two years' training in the army for her
youth; and if Germany delayed much longer,
the French army would be almost as power-
ful as the German. Across the eastern
frontler, Russia was beginning to recover
from the effects of her military defeat by
Japan in 1904-5, and, under the anxious
tutelage of both the French and the British
War Offices, was preparing an army increase
on a hitherto unapproached scale. If Ger-
many was to dominate the world, it had be-
come by 1914 a case of another successful
coup like those of 1905 and 1908, with En-
tente submission-or else war.

In the spring of 1918, Prince Lichnowsky.
German ambassador to Great Britain at
the outbreak of the war, made public
memoranda confessing that Great Britain
had steadily tried to bring about a "rap-
prochement" with Germany and to bind
the two nations in a more friendly rela-
tionship. In his statement denying many
of Prince Lichnowsky's statements, the
Foreign Minister under whom he served,
von Jagow, admitted the implication of
the diplomatic history sketched above-
namely, that Germany recognized that she
could no longer dominate Europe in peace-
ful diplomatic negotiations, and that she
could regain or even strengthen her former
position of domination only by war, or by
threat of war.

These political and diplomatic develop-
ments, however, had their roots in almost
every phase of European activity. Particu-
larly, they were made possible by the
growth of the nationalistic impulse through-
out the nineteenth century. At the close
of the Napoleonic Wars, the partition of
Europe was arranged with scant heed to the
cultural demands of various suppressed na-
tionalities. Within Austria-Hungary were
many national elements with little in com-
mon; the Balkan peninsula was a hotbed
of racial groups, with now one in the sad-
dle, now another, but with the powerful
always repressing the weaker; neither
France nor the inhabitants of Alsace-Lor-
raine could rest contented while those prov-
inces were a part of German culture; Russia
might be Slavic, but some of her elements,
for instance the Ukrainians and the Lith-
uanians, had no desire to wrap up their
destinies with those of the Great Russians;
more than one hundred years of partition
and dependence had failed to shake the
longing of the Poles for a country and a
literature of their own; and the geograph-
ical boundaries of Italy were not broad
enough to include those lands and peoples
which inherently were a part of Italian na-
tional life. Dominating all this smoulder-
ing volcano was the so-called Pan-German
movement a movement of a new and young
nation which had developed its own na-
tional life in so brilliant a fashion as
virtually to assume the leadership of the
world. but in which success had inculcated
so heedless and so unscrupulous a national
pride that Germany held itself justitied in
forcing its civilization and culture upon
all other peoples, no matter what the civil-
ization and culture of the latter and no
matter how distasteful to them might be
the German idea.

Forming the frame for this ferment of
unrestrainable forces were the industrial
needs of the last twenty-five years. The
extent to which economic competitions and
aggressions were responsible for a situation
which could make possible the outbreak of
a world war is a matter of individual opin-
ions, varying in accordance with the amount
of influence assigned economic motives in
one's philosophy of life. But it is undeni-
able that the tremendously accelerated pro-
duction due to new mechanical inventions

had made national markets no longer
adequate for the great enterprises of the
great nations, and the wealth and influence
of those nations were dependent upon the
extent of the new markets which they could
control. Preferential tariffs; colonies and
colonial expansions; access to the natural
wealth of the great undeveloped lands of
the earth, especially Africa and Siberia; the
control of the important harbors of mari-
time traffic, with their coaling facilities, and
of international waterways and canals; the
manipulation of international finance and
banking all these aspirations were the
pawns pitted against each other by the
Great Powers of Europe on their chess-
board of the world.

On June 28, 1914, the pan-Slav agitation
in Servia came to inevitable fruition with
the murder in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia,
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand the heir ap
parent to the throne of Austria-Hungary.

THE FOURTEEN DAYS.

July 23, 1914.—Austria-Hungary delivers
her expected ultimatum to Servia, making
demands of which at least two cannot be
granted without a virtual surrender of Ser-
via to Austro-Hungarian domination. It is
the first sight of the war-clouds.

July 24.-Germany supports Austria-Hun-
gary and Russia supports Servia. France
assures Russia of support. England works
for a peaceful settlement.

July 25.-Servia replies to the ultimatum
in a most conciliatory fashion, granting all
but two of the Austrian demands. Servia
begins mobilization and Russia secretly or
ders partial mobilization. Austria-Hungary
declares Servia's answer unsatisfactory.

July 27.-Germany announces that Rus-
sian mobilization will be followed by Ger-
man mobilization. Russia refuses England's
request to postpone mobilization and an-
nounces that she will not permit Servia to
be crushed. Russian mobilization begins.
The British fleet remains mobilized after
naval manoeuvres.

July 28-Austria-Hungary declares war
on Servia and proceeds with general mobili-
zation. Russia announces to Germany that
Russian mobilization will take place only
against Austria-Hungary and not against
Germany.

July 29.-Hostilities between Servia and
Austria-Hungary begin. Germany holds a
war council at Potsdam, warning that she
will mobilize unless Russian mobilization
France assures Russia of support.
England declines to promise neutrality in
case of a general European war.

ceases.

July 30.-Austria-Hungary, alarmed, be-
comes more conciliatory, and hints at ar-
bitration. Russia threatens general as well
as partial mobilization, and at midnight
carries out the threat.

July 31.-Germany replies by an ultima-
tum, demanding from Russia an agreement
within twelve hours to countermand the
Russian general mobilization. Germany asks
France what France's course will be in case
of a German-Russian war. England asks
German guarantees of respect for Belgian
neutrality, but Germany, as previously, re-
fuses to commit herself. Belgium mobilizes.

August 1.-Russia makes no reply to the
German ultimatum within the time-limit set.
Germany undertakes not to attack France
in case France will remain neutral. France
informs Germany, in reply to the ultimatum
of the previous day, that in case of a Ger-
man-Russian War, France will act as her

own interests dictate. France orders general
mobilization. Austria-Hungary is still con-
ciliatory, but the quarrel has passed out of
her hands. At 7:10 P. M., having received
по answer to her ultimatum to Russia,
Germany declares war on Russia.

August 2.-Germany demands from Bel-
gium passage-way for her troops and sends
forces into Luxemburg.

August 3.-Belgium refuses the German
demand for passage-way. England informs
Germany that violation of Belgian neutrality
will bring England into the war. Citing
alleged hostile acts by France, Germany de-
clares war on France.

August 4-German troops enter Belgium",
against Belgian resistance." England delivers
an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the
withdrawal of the German troops from Bel-
gian soil. Germany refusing, the British
ambassador demands his passports, and at
midnight England declares war on Germany.

August 5.-Austria-Hungary declares war
on Russia.

Declarations of war were made as fol-

lows:

Austria v. Belgium, August 28, 1914.
Austria v. Japan, August 27, 1914.
Austria v. Montenegro, August 9, 1914.
Austria v. Russia, August 6, 1914.
Austria v. Serbia, July 28, 1914.
Brazil v. Germany, October 26, 1917.
Bulgaria v. Serbia, October 14, 1915.
China v. Austria, August 14, 1917.
China v. Germany, August 14, 1917.
Costa Rica v. Germany, May 23, 1918.
Cuba v. Austria, December 16, 1917.
Cuba v. Germany, April 7, 1917.
France v. Austria, August 13, 1914.
France v. Bulgaria, October 16, 1915.
France v. Germany, August 3, 1914.
France v. Turkey, November 5, 1914.
Germany v. Belgium, August 4, 1914.
Germany v. France, August 3, 1914.
Germany v. Portugal, March 9, 1916.
Germany v. Rumania, September 14, 1916.
Germany v. Russia, August 1, 1914.
Great Britain v. Austria, August 13, 1914.
Great Britain v. Bulgaria, October 15,
1915.

Great Britain V. Germany, August 4,
1914.

Great Britain v. Turkey, November 5,
1914.

Greece (provisional government) v. Bul-
garia, November 28, 1916.

Greece (provisional government) v. Ger-
many, November 28, 1916.

Greece (Government of
Bulgaria, July 2, 1917.

Alexander) V.

Greece (Government of Alexander) v.
Germany, July 2, 1917.

Guatemala v. Austria, April 22, 1918.
Guatemala v. Germany, April 22, 1918.
Haiti v. Germany, July 12, 1918.
Honduras v. Germany, July 19, 1918.
Italy. Austria, May 24, 1915.
Italy v. Bulgaria, October 19, 1914.
Italy v. Germany, August 28, 1916.
Italy v. Turkey, August 21, 1915.
Japan v. Germany, August 23, 1914.
Liberia v. Germany, August 4, 1917.
Montenegro v. Austria, August 8, 1914.
Monenegro v. Germany, August 9. 1914.
Nicaragua v. Germany and her allies, may
7. 1918.

I'anama v. Austria, December 10, 1917.
Panama v. Germany, April 7, 1917.
Portugal v. Germany, November 23, 1914.
(Resolution passed authorizing military in-
tervention as ally of Great Britain.)

Portugal V. Germany, May 19, 1915.
(Military aid granted.)

Roumania v. Austria, August 27. 1916.
(Allies of Austria also consider it a declara-
tion.)

Russia v. Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.
Russia v. Turkey. November 3, 1914.
San Marino v. Austria, May 24, 1915.
Serbia v. Bulgaria, October 16, 1915.
Serbia v. Germany, August 6, 1914.
Serbia v. Turkey, December 2, 1914.
Siam v. Austria. July 21, 1917.
Siam v. Germany, July 21, 1917.
Turkey v. Allies, November 23, 1914.
Turkey v. Roumania, August 29, 1916.
United States v. Austria-Hungary.
cember 7, 1917.

United States v. Germany, April 6, 1917.
Severance of diplomatic relations has
been as follows:

Austria against Japan, August 26, 1914.
Austria against Portugal, March 16. 1916.
Austria against Serbia, July 26, 1914.
Austria against United States, April 8.
1917.
Bolivia against Germany, April 14. 1917.
Brazil against Germany, April 11, 1917.
China against Germany, March 14, 1917.
Costa Rica against Germany, September
21, 1917.

Ecuador against Germany, December 7,

1917.

At war with Germany or her allies on
June 1. 1918:

Serbia, France, Great Britain, Monte-
negro, Japan, Belgium. Italy, San Marino,
Portugal, Greece. Cuba, Panama, Siam,
Liberia, China, Brazil, Guatemala. Nica-
ragua, Costa Rica, and the United States.

The various belligerents, soon after their
respective entrances into the war. published
their own official versions of the circum-
stances which led to their participation.
These versions were in the forms of book-
lets, and were named by the color of the
covers, as follows:

Blue Books, England and Servia: Gray
Book, Belgium: Green Book. Italy; Orange,
Russia and Holland: Red, Austria-Hun-
gary: Red, White and Blue. United States;
White, Germany and Portugal; Yellow,
France.

THE GERMAN PLAN OF

CAMPAIGN.

The vastness of Russia's population com-
pelled Germany to assume the aggressive
immediately upon the outbreak of the War.
For if Russia should be unhindered in gath-
ering her vast man-power, her armies alone
would be thrice the size of the German.
Moreover, Russia lay to the east of Germany
and France to the west, so that Germany
was compelled to wage two campaigns simul-
taneously.

On the other hand, the mobilizing re-
sources of Russia were notoriously scant.
According to German calculations, it would
be six weeks or two months before the Rus-
sian army could arrive near the German
border in sufficient numbers to compel the
diversion of a great part of Germany's
strength to the east-all the more since
Austria-Hungary was counted upon to keep
busy the first armies which Russia should
be able to mobilize.

Thus the German plan was to crush
France within six weeks or two months;
then to turn her undivided strength to crush
Russia, held in check until that time by
Austria-Hungary; after which there would
be ample time to turn attention to the
British, who had adopted no policy of uni-
versal military training and who therefore
could not present an army of more than
several hundred thousand until 1915.

Of the three roads to Paris open to Ger-
many, the road via Switzerland presented
too many material difficulties to be con-
sidered. The most practicable road would
have seemed at first blush to be that through
Alsace and Lorraine. But the country in
that section was hilly and therefore both
unsuited for the rapid movement of troops
and also admirably suited for defence.
Moreover, it was from this quarter that
France had long expected attack, and along
the Alsace-Lorraine frontier France had
erected and connected the four mighty for-
tresses of Toul, Epinal, Verdun and Belfort.
The reduction of these strongholds would
immeasurably delay the German plans. Fin-
ally, there was the probability that the
Alsace-Lorraine frontier was not long enough
to avoid crowding, and hence delay, in
thrusting through it the vast hordes of men
which Germany intended to use against
France.

Therefore the road via Belgium and Lux-
emburg was chosen. Luxemburg, although
technically neutral, had no army and could
not delay the German advance. The viola-
tion of Belgian neutrality would constitute
an act of glaring international immorality,
but Germany was under the spell of that
system of thought which yields to no scru-
ples in accomplishing the task ahead of it.
Similarly, the violation of Belgian neutrality
would ensure England's entrance into the
war; but, as we have seen, England was
committed to France by a close defensive
alliance. Moreover, England had consum-
mated with France in 1912 a secret under-
standing, probably known to Germany,
whereby England was at once to go to
France's assistance in case France were at-
tacked by Germany, irrespective of the viola-
tion of Belgium's neutrality. Furthermore,
there was on the Belgian frontier but one
French fortress of strength on the road to
Paris. The country was level and admirably
suited for the rapid advance of huge bodies
of troops, even for the use of cavalry on a
large scale. Finally, for years Germany had
been constructing to the Belgian frontier a
great net-work of military railroads, which
would land the German armies almost in-
tact at the boundaries of King Albert's
kingdom.

Belgium, of course, was expected to resist
to the utmost, but the Belgian army was
weak and Germany anticipated little delay
in rolling it back to the west, beyond the
area of Germany's passage-way into France.
True, several of the Belgian fortresses lay
in that passage-way, but recent experiments
had convinced the German General Staff
that their high explosives and large caliber
guns could render even the strongest fort-
resses helpless in a short space of time.

As Germany's plan was inevitably aggres-
sive, France's plan was inevitably defensive.
She must attempt to stave off the first rush
of the German cohorts, always retreating
rather than risk surrender or encirclement,
until Russia's blows in the east could re-
lieve the pressure. If France could stave off
defeat for some months, the British man-
power also could make itself effective.

England's plan was naturally to send as
many reinforcements as possible to the as-
sistance of France and to speed the develop-
ment of an army large enough to turn the
scales of battle. In the meantime, the
British fleet would completely control the
seas and impose upon Germany a blockade
the strictness of which would tell upon
Germany's strength as the months rolled up.

Russia, as we have seen, was to mobilize
as quickly as possible. Her first armies
would have to be sent against the offensive
to be expected from Austria-Hungary to the
south; and after the pressure in the south
was relieved. Russia must hasten to form
armies on the German frontier in order to
relieve the pressure on France.

Austria-Hungary, finally, could not alto-
gether neglect the war she had started with
Servia, but obviously was to throw most of
her strength against Russia so that her ally
would not be interrupted while in the pro-
cess of annihilating France.

THE WAR, 1914

IN THE WEST

The German Advance into Belgium.-In-
stead of sending one army after another
directly toward Paris, Germany dispatched
her first forces due west across Belgium.
Thus, the first troops marching through
Belgium would reach the point farthest
west, and be ready to turn south, at the
same time that the last troops would be en-
tering Belgium, so that all the troops could
then march in practically a straight line
toward Paris. The very first troops sent
into Belgium, however, were used for the
reduction of that country. They were un-
der the command of von Emmich, and had
been mobilized within several days, whereas
the complete German mobilization was not
finished until about August 12.

The three great Belgian fortresses were
Liège, Namur and Antwerp, of which only
the first two barred the road toward France.
Antwerp being on the sea. Von Emmich
made all haste for the first of these, ar-
rived before its gates on August 5, and im-
mediately demanded its surrender. Mean-
while, the Belgian army of some 125,000
had been mobilized, portions of it were in
a position to assist Liège, and when the
German demand for surrender was peremp-
torily refused, the first great battle of the
World War opened.

The Fall of Liège and Namur.-Von Em-
mich's troops were repulsed in their attacks
on the fortress on August 5, and he was
compelled to await the arrival of his ar-
tillery on the following day. On August 6,
also, new quotas of the German army ar-
rived, flanked the city, and attacked in force
while the heavy guns demolished the forts.
On the next day, two of the strongest forts
of Liège were rendered helpless, so that the
supporting Belgian troops retired and left
further defence solely to the garrison. On
August 7, the city was occupied, the bridges
across the Meuse fell into the hands of the
invaders, the road south was thus opened,
and von Emmich went ahead with greater
deliberation, while the next German army

(the First), under von Kluck, crossed the
Meuse and proceeded on its way. Heroic re-
sistance allowed the garrison of Liège to re-
sist until August 14, when the last fort fell
before the devastating fire of the German
heavy guns. Liège had inspired the world
with the heroism of Belgium, but had not
delayed the German plans.

The next Belgian fortress to be overcome
was Namur, to the southwest of Liège, and
more strongly fortified and defended. Von
Kluck's army had marched due west, and it
was the German Second Army, under von
Bülow, which reached the Belgian lines in
front of Namur on August 18. The entire
Belgian army was stationed before the city,
but the greater size of the German forces
enabled them to flank the Belgians, and to
compel them to retire to avoid encirclement.
By August 20, the Belgian army, almost
without striking a blow, had been forced
back into Antwerp, safe, but no longer in
the path of the Germans. Meanwhile, the
withdrawal of Albert's forces allowed the
capital, Brussels, and Louvain, to fall with-
out a struggle into the hands of von Kluck's
First Army.

The Germans had learned a lesson at
Liège, and von Bülow did not attempt to
reduce Namur until his heavy guns were in
position. The bombardment opened on
August 20, and its ceaseless steel rain re-
duced the fortress to virtual impotence
within three days. On August 24, the Ger-
mans occupied the town, and on August 26,
the fortress. Namur had been counted upon
by the Allies for a more longer resistance,
and its fall within several days sadly dis-
arranged all the Allied plans, placing in dire
peril the British and French troops which
were being assembled near the French bor-
der to meet the invaders. Meantime, the
last of the German forces entering Belgium,
the German Third Army, under von Hausen,
had also crossed the frontier, and it started
south at the same time that the First and
Second Armies to the west wheeled, almost
at a right angle, and likewise started for
Paris. To the east of the Third Army, the
Fourth and Fifth Armies, under the Duke
of Württemberg and the Crown Prince, re-
spectively, crossed through Luxemburg, and
also drove south.

The German Advance through France.
Meanwhile, France seems not to have re-
alized the seriousness of the thrust through
Belgium and Luxemburg. At all events, she
concentrated most of her forces along the
Alsace-Lorraine frontier, according to pre-
arranged schedule, and even entered upon an
advance into this German territory, where
within three weeks French troops occupied
Saarburg, Mülhausen and Aitkirch, before
being driven back by the Germans. By
August 20, however, the French realized the
peril, hastily abandoned the eastern offen-
sive, and made all haste to withdraw all
their forces to the north.

The British Expeditionary Force, some
100,000 strong, had landed in France on
August 18, and by August 23 had marched
north to the Belgian border at Mons, form-
ing the extreme left of the Allied forces,
opposite the German First Army. On its
east was the French Fifth Army, under
Lanrezac, just below Namur, joined to the
British at Charleroi, and facing the German
Second Army. But further to the east, the
German Third Army was driving ahead un-
opposed, since the French Fourth Army to
the east was fully occupied with the German
Fourth Army.

When the Battle of Mons-Charleroi opened,
therefore, on August 23, the right flank of

the French Fifth Army had to be extended
beyond the safety point, to prevent flanking
movements by the German Third Army. The
German Second Army thus had little dim-
culty in driving back the French center and
left, so that the French had to retreat, leav-
ing the British right flank exposed.

The British had resisted stubbornly at
Mons, although steadily driven back by the
superior numbers of the German First
Army, until they learned that the French
had retreated and that a German corps was
swinging into position in their rear. A pre-
cipitate retreat was therefore ordered,
which compelled a further French retreat,
and for ten days the British were mercilessly
driven helter-skelter back upon Paris by the
alternate hammer-blows of first the German
First and then the German Second Army.
It was a complete rout, cutting down the
British forces to about half their strength,
breaking up their formation, and resulting
in complete exhaustion but in an almost
miraculous escape from utter destruction.
The French Fifth Army likewise retreated
precipitately, although preserving a better
semblance of order, and punishing the enemy
in some rear-guard engagements, notably at
Guise and St. Quentin. All this time, the
French commander-in-chief, Joffre, was fran-
tically rushing up reinforcements from the
Alsace-Lorraine frontier, but the withdrawal
of the British and of Lanrezac had com-
pelled the withdrawal, although in good
order, of all the French forces west of Ver-
dun, comprising the French Fourth and
Third Armies.

It seemed as though the German plan of
campaign was bearing fruit and that only
complete disaster lay ahead of the Allies.
For it was not until September 3 that the
British were able to rally sufficiently to
offer resistance once more and that the
French reinforcements were able to join the
Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies in full
strength; and by that time the Germans had
advanced more than one hundred miles into
French territory and were as far south as
Paris itself.

(In

Battle of the Marne.-The retreat of the
British and of the French Fifth Army had
left Paris exposed to capture, since there
was not sufficient time to station north of
Paris the troops diverted by Joffre from the
Alsace-Lorraine frontier, and they could be
placed only to the east of the French capital.
But the German General Staff rightly placed
the capture of the Allied army above the
capture of Paris, and von Kluck swerved in
front of the city, which he could readily
have taken, and passed southeast of it.
the meantime, the seat of the French Gov-
ernment had been removed to Bordeaux.)
Thus on September 4, when the Allies were
at last ready to cease retreating and to give
battle, the opposing forces were facing each
other south of the Marne River and north
of the Seine. It must not be forgotten that
the Battle of the Marne thus took place
along a line between Paris and Verdun, run-
ning to the south and east of Paris. For the
four great French fortresses on the Alsace-
Lorraine frontier had held, and the German
Sixth and Seventh Armies had not been able
to break through to aid the five armies
which had advanced west of Verdun.

To some extent, the reinforcements gath-
ered by Joffre had been added to the French
armies previously formed. But most of them
went into the formation of a new army, the
French Seventh Army, stationed just north
of the Seine between the French Fifth and
Fourth Armies, and placed under the com
mand of General Ferdinand Foch. However,

the French formed more than one new army.
By troops rushed up from their African
possessions and by members of the Paris
garrison, another army, the French Sixth
Army, was organized in Paris, was placed
under General Manoury, and, when Joffre at
last ordered a general advance on September
5, was marched out to attack the German
First Army on its western flank.

Von Kluck had anticipated something of
a move against his right wing, and, as he
swung below Paris to pursue the fast-re-
treating British, he had left one army corps
along the Ourcq River, around Meaux, north-
east of Paris. But Manoury greatly out-
numbered this single corps, completely de-
feated it, put it to rout on September 5, and
on September 6 made for von Kluck's rear.

Only one road then lay open to von Kluck.
To avoid being taken in the rear and thus
disrupting the entire German line, he clev-
erly turned in a complete circle and retraced
his steps in order to drive Manoury back.
Indeed, on September 7 and 8, von Kluck
arrived in force opposite Manoury and easily
crushed the new French army, threatening
to hurl it back into Paris, whence it had
started. But this retirement cf von Kluck
back to the northwest compelled a shift in
the entire German line; for if it had re
mained stationary, a serious gap would have
come into existence between von Kluck and
the German Second Army on his right.
Therefore, the Second Army also shifted to
the west, leaving a gap in the German lines
between the Second and the Third Armies.
And when von Kluck fell upon Manoury, the
German Third Army, instead of also shift-
ing to the west to close the gap, attacked
in force the French Seventh Army under
Foch, in the hope of breaking the center of
the French line.

But the westward shift of the German
Second Army allowed the French Fifth
Army, facing it, to send some reinforcements
to Foch, who on September 7, 8 and 9 was
being steadily driven back. And it was these
reinforcements which suddenly turned the
tide of battle and miraculously saved
France. For Foch's uncanny penetration
showed him a weak point in the east wing
of the German army which was driving him
back, and on the afternoon of September 9
he hurled his reinforcements at this
Achille's heel of Germany's armor.

The fresh French troops cut through the
east wing of the German Third Army as a
knife cuts through cheese, and in several
hours the entire German Third Army was
being flanked on its left. At the same time,
Foch attacked it in the center, so that von
Hausen could not send reinforcements to
his bending left. Before midnight on Sep-
tember 9, the entire German Third Army.
holding the center of the German line, bad
been driven back and Foch was pouring his
troops into the hole thus opened up.

On September 10, Foch turned to the west
and threatened to flank the German Second
and First Armies. The latter had not only
to protect themselves, but also to lend as-
sistance to von Hausen, in order to enable
him to retreat in good order; and thus they
were in no position to withstand a further
attack, especially since by this time the
British had once more become effective and
were streaming through the gap left when
the German Second Army shifted to the west
and the German Third Army remained sta-
tionary to attack Foch. Von Hausen, there-
fore, was compelled overnight to call off his
drive upon Manoury, and when September
10 dawned, the German armies were in full

Con-

Battle of the Aisne.-The Aisne River is
a sluggish canalized river about 170 miles
long flowing generally westward into the Oise
through a valley from half a mile to two
miles wide between plateaus 400 feet high
on each side. While on the drive to Paris the
Germans had prepared a strong position on
the northern plateau upon which to make
a stand in case of possible retreat.
crete platforms had been built for heavy
guns, and commodious trenches with over-
head protection against shrapnel had been
constructed for the infantry. The right of
the position rested on the Noyon Hills west
of the Oise, north of its junction with the
Aisne. From this point the line ran east
along the Aisne about forty miles and then
Four
south by east by Reims to Verdun.
railways ran back from this position into
Belgium and a fifth ran east and west at a
convenient distance in the rear of the
lines. The German retreat abruptly halted
Sept. 12 at Soissons, where the river is
about sixty yards wide. Here the armies
were deadlocked from the Noyon Hills to
the Swiss frontier. The allies sent
forces to turn the German right and strike
the railways in their rear, but each expe-
dition resulted only in a pitched battle and
the extension of the German lines north-
ward. By Oct. 7, the 25th day of the
fighting along the Aisne, the lines had been
prolonged to La Bassee, ten miles from the
Belgian frontier, and the net result of the
fighting after ten months was the exten-
sion of the lines from the confluence of the
Aisne and Oise rivers into Flanders and
as close to the English Channel coast as
operations of the British navy would per-
mit. This line was roughly marked by the
towns of Vermelles, Armentieres, Ypres,
Bixshoote and Dixmude, which became the
French reserve
scenes of fierce struggles.

out

troops, detachments from the French active
army, the British expeditionary force, Brit-
Ish Indians, Senegalese, and Turcos went to
make up the prolongation of the allies' front.

On the southeast end of the German line
the Crown Prince in September sent out
several army corps to cut the line south
of Verdun, but only succeeded in reaching
St. Mihiel, which during the first half of
1915 continued to be a starting point for
aggressive movements.