Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U.S. Noyes, Intercor. Rel. §§ 135, 170, 172; Rev. Stat. Ill. ch. 114, §§ 44, 45 (Hurd's ed.); ch. 114, Rev. Stat. of Ill. § 29; Evans v. City of Chicago, 24 Illinois, 52; Rev. Stat. Ill. ch. 32; Rev. Stat. Ill. ch. 120, §§ 32, 40; People ex rel. v. Chicago Gas Trust, 130 Illinois, 268, 285; Oregon Railroad Co. v. Oregonian R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 1; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 199 Illinois, 484; Cox v. Terre Haute & I. R. R., 133 Fed. Rep. 371, 374. Mr. Brainard Tolles, Mr. John S. Miller and Mr. John G. Johnson, with whom Mr. Joseph S. Auerbach, Mr. W. W. Gurley, Mr. John P. Wilson and Mr. John J. Herrick were on the briefs, for the receivers and the railway corporations: The Circuit Court has jurisdiction of the controversies presented by these bills. The jurisdiction of the court herein must be determined alone from the record of these cases in equity, now here on appeal. The transcripts of the record of the suits at law in which the judgments were recovered, which were the basis of the creditors' bills in which the receivers were appointed, are no part of the transcript of record here. Nor are the transcripts of record of such creditors' suits. Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 111 U. S. 505, 522; Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 642, 645; Richardson v. Loree, 94 Fed, Rep. 375, 379. They are records of other suits than those before the court on these appeals. Neither of them can be looked into in order to defeat the jurisdiction of the court below to enter these decrees; although there is authority that they might be offered in evidence here, if necessary, in order to sustain the decrees. Wines v. Mayor, 70 N. Y. 613, 614; Stillwell v. Carpenter, 62 N. Y. 639. The declarations in each case showed that promissory notes were delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant bearing the indorsement of the assistant treasurer of the maker, and that the money was advanced to the defendant by the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff held the notes as first taker, and not as an assignee. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to render judg 201 U.S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. ment on the notes was clear. Wachusett Nat'l Bank v. Sioux City Stove Works, 56 Fed. Rep. 321; Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 150; Bank of British North America v. Barling, 46 Fed. Rep. 357. The notes were made payable to the order of the makers and by them indorsed, as held by this court in Falk v. Moebs, 127 U. S. 597. And that question is one of general commercial law on which that decision is conclusive and not of Illinois law as conceived by counsel for the city of Chicago. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20; Independent Dist. v. Rea, 111 Fed. Rep. 1; Peck v. Central Vt. R. R., 79 Fed. Rep. 590; Phipp v. Harding, 70 Fed. Rep. 468; Windsor Bank v. McMahon, 38 Fed. Rep. 283; Bank v. Board, 90 Fed. Rep. 7. In any event, the common counts in the declaration for money loaned and advanced to the defendant, and upon an account stated, etc., showed a controversy within the jurisdiction of the court, and it must be presumed that these counts were sustained by proof. Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Wolcott v. Coleman, 2 Connecticut, 324; Bunyea v. Metropolitan R. Co., 19 D. C. App. 76; Harvey v. Laflin, 2 Indiana, 477. Again, this attack on the judgments is a collateral attack, and cannot be made. Every intendment is made in their favor. Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280, 285; Van Fleet, Collateral Attack, 88 12, 829. The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the creditors' bills brought for the collection of these judgments rested upon the ground that said bills were brought for the collection of judgments at law rendered by said Circuit Court of the United States, and upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. That jurisdiction cannot be here collaterally questioned. Re Cuddy, 131 U. S. 280, 285; Commercial Bank v. Burch, 141 Illinois, 519; St. Paul Trust Co. v. St. P. Pub. Co., 60 Minnesota, 105; Cap. City Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 172 Pa. St. 91. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to entertain the bills upon which the present decrees were rendered was dependent upon three grounds: The fact that the subject matter of the Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U. S. controversy was in the actual possession of receivers appointed by the Circuit Court of the United States. The fact that the purpose of the action was to aid in the collection of judgments at law by preserving certain assets properly applicable to the satisfaction of said judgments, and by establishing and quieting the title of the receivers to property of which they were in possession or with which they were vested, and which it might become necessary to sell in the course of a complete administration of the property of said corporation defendants for the benefit of their creditors. The fact that the ground of action was the attempted impairment of the obligation of a contract by the ordinances, resolutions and legislative aets of the defendant, acting through its common council, and the imminent danger of further action in the same direction with still more destructive consequences. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131; Morgan's Company v. Texas Central Ry., 137 U. S. 171; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47; White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36; Pope v. Louisville &c. Ry., 173 U. S. 570; Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 618; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506; Armstrong v. Trautman, 39 Fed. Rep. 275; Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. Rep. 263; S. C., 15 C. C. A. 397; Lanning v. Osborne, 79 Fed. Rep. 657, 662; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 Fed. Rep. 497, 505; S. C., 36 C. C. A. 155; Davis v. Martin, 113 Fed. Rep. 6, 9; S. C., 51 C. C. A. 27. A Federal question was presented. Vicksburg Water Works Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65. It makes no difference whether the repudiation by the city was legislative or administrative in its character-by ordinance or resolution. Walla Walla v. Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; American Waterworks &c. Co. v. Water Co., 115 Fed. Rep. 171; Riverside &c. Ry. Co. v. Riverside, 118 Fed. Rep. 736. The jurisdiction in these actions cannot be impaired by collateral attacks on the judgments at law. Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280; Cutler v. Huston, 158 U. S. 423; Dowell v. Ap 201 U.S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. plegate, 152 U. S. 327; W. B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 Fed. Rep. 417. There was no collusion in bringing the suit. The only possible subject of collusion was in the choice of tribunals as between the courts of Illinois and the courts of the United States. "Collusion" can not be predicated of such choice. The right to make a choice was one given to the complainant by the Constitution and laws of the United States, without restriction as to motive. There being a real debt and a real diversity of citizenship, the motive of the creditor in bringing the suit is not a matter of inquiry in this court. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 310; Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 190; Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 336; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585; Cheaver v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 123; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 216. See also Sage v. Memphis &c. R. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 571. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction to render a decree protecting the possession and quieting the title of the receivers. The whole attitude of the municipal authorities was calculated to lead irresponsible persons to take the law into their own hands. It needed only some overt and conspicuous official act, like the notice from the Commissioner of Streets, to turn loose forces of chaos and destruction. The Mayor had by his public declarations and messages, made police protection a political impossibility. That a court of equity has power to give relief against such an intolerable condition of affairs is clear. In holding that equity will give such relief, this court has shown no disposition to be restrained within the narrow limits of ancient precedents. Cases of this kind are sui generis and constitute a striking instance of the adaptability of equitable remedies to new conditions. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Waterworks Co., 172 U: S. 1, 12; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, 581; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co., 184 U. S. 368, 379; Vicksburg Water Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. $. 65; Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co., 194 U. S. 517, 531. VOL. CCI-28 Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U.S. The existence of a cloud upon title is one of the irreparable injuries of which the complainants complain and against which it is the duty of a court of equity to give relief. Where the cloud complained of is serious and substantial and occasions irreparable injury, relief is not limited to cases where there is an apparently valid lien or title outstanding. Vicksburg Water Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65; American Waterworks &c. Co. v. Horn Water Co., 115 Fed. Rep. 171; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368. This is not only a principle of general equitable jurisprudence, but a part of the local law of Illinois. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Illinois, 9; Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, 138 Fed. Rep. 209; Monson v. Kill, 144 Illinois, 248. It is a maxim of equity that the court having once obtained jurisdiction over a subject matter, will proceed to a complete determination of the entire controversy between the parties relating to such subject matter. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 52; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264. The removal of a cloud from the title was within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court because it was essential to an intelligent administration of the property and to the full development of its public usefulness during the time that it should remain under the control of the court; and also to protect its value from unlawful impairment in case a sale should become necessary. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Connor v. Alligator Lumber Co., 98 Fed. Rep. 155; Lanning v. Osborne, 79 Fed. Rep. 657; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 181; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 49. It was no objection that complainants' title is an estate for years and not in fee. Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 22 Fed. Rep. 865; McKee v. Howe, 17 Colorado, 538; 31 Pac. Rep. 115; Pennie v. Hildreth, 81 California, 127, 130; City of Newport v. Taylor's Ex'rs, 55 Kentucky, 669. The city's claim of a right to purchase was a cloud on title. The claim of an outstanding option of purchase, unaccom |