Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U. S. In giving effect to the act of 1865, the only principles of interpretation are those applicable to any statute in which there is a plain declaration of the legislative purpose about a matter clearly within the competency of the legislature to decide. City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Illinois, 626; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1; Fry v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., 73 Illinois, 399; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Illinois, 34; Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Downey, 127 Illinois, 201; Steere v. Bromwell, 124 Illinois, 27; McGann v. The People, 97 Ill. App. 591. It is a cardinal principle of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to all the words of the statute. Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; Decker v. Hughes, 68 Illinois, 33, 41; Attorney General v. Plank Road, 2 Michigan, 139; Opinion of Justices, 22 Pick. 571; Nichols v. Wells, 2 Kentucky, 255; Leversee v. Reynolds, 13 Iowa, 310. The words "during the life hereof" mean "during the continuance or existence of this statute as an amendatory act." Benham v. Minor, 33 Connecticut, 252. A section of a statute has or can have no life except as a part of the whole statute. It has no force or meaning or significance apart from the enacting clause. Wheeler v. Chubbock, 16 Illinois, 361; Burritt v. State Contracts Comm'rs, 120 Illinois, 322; In re Seat of Government, 1 Wash. T. 115; State v. Patterson, 98 N. Car. 660. No "life" can be predicated of any part of a statute, but only of the statute as a whole. The words "hereof," "herein," or "hereby," in an original statute, refer to the act itself; in an amendatory statute they refer to the original act as amended. Lane v. Kolb, 92 Alabama, 636; Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Illinois, 161; McKibbin v. Lester, 9 Ohio St. 628; Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595. The suggested difficulty as to the words "as made or amended" is equally devoid of substance. The word "as" may express either similarity, identity or simultaneity. It may relate to form, manner or time. Its use in the latter significance is well established and frequently recognized. Seibert's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 500. 201 U. S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. The rule is always applicable that the legislature is presumed to legislate for the future, not for the past. For this reason courts are reluctant to give statutes a retrospective operation. White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545. This rule has been frequently recognized by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Cleary v. Hoobler, 207 Illinois, 97. Particularly is this principle applicable to a statute which expresses a general principle, as is here done by the words "all contracts," etc. To lay down a general rule and then to exclude from its operation all future cases, would be verging upon absurdity. City Railway Co. v. Citizens' Railroad Co., 166 U. S. 565. So firmly established is this rule of construction that the courts in many cases have construed statutes prospectively, even where the legislature had apparently confined its language with intention to the past or present tense. Amsbry v. Hinds, 48 N. Y. 57; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328; Railroad Co. v. Blackman, 63 Illinois, 117; People v. Hinrichsen, 161 Illinois, 223; Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532. The term "horse railway" is not used in the acts in the zoological sense, but in the popular sense as distinguishing such railways from steam roads. Words in a statute which are not technical are to be taken in their common or popular acceptation, unless some special reason exists for giving them a strict interpretation. City of Chicago v. Evans, 24 Illinois, 52; State v. Bridgewater Township, 49 N. J. L. 614; Gross v. Fowler, 21 California, 393; Schriefer v. Wood, 5 Blatchf. 215; File Sharpening Co. v. Parsons, 54 Connecticut, 310; Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251. This principle has been held to apply with peculiar force to the titles of legislative acts. Enterprise v. Smith, 62 Kansas, 815; West Plains Township v. Sage, 69 Fed. Rep. 943, 950; Little v. State, 60 Nebraska, 749. The motive power to be used by a street railway is peculiarly a subject for regulation, from time to time, by the police power of the State. The courts will not attribute to the legislature an intention to abridge or limit the police power by a Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U.S. corporate charter, even assuming that such a limitation is possible. Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 665. See as to popular significance of the term "horse railway," Omaha Horse Railway Co. v. Cable Tramway Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 324, and Paterson Ry. Co. v. Grundy, 51 N. J. Eq. 213. In Illinois steam railroads impose an additional servitude on the highway while horse railroads do not. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. West Chicago Street R. Co., 156 Illinois, 255; Railroad Co. v. Hartley, 67 Illinois, 439; Bond v. Pennsylvania Co., 171 Illinois, 508. Neither are electric railways a burden. Cases supra. The conclusion so reached was in accord with the great weight of authority in other States. Taggart v. Newport Street Railway Co., 16 R. I. 669; Halsey v. Rapid Transit Street Railway Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380; Detroit City Railway Co. v. Mills, 85 Michigan, 634; Koch v. North Avenue R. Co., 75 Maryland, 222; Buffalo &c. R. Co. v. Du Bois Passenger R. Co., 149 Pa. St. 1; Baker v. Selma Street &c. R. Co., 130 Alabama, 474; State ex rel. Howard v. Hartford Street R. Co., 76 Connecticut, 174. In regard to cable railways the decisions, while less numerous, are to the same effect. Tuebner v. California St. R. Co., 66 California, 171; Lorie v. North Chicago City R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 270. . The term "horse railway," as used in the charter of the city, has been construed includes railways operated by electricity. Harvey v. Aurora and Geneva R. Co., 174 Illinois, 299; S. C., 186 Illinois, 290. The act of 1865 applied to the North Chicago City Railway Company in the same manner and with the same effect as to the other two companies referred to in the first and second sections of the act. By all principles of statutory construction such an amendment as is contained in the act of 1865 amends all parts of the act to which it has reference, and from the time of the amendment, the former act is to be read as if it had originally been in the form fixed by the amendment. Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Illinois, 161, 163; Farrell v. State, 54 N. J. L. 423; Dexter &c. 201 U. S. Argument for the Railway Corporations. Co. v. Allen, 16 Barb. 15; Drew v. West Orange, 64 N. J. L. 483; McKibbin v. Lester, 9 Ohio St. 627; Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595. The city has no standing to question the rulings of the Circuit Court in regard to the validity of the leases under which the complainant receivers derived title to the franchises. There are executed contracts and whether ultra vires or not titles have passed under them. Such a conveyance or lease of real or personal property, including notes and other choses in action, like a conveyance or transfer to a corporation in excess of its powers, is not absolutely void, but voidable, and passes the title, and no one can object thereto save the sovereign and, under certain conditions, the stockholders of the company. National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; Swope v. Leffingwell, 105 U. S. 3; Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282; City of Spokane v. Trustees, 60 Pac. Rep. (Wash.) 141; Mallett v. Simpson, 94 N. Car. 37; Fayette Land Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 93 Virginia, 274; The Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136; Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Nebraska, 192; Barnes v. Suddard, 117 Illinois, 237; Lancaster v. A. I. Co., 140 N. Y. 576; Houston &c. R. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Texas, 125; Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer, 8 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 151. The act of 1865 had the effect of postponing for the extended corporate life of the Chicago West Division Railway Company the provision made by the ordinance of August 16, 1858, for terminating its occupation of certain streets, through purchase of its property by the city. A state legislature with respect to municipal corporations has unlimited power to pass any legislation not expressly prohibited by state or Federal constitutions, and thereby to divest them of property rights and franchises conferred by the legislature and unexecuted by the city at the date of the subsequent legislation, provided only that in the case of property held upon specific trusts, the spirit and purpose of the trust be preserved. Simon v. Northup, 27 Oregon, 487; Coyle v. McIn Argument for the Railway Corporations. 201 U. S. tire, 30 Atl. Rep. 728; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231. They can have no property rights or franchises of their own in the sense in which those words are applicable to individuals, although they may represent as trustees private rights and interests which the legislature cannot impair or destroy. Ashby v. Hall, 119 U. S. 526. As applicable to many of these points, see Potter v. Collis, 19 App. Div. N. Y. 392. The city was bound to purchase, or provide a purchaser for, the tracks, cars, carriages, implements and appurtenances used in the operation of certain lines of railway of the Chicago West Division Railway Company before taking any steps to cause a discontinuance of the operation of said lines of railway by the company, its successors or assigns. The city is not entitled to possession until payment is made. National Water Works Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. Rep. 853; Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 103 Fed. Rep. 711, 734. In accordance with the spirit of these decisions are those cases which hold that when a lessor has covenanted to pay at the end of the term for improvements made by the lessee upon the demised property, the lessee, upon breach of such covenant, may remain in possession until he receives payment. Franklin Land Co. v. Card, 84 Maine, 528; Hopkins v. Gehnan, 22 Wisconsin, 476; S. C., 47 Wisconsin, 581; Mullen v. Pugh, 16 Ind. App. 337; Van Rensselaer v. Penniman, 6 Wend. 569. The lines of the Chicago West Division Railway Company on Ogden avenue from Randolph street to Madison street, and on Randolph street from State street to Wabash avenue, were constructed with the consent and authority of the common council of the city, and as to such lines the Chicago West Division Railway Company and its lessees are vested with an unimpeachable right to maintain the same during the period prescribed by the act of 1865. There is no provision in the acts that the designations to be made by the common council shall be by ordinance or resolu |