Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes, Svazek 143
Market signaling, a phrase formulated by Mr. Spence, means the activities and characteristics of individuals which are visible to somebody else and convey information in a market, such as the job market. This study attempts to explain the informational content of market signals.
Job Market Signaling
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active signaling allocation assumed assumption average blacks characteristics competitive conditional distribution conditional probability conspicuous consumption context convex set cooperative game decisions defined depend differential signaling costs discrimination education costs effective signal efficiency employer employer's beliefs equi equilib equilibrium configurations example expected fact Figure firm function George Stigler given guarantee Hence high-productivity hiring II.b income individual informational structure institution invest job market signaling K₁ labor market level of education librium loan lottery marginal product market data market equilibrium market signaling game multiple equilibria naling negatively correlated no-signaling observable offered wage schedule optimal choice overinvestment perfect information ployer possible potential signals prerequisite problem productive capabilities Proposition q₁ race random risk-aversion rium score screening seller signaling equilibrium signaling system situation statistical discrimination suppressing Thomas Schelling tion tive tivity unalterable variance-covariance matrix w₁ wage differentials Zvi Griliches