Women, physically inferior to men, were never able in the barbarous period to successfully contend for the mastery. They were always, with a few exceptions, subject to the sex to which nature had given superior strength. That inherent weakness of woman is still recognized in the states of the world, and the possession of sovereignty is deemed today a masculine prerogative just as it has been for thousands of years.

In the primitive state of society the death of the chieftain either precipitated a combat among rival leaders and factions in the community, or else the ability and physical superiority of one warrior caused all to submit to his control. In either event the one, presumptively the most powerful and skillful, succeeded to the exercise of the sovereignty. But with the establishment of the family relation, the institution of property, and the increasing influence of habit, custom, and acknowledged privilege, the right to exercise sovereign authority came by a natural process to be viewed as a proper subject of property, to which the principles of transmission could be applied. By those principles the right to exercise sovereignty became fixed as a legal right, and like other subjects of property passed by descent or was transferred by gift or purchase. Thus sovereign authority was commonly treated as hereditary, descending from father to son.

This method of succession was not the natural one found in the primitive community; but was purely artificial unless the new ruler actually possessed the brute force and martial skill with which he could cause all members of the community to submit to his will. If he failed in this, the authority which he possessed lacked the essential of real sovereignty, the physical strength to compel obedience. It is at this stage in political development that the theory of the "social compact" or the later theory of “habitual obedience" may be logically invoked as the basis of sovereign authority, but, whichever theory is accepted, it must be understood that the authority established is not that of the real, but of the artificial sovereign."

"Artificial." It should be understood that the adjective "artificial," used to describe a sovereign and sovereignty of a particular type, does not have its primary meaning of "made by art," "constructed," but is used in its derivative and secondary sense of "assumed," "not actual." The sovereign and sovereignty, to which it is applied, are in contrast to "real sovereign" and real sovereignty; that is, although such sovereign and such sovereignty may be apparently real, generally

As in time communities became united with other communities forming large political societies, of which the members were numbered by thousands instead of by scores, the chief of each of these greater societies could never by his own personal strength enforce his will. Did he, under such circumstances, possess the sovereignty of the state over which he was the acknowledged ruler? In one sense, yes; in another, no. He held an apparent sovereignty, which habit, custom and usage sanctioned and clothed with all the outward indices of sovereign power; but for all its outward evidence of sovereignty it was none the less artificial. The real sovereign was the individual or body of individuals in the state possessing the physical strength which, if exerted, could compel obedience. It matters not that the stronger, under the influence of habit or custom, voluntarily submitted to the weaker, the latter in reality gained thereby no more actual strength, and the former involuntarily retained the power to coerce the ruler and all other members of the state. Thus the ruler could only exercise the prerogative of sovereignty at the pleasure of the real sovereign. This establishes the following proposition (one

recognized as real, and operating and operative as if they are real, they are none the less unreal and liable to be divested of their apparent reality by the real sovereign through the exercise of real sovereignty. It is manifest that the word "artificial,” even in its secondary sense, does not in itself describe precisely the sovereign and the sovereignty intended; in fact, no English adjective meets all the requirements; hence it is necessary to explain the special meaning with which the word is used in these notes, and that it is adopted in preference to any other because it more nearly expresses the idea which it is desired to convey.

The theory of Johannes Althusius as to the relation of rulers to the sovereignty is thus stated by Professor Dunning: "Sovereignty (maiestas) is defined as the supreme and supereminent power of doing what pertains to the spiritual and bodily welfare of the members of the state. This power inheres by the very nature of the association in the people-the totality, that is of the members of the state." *** "But, for the purpose of carrying out the function of the state, duties may be distributed among agents of the sovereign, and it is in this capacity alone that kings and magistrates exercise authority. These functionaries, whatever their power and jurisdiction in reference to the individuals, are by the very nature of the case themselves subject to the people as a whole. Sovereign power, therefore, when properly understood, cannot conceivably be vested in any individual or group of individuals less than the whole people. It cannot be alienated or delegated to any one by the people; so long as there is a people it must possess the sovereignty." (Dunning, p. 63.) It should be remembered in reading this analysis of the German philosopher's theory that his system rested upon the idea that the state was founded on a "social contract" between the persons who composed it. He carries out this contractual

reached by Rousseau through an entirely different line of reasoning, since his is based on natural rights rather than on physical force): The real sovereign cannot divest himself of his sovereignty nor can he be divested of it and exist.

This distinction between an artificial sovereign and a real sovereign has not been recognized in terms by publicists, though the idea has been imperfectly advanced by some. Bluntschli, for example, says:

Besides the sovereignty of the entire nation, there is another within the state, the sovereignty of the highest member, the chief, or, since it is more clearly seen in a monarchy, the sovereignty of the prince. * * * The sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the prince are not in contradistinction. There does not result a division of sovereignty, as if the one half belonged to the people and the other to the prince: here are not two jealous powers striving for the supremacy. Both imply unity and plentitude of power; but it is clear that the whole, including the head, is superior to the head alone. (Bluntschli, pp. 503-504.)

Here is evidently the recognition of two sorts of sovereignty in a state, one of which is superior to the other. Yet both are assumed to be real, and there is an attempt (although the line of argument is not at all clear) to explain how they can exist harmoniously; in other words, to show that two supreme powers can operate without contest in the same sphere and both remain supreme. While the very idea is a contradiction, this contradiction immediately disappears if one sovereignty is seen to be real and the other only artificial.

It is needless to cite the explanations of other writers, who have found the same difficulties with the facts that were found by Bluntschli, and whose arguments are equally unsatisfactory and vague.

It was this artificial type of sovereignty that from the earliest civilized governments to the rise of the free cities of Germany in the eleventh and twelfth centuries existed in nearly every European state; a notable exception being the popular sovereignty of the early Teutons, whose system of electing their kings later developed into the political institution of an elective monarchy. This artificial sovereignty exists at

relation in the organization of governments. "The king is the executive of the people. *** His relation to the people is that of agent (mandatarius) and a contract between him and the people is perfected through his choice and coronation. He undertakes to govern in conformity to the fundamental law of the land, and they agree to obey him." (Ibid., p. 65.)

the present day to a more or less degree in modern states with monarchical forms of government. Nevertheless, the real sovereignty is not destroyed. It never can be. Since the eleventh century the real sovereign has gradually compelled recognition, until today in the more enlightened states the possessor of the real and not the possessor of the artificial sovereignty is recognized as dominant; as the actual source of political authority in a state.

The political history of England presents a familiar and at the same time a very clear illustration of this progression from the domination. of the artificial sovereign to the domination of the real sovereign. During the early Norman period, when the feudal system prevailed, the king was deemed to be the sole possessor of sovereign rights, though in fact the royal power depended for its exercise upon the will of the nobility. With them was the actual strength of arm to compel obedience within the state. The lower classes, ignorant, depraved, and unorganized, were both mentally and physically inferior to their feudal lords, whose knightly valor and skill at arms held their vassals in abject subjection, compelling them to obedience by force or by the fear of their lord's displeasure.

When, therefore, King John submitted against his will to the demands of his rebellious barons at Runnymede and granted certain rights and privileges to his subjects by Magna Charta, he did not perform a sovereign act. The act of real sovereignty was that of the nobles in compelling John to append his signature and affix the royal seal to the famous instrument. As Bacon says: "Potestas suprema seipsum *** ligare non potest." (Maxims, 19.) The supreme power— that is, the real sovereignty-cannot bind itself, nor can it be bound by another, otherwise it would lose its supremacy and its reality. To revert again to a quotation, previously given in another connection, which relates to this prominent event in English history,

the aristocracy seized the sovereign power, became the state. (Burgess, vol. i, p. 92.)

While this statement is not literally true, since the aristocracy exerted a power they already possessed, the same thought is there expressed, especially when it is remembered that the writer declares the state to be the possessor of the sovereignty.

"Supreme power limited by positive law is a flat contradiction in terms." (Austin, p. 263.)

A half century later, Henry III. and his son were captives of the insurgent army of Simon de Montfort. During those fifty years the social condition of the common people had rapidly improved, and particularly so in the cities under the civilizing influence of trade, commerce, and the exercise of their charter liberties. That the popular masses were beginning to realize the power of coöperation and organization was manifested in their merchant and trade guilds and in their trained bands of soldiery. Their strength had been demonstrated in the civil turmoils of the period, and it was recognized by the dominant nobility when borough representatives were given seats in the first Parliament. Thus the real sovereignty of England was shared in undetermined proportion by the lords and commons.

With the increase of learning among the middle and lower classes and with a growing reliance upon their own power resulting from military experience, the commons dared at length to resent and oppose the arrogance of the nobility. The crown, taking advantage of these dissensions, gained by apparent concessions the support of the common people, and upon their physical strength rested the royal authority, the artificial sovereignty. Thus, while the real sovereignty was not actually put to the test, events show that the preponderance of physical might was with the people in contradistinction to the aristocratic class.

The same state of facts is noted by Professor Burgess, though he uses in accordance with his theory the words "state" and "sovereign" as equivalents. After reciting the coalition between the king and the commons against the aristocracy, he says:

In the organization which followed, called in political history the absolute monarchy of the Tudors, the people were, in reality, the sovereign, the state, but apparently the king was the state. England under the Tudors was a democratic political society under monarchic government. (Burgess, vol. i, p. 93.)

This assertion of power, but partially realized by its possessors, was largely due to the invention of gunpowder. Gunpowder destroyed chivalry for it made the yeoman equal in destructive ability to the knight, whose training and martial skill had so long given him the ascendency. Gunpowder, like discipline, added a new factor in determining the physical might which is the essential of real sovereignty.