to do what the bill claims to do. And that is not based on a gut level response; that is based in an analysis of hard data.

It is true that for workplaces covered by the OSHA Act at the present time, there are not enough inspectors to go around. Administrative targeting is needed with the present resources of the Agency. We feel that more resources are definitely needed for the Agency to cover the ground.

Large fractions of the construction industry actually would be exempted by the provisions of the Schweiker bill because they report low injury rates or would be lost administratively under the enormous paperwork requirements that the bill creates.

Mr. ERLENBORN. I would be much more impressed with your response if, when you said that you don't quarrel with the goal, the response had been that you have found a better way to devise a formula to target those resources. Rather, the response we get from organized labor is a frantic personal attack on Senator Schweiker for having introduced a bill in which you say the goals are agreeable but which you think does not accomplish those goals. I should think that you would submit an amendment that would change the bill so that it would accomplish the goal.

Let me get to page 3 of your prepared testimony. You talk about the fundamental inequity in regard to workers in different States employed by the same corporation, same job, same rate of pay, same disability, receiving compensation, medical and rehabilitation benefits. Now, if this bill which you are endorsing sets minimum standards rather than universal standards, wouldn't those differentials continue to exist? Wouldn't you still, if these were truly minimums, have some States with higher than the minimum and others reaching only the bare minimum? Would that not lead, then, to further hearings for increasing the minimum to the highest that one individual States may have chosen to bring everybody up to so that somebody in one of the States could then raise the level again?

Mr. MIRER. I imagine that the recommendations of the President's Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws contains some compromises. For instance, I have wondered why the State average weekly wage is the element used to target the maximum replacement benefit as opposed to a flat figure.

There are rather dramatic differences among State average weekly wages, even discounting Alaska, which is a special case. There is a very wide variation between Michigan, say, and Oklahoma, which are both States where General Motors has major facilities, for example. At the present time most States are not even meeting the 100percent or 150-percent cap of maximum benefits, and therefore the ability of the bill to push these benefit caps up to the 200 percent mark would be major progress in eliminating State-to-State differences because it would then accomplish this equalization.

I should add that the reason that it is a minimum program is that it does not attack the administrative problems that also make for Stateto-State differences in workers' compensation and compensation costs. Mr. ERLENBORN. Would you agree, then, with the AFL-CIO witness who appeared before this subcommittee and said that this is merely a first step toward their goal of a Federal takeover of workers' com

pensation? Then you would have uniformity if you had only one Federal workers' compensation law with equal benefits regardless of the income level of various States.

Mr. MIRER. The most recent policy statement of the UAW did not consider that issue. That is a little bit further down the road than we are looking right now.

Mr. ERLENBORN. You have not taken the steps beyond this first step yet?

Mr. MIRER. We don't seem to be able to get the other shoe down on the first step.

Mr. ERLENBORN. One last comment. On page 10 you talk about the costs of the current program, $1.48 per $100 of payroll. That is in the context that not even the whole $1.48 gets to the disabled worker. I cannot help but contrast the cost of $1.48 per $100 of payroll with the costs of one of the federally constructed workers' compensation programs, the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Under that act, the costs in the New York Harbor area are $87.50 per $100 of payroll, which does show you that the Federal Government can be a good deal more generous than the States.

Mr. MIRER. May I comment on that briefly? The $1.48 figure is the average of all employers everywhere in the United States. I presume it comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In some individual highhazard industries, in certain States the rates go up higher than that. Coal mining in Ohio has a State premium cost rate well over $20 per $100. I don't know how high it goes. I have heard that in some forging operations they charge over $40 per $100.

You would have to look at an individual high-hazard industry rate before you could compare it with something that is inherently dangerous, such as longshore.

Mr. ERLENBORN. That argument has been made before in this committee. We can always point to the fact that the shoe salesmen in the District of Columbia are under the Longshoremen's Act, not really a high-hazard industry, but I will guarantee you that the cost of their compensation insurance exceeds that in the coal industry or the auto workers' industry or anywhere else because the Federal Government, in setting sandards and removing all incentives for returning to work, causes the highest possible cost, far exceeding anything in your fondest hopes and expectations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BEARD. Thank you very much.

Mr. MIRER. Thank you.

Mr. BEARD. The next witness is R. Pierce Head, senior vice president, Georgia Power Co., Atlanta, Ga. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. HEAD. Yes.

Mr. BEARD. We would appreciate your summarizing your remarks and we will accept the entire statement into the record.

Mr. HEAD. Representative Beard, if it would suit the committee I would prefer to skip certain portions of it but read into the record the majority of it. I can do a better job of presenting our statement in this form.

Mr. BEARD. Your entire statement will be incorporated into the proceedings.

STATEMENT OF R. PIERCE HEAD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GEORGIA POWER CO., ATLANTA, GA., ON BEHALF OF THE EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, ACCOMPANIED BY RON CLEMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, EEI; AND CARL BEHNKE, DIRECTOR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION, EEI

Mr. HEAD. My name is R. Pierce Head and I am senior vice president of the Georgia Power Co. I am executive chairman of the Labor Relations Committee and a member of the Executive Committee of the Industrial Relations Division of the Edison Electric Institute, on whose behalf I am submitting this statement.

Accompanying me are Ron Clements, congressional representative, and Carl Behnke, director of the Industrial Relations Division of EEI.

EEI is well aware of the importance of the workers' compensation system and its beneficial effect upon employees in our industry and in all industries throughout the United States. We do not wish to tamper with its strengths.

Although there are other aspects of this legislation with which we might take issue, our primary concern and the subject to which this statement is addressed is the unrealistic and expensive effort to delineate mandatory standards at this time in the area of occupational disease.

Section 5(a) of the proposed legislation would, in precedentshattering fashion, create and then impose upon the States a battery of Federal standards which would be controlling in Workers' compensation cases alleging disability arising out of occupational disease. Before so far-reaching a change in the existing framework should be adopted, certain basic questions must be addressed and satisfactorily answered:

First. Have the States failed to measure up to their responsibilities in the area of occupational disease?

Second. Would attempts to develop and implement Federal occupational disease standards under H.R. 5482 be largely duplicative of efforts elsewhere and hence wasteful?

Third. And would the costs be so steep that the workers' compensation programs in their entirety would be jeopardized?

In our judgment, the proposed legislation fails on each of the above grounds.

A key rationale for the imposition of Federal workers' compensation standards in H.R. 5482 and similar bills is the general failure of State workers' compensation laws to meet the 19 "essential" recommendations made in 1972 by the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. Indeed, in the findings and declarations of purpose contained in H.R. 5482, section 2(a) (8) expressly cites that report in justification for this proposed legislation.

However, even if the States may have fallen short in other aspects of their workers' compensation systems. they have without exception complied with the national commission's recommendation in the area pertinent here.

The relevant "essential" recommendation of the National Commission was R. 2.13, which provided: "We recommend that all States

provide full coverage for work-related diseases." The Department of Labor has recognized that, as of January 1979, all 50 States plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had met the standard of R. 2.13.

Accordingly, the imposition of Federal standards governing the area of occupational disease presses far beyond the perceived need set forth in the "essential" recommendation and thus creates an unnecessary and unwarranted intrusion into an area adequately covered by the law of each and every State.

In the light of these circumstances, the development of a new statutory scheme to provide a mandate for the States would appear unnecessary. Accordingly it is the belief of EEI that no provision should be made at this time in workers' compensation law for the setting of standards dealing with the occupational disease. Plainly it is desirable to have ongoing study regarding the identification, nature and causes of occupational disease. There are, however, existing structures already in place which can effectively accomplish such an objective. We see no need whatsoever for yet another forum to study and assess occupational disease or for another array of advisory committees to provide scientific and medical guidance. The addition of another statutory structure would be unnecessary, duplicative and wasteful.

I am referring primarily, of course, to the duplication in this bill of the studies and determinations regarding occupational disease authorized by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Limited to its proper focus-the delineation of various occupational diseases, their characteristics, their prevalence, the susceptibility of employees in the various workplaces-section 5 of H.R. 5482 essentially tracks matters already entrusted to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

It should be remembered that section 2(b) of that act declares the congressional policy of providing safe and healthful working conditions, "By exploring ways to discover latent diseases, establishing causal connections between diseases and work in environmental conditions, and conducting other research relating to health problems, in recognition of the fact that occupational health standards present problems often different from those involved in occupational safety. Of course, the Secretary of Labor, under section 6 of OSHA, is authorized to effectuate standards dealing with occupational diseases, an authority underscored by section 6(b) (5), dealing specifically with, "Toxic materials or harmful physical agents."

It is sections 20 through 22 of OSHA that establish the mechanism. for performing precisely the functions that are the touchstone of section 5 of H.R. 5482. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was created by section 22 expressly to carry out, among other things, the congressional policy set forth in section 2 of OSHA, to which I previously referred. It is clothed with the responsibility of carrying out the functions of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare which appear elsewhere in OSHA. For example, section 20(a) (2) authorizes NIOSH to provide such, "experiments as are necessary to produce criteria, including criteria identifying toxic substances..." Section 20 (a) (3) authorizes development of criteria, "dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents and sub

stances" relating to employment; Section 20 (a) (5) authorizes establishment of such programs, "of medical examinations and tests as may be necessary for determining the evidence of occupational illnesses and the susceptibility of employees to such illnesses."

Plainly, the existing structure within HEW-NIOSH and the existing advisory committees is not only equipped to make the necessary studies and assessments but is also charged with that very mission. It is pointless and wasteful to create a competing structure.

In that connection it should be noted that Congress was sufficiently concerned about duplicative efforts within the framework of OSHA itself to make specific provisions to discourage it. Section 20 (c) provides that "in carrying out his responsibilities under this subsection, the Secretary of Labor shall cooperate with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in order to avoid any duplication of efforts under this section. That directive is equally applicable here.

In addition, the backbone of section 5 of H.R. 5482 is the establishment of an advisory committee structure to assess proposed standards regarding occupational disease. That section mandates that the Secretary of Labor appoint an advisory committee on every occasion that he determines that a standard should be established. Implicit in that approach is recognition of the fact that questions as to whether or to what extent particular diseases arise out of workplace conditions are complicated and difficult ones and that the existing body of scientific and medical knowledge is too scant or diffuse to permit evaluations of particular diseases without expert guidance.

It is no solution, however, to create, as section 5 does, a new law providing for a duplicative and hence wasteful structure of advisory committees. The solution lies in making use of existing law and existing advisory committees which are already charged with essentially the same functions contemplated by section 5.

The new advisory committees proposed under this bill would duplicate the work that is already being done or could be done by many of the 292 current HEW advisory committees and by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

The latter, established by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, remains within the jurisdiction of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and exists for essentially the same purposes as the advisory committees envisioned by H.R. 5482.

Indeed this new invocation of an advisory committee requirement as set forth in the bill is contrary of congressional mandate and Presidential directive, both of which have as stated objectives the termination of the proliferation of advisory committees by avoiding the creation of new ones.

They are particularly to be avoided where, as here, the new committees would duplicate efforts already being undertaken or capable of being undertaken by existing advisory committees or government agencies.

The congressional mandate to which I refer is the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law 92-463. Section 2(b) (2) of that law, which was enacted in 1972, states that new advisory committees should be established only when they are determined to be essential and their numbers should be kept to the minimum necessary.