D. OF FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY.
1. To pass upon conflict between state statute and state constitution prior to
determination by state tribunals.
A state statute may be unconstitutional because conflicting with the con-
stitution of the State or with that of the United States, but all objec-
tions to its validity whether state or Federal may be presented in a
single suit and call for consideration and determination; and as a
Federal court has the jurisdiction it may be its duty, when the question
is properly presented, to pass upon an alleged conflict between a state
statute and the state constitution even before the question has been
considered by the state tribunals. It will however be reluctant to do
so especially when the statute is one affecting public revenues of the
State. Michigan Central Railroad v. Powers, 245.
2. Maintenance of bill by receiver to protect jurisdiction and right of court to
administer property.
Where, as in this case, the attitude and claims of the municipality cast a
cloud upon the title to property consisting largely of franchises in the
hands of receivers and to be administered under orders of the court,
the receivers may, with the authority of the court, proceed by ancillary
bill to protect the jurisdiction and right to administer the property,
and to determine the validity of claims of parties which cast a cloud
upon such franchises and in such a case it is proper to grant an in-
junction until the rights of the parties can be determined. Blair v.
Chicago, 400.
3. Materiality of motive of litigant.
Where there is a proper cause of action and diverse citizenship, jurisdiction
of the Federal courts exists, and the motive of the creditor who desires
to litigate in that forum is immaterial, and does not affect the juris-
diction; nor is such jurisdiction if it actually exists, affected by the
fact that a receivership was in view when judgments were entered.
(South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286). Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;
HABEAS CORpus, 1;
JURISDICTION, A 3;
PUBLIC LANDS, 1;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
E. OF STATE COURTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 11;
CORPORATIONS, 3;
HABEAS CORPUs, 1.
Exclusion of persons liable to jury duty as ground for challenge to array.
Even when persons liable to jury duty under the state laws are excluded
it is no ground for challenge to the array, if a sufficient number of unex-
ceptionable persons are present. Rawlins v. Georgia, 638.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5.
LAND DEPARTMENT.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
Effect on legislation of possibility of misconduct on part of officials.
While there is always a possibility of misconduct on the part of officials,
legislation may proceed on the assumption of their properly discharg-
ing their duties. Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Powers, 245.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;
See BANKRUPTCY;
MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Limitation of personal actions in Porto Rico.
Royal Insurance Co. v. Miller, 199 U. S. 353, followed to effect that, in
the absence of express legislation affecting Porto Rico, the law prior
to the extension of the Civil Code thereto in 1889 concerning limita-
tions of personal actions, is that generally prevailing under Spanish
law and in these cases on insurance policies, the loss under which had
occurred prior to 1889, the twenty-year term applied and not the
fifteen-year term applicable under the Civil Code after its extension
to Porto Rico. Amadeo v. Northern Assurance Co., 194.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.
Florida. Married women (see National Banks, 1). Christopher v. Norvell,
216.
Illinois. Municipal corporations; control of streets (see Municipal Corpo-
rations, 4). Blair v. Chicago, 400. Street railways (see Chicago
Traction Cases). Ib.
Massachusetts. Mill Act (see Practice and Procedure, 7). Otis Co. v.
Ludlow Co. 140.
Michigan. Act No. 173, Laws of 1901, Taxation (see Taxation, 11). Michi-
gan Central Railroad v. Powers, 245.
New York. Sale of adulterated milk, Laws of 1893, chap. 338 (see Con-
stitutional Law, 8). St. John v. New York, 633.
Ohio. Conditional sales (see Bankruptcy). York Manufacturing Co. v.
Cassell, 344.
Philippine Islands. See Divorce.
Porto Rico. Limitation of actions (see Limitation of Actions). Amadeo
v. Northern Assurance Co., 194.
Teras. Rev. Stat. Texas, articles 4497-5000 (see Constitutional Law, 1).
Houston & Tex. Cent. Railroad v. Mayes, 321.
MANDAMUS.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1.
Burden of proof as to seaworthiness of vessel—Harter act.
The relief afforded by 3 of the Harter act, 27 Stat. 445, to shipowners
is purely statutory and in order for a shipowner to avail of the exemp-
tions from liability for errors of management or navigation the burden
is on him to prove affirmatively, in all cases, and not only in those where
there is conflicting testimony, that the vessel was seaworthy at the
beginning of the voyage or that due diligence had been used to make
her so. The discharge of the duty of the shipowner in this respect is
not left in the absence of proof to any presumption. The Wildcroft, 378.
MARRIED WOMEN.
See NATIONAL BANKS, 1.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11, 12, 13; FEDERAL QUESTION;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5.
MINERAL LANDS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
See MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST.
Effect of mortgage as lien on machinery subsequently placed on the land.
A mortgage containing no clause covering after-acquired property is not
a lien on machinery placed on the land after the execution of the mort-
gage, and the title to which is reserved in the vendor until payment
therefor. York Manufacturing Co. v. Cassell, 344.
1. Power to grant right to obstruct navigable stream-Right of owner of soil
under bed of stream as to use.
In a navigable stream the public right is paramount, and the owner of the
soil under the bed can only use it so far as consistent with the public
right; and a municipality, through which a navigable stream flows,
cannot grant a right to obstruct the navigation thereof nor bind itself
to permit the continuance of an obstruction, and this rule is not affected
by the fact that the person claiming a right to continue such an obstruc-
tion is the owner in fee of the bed of the stream. West Chicago Railroad
v. Chicago, 506.
2. Grant by municipality constituting contract within impairment clause of
Constitution-Power to compel grantee to remove obstruction to navigation.
A municipal ordinance giving permission to a street railroad company to
construct a tunnel under a navigable stream, the law of the State pro-
viding that railways shall not be constructed so as to interrupt the navi-
gation of any water in the State, does.not amount to a contract under
the contract clause of the Constitution, so that the city could not subse-
quently require the company to lower the tunnel so as not to interfere
with the increased demands of navigation; nor, in the absence of any
provision to that effect, would it be construed as containing an implied
covenant that the municipality would bear the expense of such altera-
tions required by subsequent ordinances. Ib.
3. Duty of protecting unobstructed navigation of rivers under its jurisdiction.
A municipality is under the duty of protecting the unobstructed naviga-
tion of navigable rivers under its jurisdiction; and it cannot be ex-
empted therefrom by making agreements in regard thereto. Ib.
4. Title and control over streets under Illinois law-Legitimate use of street.
Under the law of Illinois municipal corporations have a fee simple in, and
exclusive control over, the streets, and the municipal authorities may
do anything with, or allow any use of, the streets not incompatible
with the ends for which streets are established, and it is a legitimate
use of a street to allow a street railroad track to be laid down in it.
Blair v. Chicago, 400.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 7;
JURISDICTION, D 2;
STATUTES, A 2, 5.
Construction-Effect of mistake in one ordinance in construction of others
dealing with same subject.
In construing municipal ordinances dealing with important matters such
as extensions of street railway franchises it may reasonably be presumed
that no provision escaped attention or was misunderstood; and, while
a mistake might occur in one ordinance, it will not be supposed that the
mistake occurred in four ordinances dealing with the same subject.
Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Ry., 529.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1. Liability of shareholders; exemption from liability by state statute.
Although in a limited sense there is an element of contract in becoming à
shareholder of a national bank, the liability for debts of the institution
is not contractual but is based on the provisions to that effect in the
national banking law. The Government creating the bank has pre-
scribed the terms upon which ownership of its shares can be acquired,
and only those are exempted from liability who are specially described
in the statute; nor can any shareholders be exempted from such lia-
bility by a state statute. Under § 5151, Rev. Stat., a married woman
residing in Florida, who has inherited stock in a national bank, which
has been transferred to her and on which she has received and accepted
dividends, is subject to a personal judgment for an assessment of the
comptroller, notwithstanding that under the laws of Florida a married
woman cannot enter into a contract. Nothing in the law of Florida
incapacitates a married woman in that State from becoming the owner,
by bequest or otherwise, of stock in a national bank. How and from
what property such a judgment shall be satisfied not involved or de-
cided in this action. Christopher v. Norvell, 216.
2. Power to borrow money and give time obligations therefor-Liability of
stockholders.
A national bank finding itself embarrassed though possessed of a large
amount of assets apparently in excess of its obligations is not pro-
hibited by the national banking act from borrowing, and it has the
power to borrow, money to meet pressing demands, which it has not
the cash to meet, and to give its time obligations therefor, secured by
all of its assets; and if it subsequently goes into liquidation, and the
collateral is insufficient to meet the obligations, the stockholders, both
assenting and non-assenting to the liquidation are subject to the addi-
tional liability to the extent imposed by § 5151, Rev. Stat., and the
holder of the notes can enforce the same by creditor's bill. Wyman
v. Wallace, 230.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1, 2, 3.
OBSTRUCTIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1, 2.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2;
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3.
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