which was expressly limited in the duration of its grants to the term of twenty-five years. No intention will be presumed to make an extension of this part beyond the life of the grant to the main lines of the North Side road.
12. The grants by the trustees of Lake View will not extend beyond the life of the corporation making them and upon the annexation of the town of Lake View to Chicago, the further right to use the streets must be de- rived from grants by the council of that city under power conferred by the Cities and Villages Act.
The decree is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed. Blair v. Chicago, 400.
Power of removal from office-Right to compensation of one wrongfully dis- charged.
The provisions of the Civil Service Act of January 16, 1883, are broad and comprehensive; under it, the Executive order of May 16, 1896, Rule III, and the order and list of the Secretary of the Interior of June 9 and September 26, 1896, based thereon, stenographers receiving the specified salaries employed in offices of surveyors-general were brought within the protection of the law and can only be removed at least by a sub- ordinate officer of the Department—for just cause and upon written charges on notice with opportunity to defend; and until removed in accordance with the law and rules thereunder, and so long as he remains ready and willing to discharge the duties of his place, he cannot be de- prived of the compensation legally belonging to one entitled to hold the position notwithstanding the surveyor-general in whose office he is employed attempts to discharge him and excludes him from the office. United States v. Wickersham, 390.
CLASSIFICATION FOR LEGISLATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 8.
CLASSIFICATION FOR TAXATION.
CLOUD ON TITLE. See JURISDICTION, D 2.
COLLATERAL ATTACK.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; CORPORATIONS, 1.
COMMERCIAL PAPER.
See JURISDICTION, C 3.
MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST.
ACTS OF. See Acts of Congress.
POWERS OF. See Corporations, 1.
1. Commerce clause-Validity of state requirements of railroad engaged in interstate commerce.
An absolute requirement that a railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall furnish a certain numbers of cars on a specified day, to transport merchandise to another State, regardless of every other consideration except strikes and other public calamities, transcends the police power of the States and amounts to a burden upon interstate commerce; and rticles 4497-5000, Rev. Stat. Texas, being such a requirement, are, en applied to interstate commerce shipments, void as a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Such a regula- tion cannot be sustained as to interstate commerce shipments as an exercise of the police power of the State. Houston & Tex. Cent. Rail- road v. Mayes, 321.
2. Contracts within impairment clause-Provision in state statute for special rate of taxation in respect to particular corporation.
Provisions in a state statute for a special rate of taxation in respect to a particular corporation, made with a view of inducing large expenditures and the completion of an unfinished road of great public importance, and which are formally accepted and complied with, amount to a con- tract within the protection of the impairment clause of the Federal Constitution, and no other tax can be imposed on the corporation. Powers v. Detroit & Grand Haven Ry., 543.
3. Contracts within impairment clause-Municipal ordinance extending fran- chises of street railway companies.
Ordinances granting an extension to a consolidated street railway corpo- ration, possessing franchises expiring at different times, on conditions involving great expense to the corporation and resulting in substan- tial benefits to the public as to transfers for single fares and relat- ing to the entire system as well as the extensions granted, and providing that the right granted terminate with the then existing grants of the main line at a specified date later than that of termination of some of the franchises, amount, on the acceptance by the company and com- pliance with the conditions, to a contract within the protection of the impairment clause of the Constitution extending the various fran- chises to that date; the period, in this case of four years, not being an unreasonable one in view of the substantial benefits accruing to the public. Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Ry., 529.
4. Contracts within impairment clause-Validity of ordinance reducing street
railway fares. Cleveland v. Cleveland City Railway Co., 194 U. S. 517, followed as to the power of the city council of Cleveland to pass ordinances diminishing the rate of fare on street railways in view of the contracts contained in ordinances heretofore passed in regard to street railways. Ib.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4.
5. Due process of law-Failure to repeat testimony in criminal trial to accused who is almost totally deaf.
Where in the criminal trial of a person compos mentis, but almost totally deaf, the state court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, and also to direct and enforce the judgment which was entered, the jurisdiction is not lost by any irregularities caused by the failure of the court to have the testimony repeated to the accused through an ear trumpet; nor is the accused thereby deprived of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though the case be a hard one Federal courts cannot on habeas corpus proceedings grant relief from the judgment; their power is limited to the question of jurisdiction. Felts v. Murphy, 123.
6. Due process of law-Power of State to exempt classes from jury duty. There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment which prevents a State
from excluding and exempting from jury duty certain classes on the bona fide ground that it is for the good of the community that their regular work should not be interrupted. Rawlings v. Georgia, 638.
7. Due process of law; deprivation of property without—Action of municipality with respect to removal of obstruction to navigation of river. The right of a railroad company to maintain a tunnel under a navigable river is subject to the paramount public right of navigation, and where it has been constructed under municipal ordinance and state law that it shall not interrupt navigation, the duty of not obstructing the navi- gation is a continuing one; and, if the increased demands of naviga- tion at any time require a deeper channel than when the tunnel was originally constructed, it is within the power of the municipality to compel the railroad company at the latter's own expense to either remove the tunnel or lower it to conform with the necessities of com- merce, and, as in this case, to the rule established by act of Congress, and such action of the municipality is not unconstitutional, and does not amount either to taking the property for public use without com- pensation, or depriving the company of its property without due process of law. (C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Drainage Commission, 200 U. S. 251, followed.) West Chicago Railroad v. Chicago, 506.
8. Equal protection of laws-Power of State to classify for purpose of legisla-
A State may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation,
provided the classification is based on proper and justifiable distinc- tions; and so held that chap. 338 of the laws of New York of 1893, prohibiting the sale of adulterated milk, is not in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because in certain respects, it provides different prohibitions and penalties as to producing and non-producing vendors of milk. St. John v. New York, 633.
9. Fourteenth Amendment; effect of long-settled law and usage in determin- ing constitutionality of state statute.
In determining whether a statute of a State is constitutional, this court cannot wholly neglect the long-settled law and common understand- ing of that State, and will not, under the Fourteenth Amendment, upset what has long been established and accepted. Even the inci- dents of ownership may be cut down by the peculiar laws and usages of a State. Otis Co. v. Ludlow Co., 140.
10. Fourteenth Amendment-Power of State to modify distinction between trespass and disseisin-Validity of Maine statute as to limitations in regard to wild lands.
The distinction between trespass and disseisin may be modified by statute as properly as it may be established by common law. Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment hinders a State from enacting that in future the doing of such overt acts of ownership as are possible on wild lands, under a recorded deed showing that the actor claims title coupled with the payment of taxes, the owner not paying any meanwhile or doing any act indicative of ownership, shall constitute a disseisin which if continued long enough shall bar an action for the land; nor is such an act unconstitutional because it fixes the period at twenty years and allows it to become operative as to suits commenced five years after its enactment as it would be within the power of the legislature to fix the entire period of limitation at five years, and the owner would have an opportunity to defeat the disseisin by asserting ownership within that time; such a statute would not be construed as permitting suit to be barred by a period of twenty years' inactivity prior to the enact- ment of the statute, if acts of ownership were exercised thereafter. Soper v. Lawrence Brothers, 359.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4.
11. Full faith and credit clause-Effect of decree of divorce rendered without personal service on defendant wife.
The husband and wife being domiciled in New York, the husband left the wife, acquired, in good faith, after a lapse of years, a domicil in Con- necticut, and obtained in that State, and in accordance with its laws, a judgment of divorce based on constructive, and not actual, service of process, on the wife, who meanwhile remained domiciled in New York and never appeared in the action. The wife subsequently sued for divorce in New York and obtained personal service in that State
on the husband who pleaded the Connecticut judgment. Held, with- ́out questioning the power of the State of Connecticut to enforce the decree within its own borders, and without intimating any doubt that the State of New York might give it such degree of efficacy that it might be entitled to in view of the public policy of the State, that the Connecticut decree, rendered as it was without being based on personal service of the process on, and therefore without personal jurisdiction of the court over, the wife, was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Haddock v. Haddock, 562.
12. Full faith and credit clause-Nature of suit for divorce brought in State other than that of domicil of matrimony against wife still domiciled there. A suit for divorce brought in a State other than that of domicil cf matri- mony against a wife who is still domiciled therein is not a proceeding in rem justifying the court to enter a decree as to the res, or marriage relation, entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Ib.
13. Full faith and credit clause; effect of, as regards power of States over subject of marriage and divorce.
The States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce and the Constitution delegated no authority to the Central Government in regard thereto, and the destruction of the power of the States over the dissolution of marriage as to their own citizens cannot be brought about by the operation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
14. Searches and seizures; scope of interdiction of Fourth Amendment. The search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment was not intended to interfere with the power of courts to compel the production upon a trial of documentary evidence through a subpœna duces tecum. Hale v. Henkel, 43.
15. Searches and seizures—Immunity of corporations under Fourth Amend-
A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and in organizing itself as a collective body it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Cen- gress a subpœna duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Ib.
Self-incrimination. See WITNESSEs, 3, 5, 6, 7.
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