people of the United States. I suspect that the people of the United States understand their own interests better than any group of men in the confines of the country understand them.'

It may, of course, be thought that it is not the "interests of the people of the United States" that should prevail in the formation of an organization so general as a "League of Nations," but the interests of humanity. This may be true, but the "trustee theory, the guardianship theory," is perhaps even less applicable to humanity as a whole than it is to a single people, who in ordinary circumstances may at least have an opportunity to choose, and to some extent direct, their trustee or guardian.

It would, however, be a fatal error to overlook the fact that the interests of the people of the United States, as well as the interests of other portions of humanity, are deeply involved in any plan to form a "League of Nations." Great benefits might accrue, or serious disadvantages might result from occupying a place in it. It is the

duty of the people as well as the statesmen of the nations that may enter into such a league, to consider for themselves the alleged benefits and the possible disadvantages. This has been done in Great Britain, in France, in Italy, and in Japan,—to mention only a few of the co-belligerents,—and their interests, which are different, have been carefully considered. The signs of this are evident to those who are familiar with the contemporary comments of the European press upon this subject, especially the great British quarterlies, which have discussed the "League of Nations" with a candor, a seriousness, and an understanding that have not been equaled by American periodicals of the same class, which have inclined to take the complimentary speeches of Lloyd George, Lord Grey, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Balfour as a complete and authoritative expression of British opinion, but this is far from being the case.

No discussion of the subject had been published in America to compare in amplitude of knowledge and solidity of judgment with

the treatment of it under the title "The Greatest League of Nations," by Lord Sydenham of Combe, in "The Nineteenth Century and After," for August, 1918, which concludes: "We shall not win the war by planning Leagues of Peace to meet circumstances which we cannot yet foresee. Like the paper constitutions of Siéyès they may prove impracticable; but the Holy Alliance against the forces of evil remains, and when it is crowned with victory it can be turned into a powerful agency for maintaining the peace of the world. Then, in some happier future, the vision of Isaiah may be fulfilled, and 'Nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any

Nor had anything appeared in the American periodicals so searching and so well informed as the article by J. B. Firth, under the title "The Government and the League of Nations," in "The Fortnightly Review" for September, 1918. He points out that the British Government some months before appointed "a very well chosen Committee,"

-as Mr. Balfour described it,-"on which international law and history were powerfully represented," to examine and report on a "League of Nations." "The report," he says, "has been drawn up, but its contents have not been divulged. Neither Lord Curzon nor Mr. Balfour alluded to it; they did not even say that it had been considered by the War Cabinet. By a curious coincidence the same official reticence is being observed in France. There, too, an authoritative Commission, presided over by M. Bourgeois, was appointed by the Government, and issued its report last January; but it has not been published in France, and, according to Lord Curzon, no copy of it had reached the British Government on June 26th. Why this secretiveness, both in London and Paris? If there had been practical unanimity in favor of the project there could be no reason for reserve."

There was, no doubt, however, an excellent reason for this discreet silence. It is the desire of the officials of both England and France not to wound the sensibilities of the

Americans, who are credited with being the sponsors of the "League of Nations." The British leaders, always without definition, but in a fine spirit of courtesy, took up the watchword, a "League of Nations,"-for it was so far nothing more, and Lord Curzon was able to say in the House of Lords, that opinion in England in favor of the League was "rather in advance of the opinion of any of our Allies save the United States"; and he added, that "if the British Government went ahead too quickly, or too abruptly, there was danger of a rebuff." As a confirmation of this danger, Mr. Firth remarks, that, “although the report of the French Commission has not been published, it is an open secret that its judgment was adverse to any proposal for establishing an international force which shall be always ready to enforce the decisions of the League upon a recalcitrant member.”

In an admirable historic summary, Mr. Firth illustrates with instances the tedious wrangling in the so-called Concert of Europe over the simplest and most necessary forms