4 strike out "on" and insert it between " has" and "the.” 5 insert "or" between " debtor" and "where." 216 322 327 327 14 strike out "there." 27 after" events," put a period, and erase it after "instance. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, JANUARY TERM, 1822-CHARLESTON. No doctrine is better established than that where one commits an offence, which is made felony by statute, and then the statute be repealed, he can not be punished as a felon in respect of that statute: and the doctrine applies as well to the imposing and recovering of penalties, as to the creating and punishment of felonies. The patrol act of 1819, is only a re-enactment of the act of 1809, and the former acts, with some small alterations. The act of 1819 and 1809, differ in three particulars: 1. As to the amount of fines. 2. In the person before whom the penalty is to be recovered. 3. In the appropriation of the fines. MOTION for a prohibition made before Judge Richardson, to prevent the collection of certain fines imposed by Captain Cole on William Brisbane, for the non performance of patrol duty. The suggestion stated a variety of grounds, but the motion was granted, on the ground that the act under which. the fines were imposed, had been repealed by a subsequent act of the Legislature. A motion was now made to reverse the decision of the presiding Judge, and to dismiss the rule, because the act has not been repealed, so far, at least, as fines had been imposed, prior to the passage of the last act, which is considered as the repealing act. On the part of the appellant, Mr. Prioleau contended that where an act of the Legislature repealed a former act imposing a penalty, such penalty could not be recovered after the repeal of the law by which it was imposed; and that the act of 1819, regulating the performance of patrol duty, did repeal the old act of 1809, on the same subject, both by a repugnancy in its provisions, and by an express clause to that effect; and that there is no clause in the latter act providing for the enforcement or recovery of the penalties imposed by the former act. To support these positions, he relied on 1 Hale, 291. 1 Wm. Blackstone, 451. 4 Dallas, 373-4. 1 Cranch, 110. 5 Do. 281.6 Do. 329. The Attorney General did not controvert the general position, that, where a statute creating an offence is repealed by a subsequent statute, that no punishment can be inflicted after the repeal of the first statute; but contended that the act of 1809, was neither virtually nor actually repealed by the act of 1819. Mr. Justice Colcock delivered the opinion of the court: No doctrine of law is better established than that where one commits an offence which is made felony by statute, and then the statute be repealed, he cannot be punished as a felon in respect of that statute. (1 Hawk. P. C. 306, Sec. 10. 1 Hale, 219.) And the doctrine applies as well to the imposing and recovery of penalties, as to the creating and punishment of felonies. The reason of the law is obvious; it is not only unwise and impolitic, but it is unjust to punish a man for the commission of an act which the law no longer considers as an offence. The policy of a country may require the prohibition of certain acts, or the performance of certain duties for a time, after which, the acts may be innocent, and the duties not required. It would not be less absurd to punish a man for an act which is not illegal at the time the punishment is inflicted, than to punish him for one which never has been declared illegal; and upon an examination of the authori |