control those evil moral qualities, to which this creature "man" is liable, when invested with power! The latter is that law enacted to control the vices of man in his private capacity. If the former species of law should be suffered to remain unchanged, the ef fects would be the same, as if the latter should remain unchanged. Both, unaltered, would be evaded by the ingenuity, avarice and ambition of public man, as well as private man. And therefore, it is as necessary for the preservation of liberty, that constitutions or political law, should be amended from time to time, in order to preserve liberty against the avarice and ambition of men in power, by meeting and controlling their artifices; as it is occasionally to amend municipal law, for the preservation of property against the vicious practices of men not in power.

To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately advanced, namely, that the substance of a constitution may be effectually destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates it. The government of that country took its present form in the thirteenth century; but its aspect, in substance, has been extremely different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking time to mark the changes, in substance, which have taken place under the form of kings, lords and commons, it will suffice to cast our eyes upon the present state of that government. What are now its chief and substantial energies? Armies, debt, executive patronage, penal laws and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance of the English monarchy; to the ancient English monarchy they were unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses; for, whether these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change of administration, these abuses proceeded. The outs were clamorous for preserving the constitution, as they called it; for though divorced from its administration, the hope of getting in,

again caused them to maintain abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified upon the next turn of the wheel; just as in Prussia, where divorces are common, nothing is more usual than for late husbands to affect a violent passion for a former wife, if she carried off from him a good estate! And the ins, fearing the national jealousy, and the prepossession against amending the form of government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies, brought no relief to the nation. So that, under every change of men, abuses proceeded.

The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft, similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their religious liberty, by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol; in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure; and when that fraud was detected, a metaphysical idol in the shape of a tenet or dogma, was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects, because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to excite the same species of idolatry and superstition, for the same reason, namely, to conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at others, a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one, the former "grand monarch of France;" of the other, the present "church and state" tenet of England, is an evidence. And if our constitution is to be made like the "church and state" tenet of England; a metaphysical, political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of saving both that and the national liberty; and if, like that tenet, it is to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men, for its substantial destruction; it is not hard to imagine that it, also, may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes they are forever assuming. A constitution may allegorically be considered as a

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temple for the preservation of the treasure of liberty. Around it, may be posted one, two or three, or more sentinels; but unless these sentinels are themselves watched by the people, and unless the injuries they are frequently committing upon the temple, are diligently repaid, such is the nature of man in power, that the very sentinels themselves have invariably broken into the temple, and conveyed away the treasure. And this because of the delusion inspired by political idolatry, which forbids nations to meet abuses by amending their governments or constitutions; and teaches them, that municipal law alone will suffice for their happiness.

Permit me, sir, to illustrate this argument by declaring how I would proceed, if such was my design, to destroy the constitution of the United States; premising that I speak prospectively and not retrospectively. I would have recourse to those very energies which constitute the English monarchy; armies, debt, executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. I would endeavor, by these monarchical energies, to produce the same effects as in England; and I would hide my intentions by exciting a fanatical adoration for the constitution, which I would endeavor to make a metaphysical idol; and which I would myself adore-in order to destroy. Whilst I pretended to be its devotee, it should become my screen.

This, sir, will be the consequence, if the people of the United States should become jealous of amending the constitution; and therefore this species of jealousy, so industriously attempted to be excited, is calculated, if it could operate, to bring upon them the utmost calamity. Abuses of a political system will happen; and amendments only can meet abuses. Public opinion, and not an idolatrous tenet, is the element of our policy; and however the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Pickering,) may deride the opinion of the people, it is the element in which our policy is rooted, and which can at all times be safely intrusted with moulding their form of government.

[Mr. Pickering here explained.]

Sir, I quote gentlemen's ideas and not their words; is it not true that the gentleman ridiculed a recommendation of this very amendment, even from a state legislature, because of some grammatical inaccuracy; and that he reasoned against the possibility of knowing what the public opinion was? And yet, however inaccurately it may be expressed, that gentleman certainly has had sufficient evidence to convince him, that public opinion is really a noun substantive.

It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as if they supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of this amendment, is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a vice president. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment; and the other (as to which I have heretofore expressed my sentiments,) is to enable the electors, by perfecting the election of a President, to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the constitution, in all cases wherein it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that principle to act by majorities? Did the constitution intend that any minor faction should elect a vice president? If not, then an amendment to prevent it, accords with, and is preservative of the constitution. Permit me here again to illustrate by an historical case. England, in the time of Charles the second, was divided into two parties; protestants and papists; and the heir to the throne was a papist. The protestants, constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion bill; but it was defeated, and the minor papist faction, in the person of the duke of York, got possession of executive power. The consequences were, domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally, for almost a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation has been ever since groaning, and under which the government will finally expire.

Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James II. from executive power, the English would have escaped all these calamities. Such precisely may be our case. I beg again that it may be understood, that in this application, I speak prospectively, and not retrospectively.

But it is far from being improbable, that in place of these religious parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may at some future day, see our country divided into a republican party and a monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the constitution, that a minor monarchical faction, should, by any means, acquire the power of electing a vice president; the possible successor to executive power? Ought a republican majority to stake the national liberty upon the frail life of one man? Will not a monarchical executive, overturn the system of a republican executive? And ought the United States to shut their eyes upon this possible danger, until the case shall happen, when it may be too late to open them?'

Sir, let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have suffered, from the cause of investing executive power in a man, hostile to the national opinion; and avoid them. They suffered, because their exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority, which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles from executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.

Shall we, sir, be so injudicious, as to make election destroy the principle of election, by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a vice president? Shall we make election, invented to exclude monarchy, a handmaid for its introduction? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day assailing our republican