PARTIES.

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 3, 4;
PUBLIC LANDS, 4.

PATENTS FOR LAND.
See JURISDICTION, C 2;
PUBLIC LANDS.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

See DIVORCE.

JURISDICTION, A 4, 5.

PLEADING.

See JURISDICTION, C 1; D 2.

POLICE POWER.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.

POWERS OF CONGRESS.
See CORPORATIONS, 1.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

1. Acceptance by Federal Supreme Court of trial court's findings of fact.
This court generally accepts the findings of a trial court upon a question
of fact when the evidence is conflicting; and so held in this case as to
a charge of systematic under-valuation which the trial court found
against. Michigan Central Railroad v. Powers, 245.

2. Following state court's construction of state statute.

If a state statute, as construed by the state court, is constitutional, this
court follows that construction. Soper v. Lawrence Brothers, 359.

3. Following findings of fact concurred in by District Court and Circuit Court
of Appeals.

Findings of fact by both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals as to seaworthiness of a vessel at, and due diligence used prior to,
the commencement of the voyage will not ordinarily be disturbed by
this court and so held in this case. The Wildcroft, 378.

4. Effect in this court of decisions of state court, in determining existence of
contract made by legislative action.

Although decisions of the highest court of a State are not binding on this
court in determining whether a contract was made by legislative action
of that State which is entitled to protection under the impairment of
obligation clause of the Federal Constitution, it will consider decisions
of that court on the point in question. Blair v. Chicago, 400.

5. Effect on this court of questions concerning fraud in contracting marriage
and laches in bringing action for divorce.

Questions concerning alleged fraud in contracting a marriage and laches

on the part of one of the parties in bringing an action for divorce are
matters solely of state cognizance and may not even be allowed to in-
directly influence this court in determining the Federal question which
is involved. Haddock v. Haddock, 562.

6. Consideration of claim not raised below.

This court will not consider a claim which was not set up in the bill or in
the court below, nor suggested until after the argument in this court.
Rodriguez v. Vivoni, 371.

7. Dismissal without prejudice or retention of bill pending decision of state

court.

Under the Massachusetts Mill Act the right of the lower owner only be-
comes complete when the land is flowed, and then it is only a right to
maintain a dam subject to paying the upper owners for harm actually
done, in pursuance of the terms of the act. In a suit at equity brought
by the upper owner to restrain the lower owner from building a dam,
the state court having declared generally that the Mill Act is valid, but
not having definitely expressed itself as to its constitutionality, and as
the opinion of this court may depend upon the interpretation of the
act by the state court, held, that the bill should be dismissed without
prejudice, or retained until plaintiff's rights have been determined
in an action for damages under the statute pending in the state court.
Otis Co. v. Ludlow Co., 140.

1. Construction of Government grants-Determination by State of incidents
attached to ownership of property bordering on navigable stream.
While the Federal court construes Government grants without reference
to the construction adopted by the States for their grants, the incidents
attached to ownership of property conveyed by the United States

bordering on a navigable stream are to be determined by the State
in which it is situated subject to the limitation that its rules do not
impair the efficacy of the grant or its use by the grantee. Joy v.
St. Louis, 332.

2. Title to accretions; nature of question as one of local or Federal law.
Whether land contained in an original patent reached to a river under
the distances called for is a question of fact, and whether the patentee
is entitled to accretion is a question of local and not Federal law, and
ejectment for the land made by accretion cannot, where diversity of
citizenship does not exist, be maintained in the Circuit Court as a case
arising under the law of the United States. Ib.

3. Indian reservations; effect of Wisconsin enabling act as grant of sections
within, for school purposes.

The provisions in the enabling act of August 6, 1846, authorizing the people
of the then Territory of Wisconsin to form a state government, and by
which section 16 in every township of the public lands, in that Terri-
tory, not sold or otherwise disposed of was granted to the State for the
use of schools, did not operate to vest in the State section 16 of town-
ships within the La Pointe or Bad River and the Flambeau Indian
Reservations from which the Indians have never been required to
remove; and this notwithstanding by the provisions in treaties exe-
cuted prior to 1846 the Indians occupying them ceded those lands to
the United States only retaining the privileges of occupancy thereof
until required to remove therefrom by the President of the United
States, and that after 1846 the same lands were included in the reserva-
tions as they now exist. United States v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 557,
followed, as determinative of this case (although it did not have refer-
ence to the particular Reservation involved in this case). It was held
that the court will not, at this time and at the instance of the State,
interfere with the administration by the Interior Department of the
lands in question for the benefit of the Indians for whom the Reserva-
tion was established. Wisconsin v. Hitchcock, 202.

4. Parties in adverse proceedings-Restoration of land to public domain-
Collateral attack of rulings of Land Department-Final certificate as
equivalent of patent.

The Land Department refused to issue a patent on a mining lode location
for which the local office had issued final certificate on the ground that
the entry embraced two tracts separated by a placer claim; but gave
the applicant the privilege for a definite period of electing which tract
he would take, the entry to be cancelled on one of the tracts specified
unless he meanwhile appealed or made his election. Within the period
he waived his appeal and elected to take the other tract. Subsequently
the Land Department entered a formal order cancelling the entry as to
the tract abandoned. Meanwhile three entries were made of the aban-
doned tract. The first immediately after the Land Department had
refused the patent; the second immediately after the election and
relinquishment was made; and the third immediately after the final

order of cancellation was entered. In consolidated adverse proceed-
ings between these three entrymen, held, that:

(a) In adverse proceedings each party is practically a plaintiff and must
show his title.

(b) The order refusing to grant the patent did not of itself restore the land
to the public domain during the period of election, but the relinquish-
ment of the original entryman to the abandoned tract operated to do
so eo instanti, and the formal order of cancellation merely recorded a
preëxisting fact, and the rights of the party entering the land im-
mediately after the relinquishment were superior to those of the other
entryman.

(c) Rulings of the Land Department as to land covered by a location can-
not be challenged collaterally in separate proceedings and the principle
of freedom from collateral attack is equally applicable in cases of final
entry as in those where patent has issued.

d) A final certificate issued after submission of final proof and payment
of purchase price is for many purposes equivalent to a patent. Brown
. Gurney, 184.

1. Jurisdiction of subordinate judicial tribunals dependent upon act of Con-

gress.

Subordinate judicial tribunals of the United States can exercise only such
jurisdiction as may be authorized by acts of Congress and whatever
the nature of a civil suit or criminal proceeding in a state court it
cannot be removed to the Federal court unless warrant therefor be
found in some act of Congress. Kentucky v. Powers, 1.

2. Right of removal where discrimination against accused due to illegal or
corrupt acts of administrative officers unauthorized by constitution or
laws of State.

Under 88 641, 642, Rev. Stat., there is no right of removal into the Circuit

Court of the trial of a person indicted under the state law where the

alleged discrimination against the accused in respect to his equal rights,
is due merely to illegal or corrupt acts of administrative officers un-
authorized by the constitution or laws of the State as interpreted by
its highest court. The remedy for wrongs of that character is in the
state court, and ultimately in this court by writ of error to protect
any right secured or granted to the accused by the Constitution or
laws of the United States which has been denied to him in the highest
court of the State in which the decision in respect to that right can be
had. Ib.

3. Refusal of state courts on previous trials to recognize alleged pardon by
acting governor as ground for removal.

The fact that the courts of the State have on previous trials refused to

recognize the validity of an alleged pardon given to the accused by the
acting Governor of the State does not make a case under § 641, Rev.
Stat., for the removal of the prosecution from the state court into the
Circuit Court. Ib.

4. Application of section 641, Rev. Stat.

While the prior decisions of this court determining the scope of § 641,
Rev. Stat., had reference to discrimination against negroes because of
their race, the rules announced equally apply where it exists as to the
white race; 641 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment is for the
benefit of all of either race whose cases are embraced by its provisions
and not alone for the benefit of the African race. Ib.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.
See CIVIL SERVICE.

REPEAL.

See STATUTES, A 3.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7.

SCHOOL LANDS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 15.

SELF-INCRIMINATION.
See WITNESSES, 3, 7.

SERVICE OF PROCESS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.