the Panther made a formal written agreement which embodied the terms specified in the order of the court, and thereunder the Panther has ever since been in possession of the property, producing or causing others to produce oil and gas from the land, and has been paying or delivering one-fourth thereof to the receiver or to his order.

On November 23, 1914, Saber Jackson, who had not theretofore been a party to the Wildcat suit, otherwise than as guardian for Martha Jackson, intervened in that case in his own behalf and filed his answer and cross-bill, wherein he set forth his claim to a life estate in the land as tenant by the curtesy, and prayed that he be decreed to have such life estate and to have such further relief as might be just. His answer and cross-bill opened with these words:

"Comes now Saber Jackson, and by leave of court first obtained files this his answer and cross-bill in the above-entitled cause, hereby submitting to all of the orders, judgments, and proceedings heretofore had in said cause, as fully as though he had been made a party defendant herein from the institution of the suit."

On December 4, 1914, Saber Jackson assigned to George M. Swift all his rights to any oil and gas that had been or might be derived