ceal, the fraud when he asks the benefit of the act. (In re Rainsford, 5 N. B. R. 381; Fed. Cas. 11537.)

When a bankrupt's discharge is opposed on the grounds of false swearing, of attempt to conceal property, and of transfer of a portion to a creditor with intent to give preference, a discharge will be granted when the evidence shows that the bankrupt had no interest therein, and that the transfer was without fraud. (In re Penn et al., 5 N. B. R. 288; Fed. Cas. 10929.)

The fact that a bankrupt paid certain creditors in full shortly before commencement of proceedings is no ground for withholding a discharge, where it is not shown that such payments were intended as preferences (In re Burgess, 3 N. B. R. 47; Fed. Cas. 2153); nor where the payment of a debt is made through inadvertence or under a mistaken sense of duty, and without fraudulent intent (In re Rosenfeld, 2 N. B. R. 49; 1 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 100; Fed. Cas. 12057; In re Seeley, 19 N. B. R. 1; Fed. Cas. 12628); nor are mere preferences made without contemplation of proceedings in bankruptcy (In re Jones, 13 N. B. R. 286; 2 Lowell, 451; Fed. Cas. 7446); nor is the fact that the bankrupt caused and permitted loss, waste and destruction of his estate and effects, and misspent and misused the same, prior to filing the petition. (In re Rogers, 3 N. B. R. 139; 1 Lowell, 423; Fed. Cas. 12001.) Where, in opposition to a discharge, a creditor sets up the fraudulent transfer by the bankrupt of certain of his property in violation of the act, but on trial the allegations are not proved as a matter of fact, the assignee is not prevented by a decision of the court from suing the transferee of the property. (In re Penn et al, 8 N. B. R. 93; Fed. Cas. 10928.)

The matter will be held res adjudicata, and a bank will be estopped from opposing the discharge on the ground that the bankrupt made a fraudulent conveyance to his wife, when it appears that the cashier of the bank had recovered judgment in his own name upon the bank's claim against a debtor, and that he filed a creditor's bill against the bankrupt and his wife asking that the conveyance be set aside, and the bill was dismissed. (In re Antisdel, 18 N. B. R. 289; Fed. Cas. 490.)

The beneficiaries under a general assignment for the benefit of all of his creditors without preference, and who have assented in writing to a substitution of assignees thereunder, are estopped from opposing the discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy on the ground that such assignment was fraudulent. (In re Schuyler, 2 N. B. R. 169; 3 Ben. 200; 16 Pittsb. Leg. J. 94; 2 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 85; Fed. Cas. 12494.)

A general assignment for the benefit of creditors, without preference, and in good faith, made sixteen days prior to commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, and pending adverse proceedings by a creditor, is not a bar to a discharge. (In re Pierce et al., 3 N. B. R. 61; 26 Leg. Int. 332; 16 Pittsb. Leg. J. 201; Fed. Cas. 11141.)

The omission of a debtor to have himself adjudged a voluntary bank

rupt, when his property is attached at the suit of a hostile creditor without his knowledge or consent, is not sufficient to prevent his discharge. (In re Belden, 2 N. B. R. 14; 2 Amer. Law Rev. 771; 15 Pittsb. Leg. J. 547; Fed. Cas. 1240.)

The omission from the schedule of a complete statement of the property owned by the bankrupt is not in itself ground for refusing a discharge (In re Smith, 13 N. B. R. 256; 1 Woods, 478; Fed. Cas. 12995); nor is the omission of names of creditors in the schedule with their knowledge and consent (In re Needham, 2 N. B. R. 124; 1 Lowell, 309; 2 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 39; 16 Pittsb. Leg. J. 313; 1 Chi. Leg. News, 171; Fed. Cas. 10081); nor is the mere omission of the name of a creditor, unless the omission was wilful and fraudulent. (Payne & Bro. v. Able et al., 4 N. B. R. 67.)

Neither the actual nor alleged residence or place of business of a bankrupt can be directly made the ground of opposition to his discharge. (In re Burk, 3 N. B. R. 76; Deady, 425; 2 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 45; Fed. Cas. 2156; In re Ives et al., 19 N. B. R. 97; 5 Dill. 146; Fed. Cas. 7115.)

A bankrupt court has jurisdiction to grant a discharge, even though there may be creditors who were not regularly brought before it by publication and service of notice. (Thurmond v. Andrews and Wife, 13 N. B. R. 157.)

Failure to publish notice of appointment of assignee is not cause for withholding a discharge. (In re Strachen, 3 N. B. R. 148; In re Little field, 3 N. B. R. 13; 1 Lowell, 331; 2 Amer. Law T. 122; 1 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 164; Fed. Cas. 8398.)

Where it appears that the bankrupt has committed an act that, if properly pleaded, will bar a discharge, the court will not of its own motion refuse a discharge (In re Antisdel, 18 N. B. R. 289; Fed. Cas. 490); or where on application for a discharge it appears that the bankrupt had given fraudulent preferences, but no creditors appeared in opposition, the court will not deny a discharge. (In re Clark et al., 19 N. B. R. 301; 36 Leg. Int. 414; Fed. Cas. 2812. For contra, see In re Sohoo, 3 N. B. R. 52; Fed. Cas. 13162.)

Where a member of a late copartnership files his individual petition in bankruptcy and inserts therein debts of the copartnership, the schedules showing that there were no partnership assets, and alleging that he was unable to get his late copartner to join in the petition, he is entitled to be discharged of his partnership as well as individual debts, and it is unnecessary that his copartner be made a party to the proceedings. (In re Abbe, 2 N. B. R. 26; 15 Pittsb. Leg. J. 589; Fed. Cas. 4.) The fact that one member of a bankrupt firm did not file a schedule of debts and effects, nor deliver his property into the hands of the assignee, does not affect the right of the other partners to receive a discharge. (In re Scofield et al, 3 N. B. R. 137; Fed. Cas. 12509.) A partner may be bankrupt, while the remaining partners, as individuals, and the firm itself,

may be solvent. The bankrupt partner has an unquestionable right to be discharged from all his debts provable under the act. (In re Frear, 1 N. B. R. 201; 2 Ben. 467; Fed. Cas. 5079; In re R. Stevens, 5 N. B. R. 112; 1 Sawy. 397; 1 Pac. Law Rep. 45; Fed. Cas. 13393.)

Objections to the discharge of the bankrupt on the ground that he has promised certain creditors money to vote for composition cannot be set up against his discharge. (In re Morris et al., 19 N. B. R. 111; 19 Alb. Law J. 281; 36 Leg. Int. 215; 26 Pittsb. Leg. J. 121; Fed. Cas. 9824.) In the absence of fraud, the original adjudication is conclusive on all creditors, and cannot be disputed upon the question of granting a discharge that is opposed on the ground that the petition was filed by collusion between the bankrupt and petitioning creditors. (In re Ordway Bros., 19 N. B. R. 171; 19 Alb. Law T. 482; Fed. Cas. 10552.)

An adjudication of bankruptcy, suffered by default, will not prejudice the bankrupt in his application for a discharge. (In re Lathrop, Luddington & Co., 3 N. B. R. 11; 2 Amer. Law T. 124; Fed. Cas. 8105.)

An act of bankruptcy committed a long time before the passage of the Bankrupt Act is no ground for refusing a discharge. (In re Keefer, 4 N. B. R. 126; 3 Chi. Leg. News. 125; Fed. Cas. 7026.)

A final disposition of a cause in bankruptcy may take place although no application for a discharge has been made and no action of the court had upon the subject. (In re Brightman et al., 15 N. B. R. 213, 215; 14 Blatchf. 130; Fed. Cas. 1878.)

The specification in opposition to discharge. A creditor opposing the discharge of a bankrupt must enter his appearance and file specifications at the time required by law. (In re McVey, 2 N. B. R. 85; 1 Chi. Leg. News, 103; Fed. Cas. 8932.) The statute lays down no time certain within which specifications of discharge are to be filed, but leaves that matter to be regulated by the supreme court, and the rule of court gives a power to enlarge the time (In re Houghton, 10 N. B. R. 337; Fed. Cas. 6730), which has made the limit ten days after the appearance in opposi tion to the discharge. (Orders XXXII.) On motion, specifications against the bankrupt in opposition to discharge will be stricken out if no appearance be made on order to show cause. (In re Smith et al., 5 N. B. R. 20; Fed. Cas. 12985.) Whenever the objection to a discharge rests on facts, there must be a specification in order that the bankrupt may produce evidence and that there may be a trial of the fact. (In re White et al, 18 N. B. R. 107; Fed. Cas. 17533.) The filing of an opposition to a bankrupt's discharge is the commencement of an individual proceeding on the part of the creditor against the bankrupt (Creditors v. Williams, 4 N. B. R. 187; Fed. Cas. 3379), and the burden of proof is on the creditor filing such specifications. (In re Okell, 2 N. B. R. 35; Fed. Cas. 10475; In re Herdic, 19 N. B. R. 385; Fed. Cas. 6403.)

Specifications in opposition to the discharge of a bankrupt which are in vague and general terms are insuficient. In re Tyrrel, 2 N. B. R. 73;

Fed. Cas. 14314; In re Hill, 1 N. B. R. 42; 2 Ben. 136; 15 Pittsb. Leg. J. 329; Fed. Cas. 6482; In re Beardsley, 1 N. B. R. 52; 1 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 46; Fed. Cas. 1183; In re Hansen, 2 N. B. R. 75; Fed. Cas. 6039; In re Dreyer, 2 N. B. R. 76; Fed. Cas. 4082; In re McVey, 2 N. B. R. 85; 1 Chi. Leg. News, 103; Fed. Cas. 8932; In re Rosenfield, 1 N. B. R. 161; 7 Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.) 618; 1 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 81; Fed. Cas. 12058; In re Smith & Bickford, 5 N. B. R. 20; Fed. Cas. 12985.) They must be precise and definite, and as exact as specifications in an indictment. (In re Butterfield, 14 N. B. R. 147; 5 Biss. 120; Fed. Cas. 2247.) They must be of fact, and be distinct, precise and specific, and must not be allegations merely in the language of the Bankrupt Act, or allegations so general as really not to advise the bankrupt what facts he must be prepared to meet and resist. (In re Rathbone, 1 N. B. R. 50; 2 Ben. 138; 15 Pittsb. Law J. 233; 25 Leg. Int. 60; Fed. Cas. 11580.) They must be full, clear and positive, as to time, place and person. (In re J. D. Eidom, 3 N. B. R. 27; Fed. Cas. 4314.) An allegation in a specification in opposition to the discharge of a bankrupt, that he had concealed property of considerable value, is bad because it does not describe the property as to kind or quantity, and does not state how the concealment was effected or when it occurred. (In re Rathbone, 1 N. B. R. 50; 2 Ben. 138; 15 Pittsb. Law J. 233; 25 Leg. Int. 60; Fed. Cas. 11580.)

An allegation in a specification filed in opposition to a discharge, that "said bankrupt has wilfully omitted” certain premises from the schedule attached to his petition, is entirely insufficient for the reason that it is not alleged that the bankrupt has wilfully sworn falsely in his affidavit annexed to his schedule. (In re Keefer, 4 N. B. R. 126; 3 Chi. Leg. News, 125; Fed. Cas. 7636; In re Hummitsh, 2 N. B. R. 3; 15 Pittsb. Leg. J. (O. S.) 494; Fed. Cas. 6866.) It must appear that the bankrupt knew the claim was false, in order to bar a discharge on the ground that he swore falsely in the affidavit accompanying his schedule that he was indebted to the creditor named therein, or that he did not disclose to the assignee that the claim was false and fictitious. (In re Blumenthal, 18 N. B. R. 555; Fed. Cas. 1576.) Charges in general terms of the destruction and removal of books and papers to defraud creditors and procurement of certain creditors' assent by pecuniary consideration are too vague to prevent a discharge. (In re Freeman, 4 N. B. R. 17; 4 Ben. 245; Fed. Cas. 5082.) Specifications charging the bankrupt with having concealed his estate and effects, and with having concealed, removed, altered and destroyed the books and writings relating thereto, are insufficient for want of averment of fraudulent intent. (In re Condict, 19 N. B. R. 142; 2 N. J. Law J. 82; Fed. Cas. 3094) Incomplete specifications in opposition to a discharge may be amended in due course. (In re McIntire, 1 N. B. R. 115; 1 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 120; Fed. Cas. 8823.)

Grounds for refusing discharge.- Under the act of 1867, a discharge was refused where the bankrupt had omitted from his schedule of assets

an estate in expectancy under a will (In re Connell, Jr., 3 N. B. R. 113; Fed. Cas. 3110); or if he put into his schedule, as due, a debt which was false or fictitious (In re Orcutt, 4 N. B. R. 176; Fed. Cas. 10550); or if he wilfully swore falsely in the affidavit annexed to his inventory in stating that he had no assets; or if he had concealed his property and had been guilty of fraud in not delivering such property to his assignee. (In re Rathbone, 1 N. B. R. 145; 1 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 70; Fed. Cas. 11583; In re Hussman, 2 N. B. R. 140; 2 Amer. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 53; 1 Chi. Leg. News, 177; Fed. Cas. 6951.) And it was refused where a member of a firm withdrew as his exemption a homestead in his wife's name, partly paid for by the wife and partly by money from the firm's earnings. (In re Croft Bros., 17 N. B. R. 324; 6 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 218; 8 Biss. 188: 10 Chi. Leg. News, 201; 6 Amer. Law Rep. 597; Fed. Cas. 3404.) It was also refused in case of a voluntary petition of partners, where the names of parties who should be joined as petitioners were not so joined. (Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Cass et al., 18 N. B. R. 279; 6 Weekly Notes Cas. 371; 6 Reporter, 579; 19 Alb. Law T. 119; 26 Pittsb. Leg. T. 25; Fed. Cas. 2732.)

Where, in opposition to a discharge, issues of fact are raised on the specifications, and a prima facie case of fraud is made out, the discharge will be withheld until such prima facie case is overthrown. (In re Doyle, 3 N. B. R. 190: Fed. Cas. 4052.)

If there be an omission to enter an order refusing a discharge, the bankrupt court may make it nunc pro tunc, if no rights of third persons have intervened which can be thereby prejudiced. (In re Drisco et al., 14 N. B. R. 551; Fed. Cas. 4086.)

That which would prevent a discharge will also invalidate one, if the appropriate remedy be sought. (In re Rainsford, 5 N. B. R. 381; Fed. Cas. 11537.)

The court will refuse a discharge where it appears, upon an inspection of the record, that the bankrupt is not entitled thereto, although there are not objections interposed by creditors. (In re Wilkinson, 3 N. B. R. 71; 2 West. Jur. 350; 16 Pittsb. Leg. J. 237; Fed. Cas. 17667; In re Sohoo, 3 N. B. R. 52; Fed. Cas. 13162.)

Books of account.- Under the corresponding section of the act of 1967 it was provided that a merchant or tradesman must keep books of account in order to be entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy (In re Bond, 4 N. B. R. 161; Fed. Cas. 1697; In re Odell et al., 17 N. B. R. 73; 9 Bon. 209; Fel. Cas. 10126; In re O'Bannon, 2 N. B. R. 6; Fed. Cas. 15: In re Tyler, 4 N. B. R. 27: Fed. Cas. 11805); but the books must be such as will at all times exhibit to his creditors his position, so that when placed before them for investigation they may at once ascertain his standing and property and the result of his business, and whether everything has been fair and honest on his part. (In re Brockway, 7 N. B. R. 575; 6 Ben. 326; Fed. Cas. 1917: In re Garrison, 7 N. B. R. 287; 5