membership of the lower house in the state legislatures, as well as the inexperience of the majority of its members, it is natural that a large amount of power should have been concentrated in the hands of the speaker. Through his power of making committee appointments, of distributing the legislative business, of guiding the discussion on the floor, and, with the aid of the committee on rules or through an informal steering committee, of controlling or at least influencing the order of business, and determining the opportunities to be accorded the backers of any particular measure, the speaker may build up a powerful influence, if he unites technical knowledge with political tact. The chances for the development of a strongly centralized parliamentary authority in the state legislatures are of course less favorable than they have been in Congress during the last two decades. Yet in some of the larger states, like New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, gavel-rule has at times been carried out with more lack of consideration for the political opposition, and especially for the minority in the ruling party, than has ever been exhibited in Congress. While the Congressional speaker has never been accused of systematically working in alliance with corrupt interests, such connection has at times been established in some of the states. In Pennsylvania it was openly acknowledged, with the cynical frankness of the former political masters of that commonwealth. The New York Assembly has perhaps approached more closely to the model of Congress, and under strong and able speakers like Nixon there has been a concentration of parliamentary activities, and a guidance of parliamentary procedure through the committee on rules, closely approaching the situation in Congress. But in the ordinary legislatures, parliamentary centralization is not carried to such an extent because it is not necessary. The membership is smaller, the amount of business less distracting; there can be more free discussion and more individual independence of the members. In these legislatures, the speaker owes what influence he may have to his personal experience and ability, rather than to the structural factors involved. It occasionally happens that even in those states in which the organization is most effectual, a successful revolt may take place. Thus in the Illinois Assembly of 1903, the power of the speaker was overthrown by the minority Republicans and Democrats, when the famous traction bill of that year was up for consideration.- Paul S. Reinsch, “American Legislatures and Legislative Methods," p. 177. 5 California's Legislative Employees.-The California house of representatives, consisting of eighty members, had in 1907 the following paid employees: one chaplain, one chief clerk, four assistant clerks, one sergeant-at-arms, one bookkeeper, one clerk, fifteen assistant sergeant-at-arms, twenty-three committee sergeant-at-arms, one journal clerk, six assistant journal clerks, five minute clerks, nine assistant minute clerks, one history clerk, one assistant history clerk, one engrossing and enrolling clerk, thirty assistant engrossing and enrolling clerks, one postmaster, six assistant postmasters, one secretary to the speaker, one bookkeeper to the ways and means committee, one file clerk, two assistant file clerks, one bill clerk, thirty stenographers, one clerk to the minority, sixty-nine committee clerks, forty assistant committee clerks, two copy clerks, one mail carrier, one electrician, three telephone attendants, one cloak room attendant, ten doorkeepers, thirty porters, and nineteen watchmen, making a total of 335 employees with salaries ranging from $3 to $8 per day. The senate, composed of forty members, has 228 paid employees. -J. W. Garner, "Government in the United States," p. 81. 6 Committee Investigations.-The practice has recently arisen of allowing committees of the legislature to sit in the interval between legislative sessions. The purpose usually has been to acquire through investigation a sufficient basis of fact for prospective legislative action. The holdover senators form the personal link between the legislative session appointing the committee and that to which it is to report. Considering the frequency of extra sessions in most states which have a biennial session, we note a certain tendency toward continuity of legislative action, of which the inter-session committees are another indication. Prominent examples of such committees are the Stevens committee (1904), for the investigation of gas prices in New York, which did exceedingly careful and important work; the committee on traction interests appointed in Massachusetts in 1905; and the famous insurance investigation committee ap pointed in New York the same year. This activity of a legislative committee of inquiry in subjecting a certain industry or condition to a searching scrutiny, uncovering abuses, putting aside shams, and arriving at a sound basis of fact, is certainly the only safe preparation for legislative action upon complicated industrial and financial matters. As the powers of such a committee to demand the production of evidence generally transcend those possessed by a grand jury, this method bids fair to become very useful for the purpose of dealing with a widespread corruption, backed by powerful interests. An important investigation was undertaken by the Drake committee of the Ohio senate in 1906. In inquiring into the affairs of Cincinnati, the committee caused the return to the public treasury of over $200,000, which had been given as gratuities to treasurers, by banks favored in the deposit of Hamilton County funds. The work of the committee was blocked, and its powers of action emasculated by a remarkable decision rendered by a judge of the court of common pleas, who took the ground that the investigating committee was an illegal body, as the constitution of Ohio gave the legislature no authority to appoint a commission with power to take testimony as to alleged corruption in Hamilton County and to compel the attendance of witnesses.- Paul S. Reinsch, op. cit., p. 174, 175. The Legislator's Experience.—Some notion of the practical experience of legislators, especially new men, can be gathered from the following somewhat humorous account by a member of the New York assembly: “Before I came up here I had an idea that a legislator, after a profound study of the subject, would introduce a bill with a few words that would at once attract the attention of the press and through them the public. Presently, by some machinery which I never clearly understood, the bill would be taken up in its turn and after grave and serious argument would be either passed or defeated. But what really happens is this. You sneak up back of the desk and drop into a slot your bill, which half of the time you don't know anything about yourself, because either your boss, or your senator, or some organization in your district, gave it to you. By bothering the clerk next day you can find out what committee it has been |