for one moment have listened to it? They were not madmen. They had not taken degrees at the hospital of idiocy. They knew the nature of man and the effect of his combinations in political societies. They knew that when the weight of particular sections of a confederacy was greatly unequal, the resulting power would be abused: that it was not in the nature of man to exercise it with moderation. The very extravagance of the intended use, is a conclusive evidence against the possibility of the grant of such a power, as is here proposed. Why, sir, I have already heard of six states, and some say there will be, at no great distance of time, more.. I have also heard, that the mouth of the Ohio will be far to the east of the centre of the contemplated empire. If the bill is passed, the principle is recognized. All the rest are mere questions of expediency. It is impossible such a power could be granted. It was not for these men that our fathers fought. It was not for them this constitution was adopted. You have no authority to throw the rights and liberties and property of this people into "hotchpot" with the wild men on the Missouri, nor with the mixed, though more respectable race of Anglo-Hispano-Gallo Americans, who bask on the sands, in the mouth of the Mississippi. I make no objection to these from their want of moral qualities, or political light. The inhabitants of New Orleans are, I suppose, like those of all other countries, some good, some bad, some indifferent.

As then the power in this bill, proposed to be usurped, is neither to be drawn from the general nature of the instrument, nor from the clause just examined, it follows, that if it exist anywhere, it must result from the treaty-making power. This the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Rhea,) asserts. But the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) denies, and very justly; for what a monstrous position is this, that the treaty-making power has the competency to change the fundamental relations of the constitution itself!

That a power under the constitution should have the ability to change and annihilate the instrument, from which it derives all its power. And if the treaty-making power can introduce new partners to the political rights of the states, there is no length, however extravagant, or inconsistent with the end, to which it may not be wrested. The present President of the United States, when a member of the Virginia convention for adopting the constitution, expressly declares, that the treaty-making power has limitations; and he states this as one," that it cannot alienate any essential right." Now, is not here an essential right to be alienated?-the right to that proportion of political power, which the constitution has secured to every state, modified only by such internal increase of states, as the existing limits of the territories, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, permitted. The debates of that period chiefly turned upon the competency of this power to bargain away any of the old states. It was agreed, at that time, that, by this power, old states, within the ancient limits, could not be sold from us. And I maintain, that by it, new states, without the ancient limits, cannot be saddled upon us. It was agreed, at that time, that the treatymaking power "could not cut off a limb." And I maintain, that neither has it the competency to clap a hump upon our shoulders. The fair proportions, devised by the constitution, are, in both cases, marred; and the fate and felicity of the political being, in material particulars, related to the essence of his constitution, affected. It was never pretended by the most enthusiastic advocates for the extent of the treatymaking power, that it exceeded that of the king of Great Britain. Yet I ask, suppose that monarch should make a treaty stipulating that Hanover or Hindostan, should have a right of representation on the floor of parliament; would such a treaty be binding? No, sir, not as I believe, if a house of commons and of lords could be found venal enough to agree to

it. But, although in that country, the three branches of its legislature are called omnipotent, and the people might not deem themselves justified in resistance, yet here there is no apology of this kind. The limits of our power are distinctly marked, and when the three branches of this government usurp upon this constitution, in particulars, vital to the liberties of this people, the deed is at their peril.

I have done with the constitutional argument. Whether I have been able to convince any member of this House, I am ignorant, I had almost said, indifferent. But this I will not say, because I am, indeed, deeply anxious to prevent the passage of this bill. Of this I am certain, however, that, when the dissensions of this day are passed away, when party spirit shall no longer prevent the people of the United States from looking at the principle assumed in it, independent of gross and deceptive attachments and antipathies, the ground, here defended, will be acknowledged as a high constitutional bulwark, and the principles here advanced will be appreciated.

I will add one word, touching the situation of New Orleans. The provision of the treaty of 1803, which stipulates, that it shall be "admitted as soon as possible," does not therefore imply a violation of the constitution. There are ways, in which this may constitutionally be effected, by an amendment of the constitution; or by reference to conventions of the people, in the states. And I do suppose, that, in relation to the objects of the present bill, (the people of New Orleans,) no great difficulty would arise. Considered as an important accommodation to the western states, there would be no violent objection to the measure. But this would not answer all the projects, to which the principle of this bill, when once admitted, leads, and is intended to be applied. The whole extent of Louisiana is to be cut up into independent states; to counterbalance and to paralyze, whatever there is of influence in other quarters of the Union.

Such a power, I am well aware, the people of the states would never grant you. And, therefore, if you get it, the only way is, by the mode adopted in this bill -by usurpation.

The objection here urged is not a new one. I refer with great delicacy to the course pursued by any member of the other branch of the legislature; yet I have it from such authority that I have an entire belief of the fact, that our present minister in Russia, then a member of that body, when the Louisiana treaty was under the consideration of the senate, although he was in favor of the treaty, yet expressed great doubts on the ground of constitutionality, in relation to our control over the destinies of that people, and the manner and the principles, on which they could be admitted into the union. And it does appear, that he made two several motions in that body, having for their object, as avowed, and as gathered from their nature, an alteration in the constitution to enable us to comply with the stipulations of that convention.

I will add only a few words, in relation to the moral and political consequences of usurping this power. I have said that it would be a virtual dissolution of the Union; and gentlemen express great sensibility at the expression. But the true source of terror is not the declaration I have made, but the deed you propose. Is there a moral principle of public law better settled, or more conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership, after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more, in the political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils! Again; it is settled as a principle of morality,

among writers on public law, that no person can be obliged, beyond his intent, at the time of the contract. Now who believes, who dare assert, that it was the intention of the people, when they adopted this constitution, to assign, eventually, to New Orleans' and Louisiana, a portion of their political power; and to invest all the people, those extensive regions might hereafter contain, with an authority over themselves and their descendants? When you throw the weight of Louisiana into the scale, you destroy the political equipoise, contemplated at the time of forming the contract. Can any man venture to affirm, that the people did intend such a comprehension as you now, by construction, give it? Or can it be concealed, that beyond its fair and acknowledged intent, such a compact has no moral force? If gentlemen are so alarmed at the bare mention of the consequences, let them abandon a measure, which, sooner or later, will produce them. How long before the seeds of discontent will ripen, no man can foretell. But, it is the part of wisdom not to multiply or scatter them. Do you suppose the people of the northern and Atlantic states will, or ought to look on with patience and see representatives and senators, from the Red River and Missouri, pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a sea-board fifteen hundred miles, at least, from their residence; and having a preponderancy in councils, into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted? have no hesitation upon this point. They neither will see it, nor ought to see it, with content. It is the part of a wise man to foresee danger and to hide himself. This great usurpation, which creeps into this House, under the plausible appearance of giving content to that important point, New Orleans, starts up a gigantic power to control the nation. Upon the actual condition of things, there is, there can be, no need of concealment. It is apparent to the blindest vision. By the course of nature, and conformable to the acknow

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