can neither prove or disprove our doctrine; nor can the Europeans prove or disprove theirs. It is a matter of accepting or declining to accept as "self-evident" certain propositions which can neither be proved nor disproved. There must be a conversion of the Europeans to the American doctrine, or a conversion of the Americans to the European doctrine. Between the doctrine of legally limited power and that of legally unlimited power there is no half-way house. A political union for judicial purposes between a nation which regards all governmental power as legally limited and a nation which holds that a part of the government is legally unlimited, is clearly contrary to American policy and has a tendency to imperil and ultimately to overthrow American institutions. It is still clearly our true policy, as it was in Washington's day, "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world," and to regard as our friends and permanent allies all the nations of the world; dealing with them, however, on such terms that we shall not sacrifice or imperil the fundamental doctrine of legally limited governmental power for which this nation stands, and which we believe to be essential to peace and justice.

The formation of a judicial union with particular nations is thus seen to be contrary to American policy. It seems clearly also to be inexpedient. Judicial unions of particular nations are likely to convert themselves into "Holy Alliances." They tend to establish a law for the particular union which is inconsistent with the general juridical sentiment of mankind; to become selfrighteous; and to attempt to force their ideas of law and political doctrine upon the rest of the world. If the United States, Great Britain and France were to enter into a judicial union, could we reasonably blame any outsider nation which should declare its own "Monroe

Doctrine" in order to protect its legal and political ideas from invasion by the union? We think that the American system deserves to be protected, and we are determined to protect it, not only in our own interests but in the interests of the world at large. But the strength of our position lies in the doctrine which we are protecting and in our wholly defensive attitude. If we form a judicial union with nations which do not hold the political principles which the Monroe Doctrine protects, we may well be charged, by outsider nations, with having abandoned our fundamental principles, our defensive attitude, and the Monroe Doctrine itself. Moreover, we may well be considered as having formed a "Holy Alliance" with these nations to propagate such a faith in legal and political matters as the whole Alliance may decide to be suitable for itself and the rest of the world to hold. Thus a particular union for judicial purposes might lead to jealousy and war, instead of to peace.

A particular union is thus seen to be inexpedient, as well as contrary to American policy. It appears also that it is unnecessary, since there may be a more simple and practicable road to the arbitration or judicial settlement of disputes between nations by legally limited tribunals, which, it appears, ought to be the goal of our efforts. There is one union or society of which any nation may be a member, without creating any jealousy or imperilling its fundamental legal and political doctrines. This is the union or society of all the nations and peoples of the world, which has already received the name of "the society of nations." Scholars already recognize the existence of this society and are beginning to regard that which has been called "international law" as the law of the society of nations. To make this society a political fact and a part of practical, every-day politics,

nothing is required except that the nations should recognize the existence of this political society and their membership in it. They will then be bound by the customary law of the society, as it is now formulated and as it may hereafter be formulated. For the government of political societies under customary law, courts are the only necessary organs. They ascertain custom, determine its reasonableness, and by their adoption and application of reasonable custom authenticate it as a part of the customary law of the society. Such courts are legally limited by the principles of the supreme universal law, by the existing unwritten constitution and customary law of the society, and by all customary law which, under these limitations, they assist in formulating. The customary law, in the case of the society of nations, is to all intents and purposes a federal law of the society of nations, since it relates only to those matters which are common to all the nations or are

beyond the competency of any one. That which we call "international law" is in fact the federal customary law of the society of nations, formulated without a definite legislature and enforced without a definite executive. For the proper development of customary law, courts and tribunals with advisory powers seem likely to be more effective than those whose decisions purport to be enforced by physical or moral compulsion; for customary law must ever rest largely in opinion, and the strength of customary law lies in its power to induce a voluntary obedience. Moreover, nations which hold to the doctrine of legally unlimited governmental power could reasonably accept advisory arbitration by tribunals recognizing themselves as legally limited, since it would not be inconsistent with their doctrine to take advice concerning the settlement of their disputes with other nations.

For the purpose of bringing about the judicial settlement of disputes between nations by legally limited tribunals, any one nation may act alone in its recognition of the society of nations and its membership therein; or several may act simultaneously. Considering the fact that this nation stands for legal limitations upon all governmental power, it seems that it might properly take the lead, leaving the nations which do not accept this doctrine to take such action as they deem proper. This might require that this nation should offer to submit to advisory arbitration all disputes of every kind with any nation, on the understanding that the arbitrators were to regard themselves as legally limited by the principle of universal law that no person is to be deprived of his life, liberty or property by any political society or government without due process of law, and, subject to this law, by all the customary organic and regulative law of the society of nations, as the same is now formulated under the name of "international law" and as it may be formulated by the authentication of reasonable customs-the existence of customs and their reasonableness being determined by having regard to and respect for all existing accepted customs, the principles of all civilized systems of laws, and the precedents under these systems. Such an offer might be made by a joint resolution of both Houses of Congress and a Presidential announcement contained in a Presidential Message, in substantially the same way as the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated. The present Hague Tribunal and the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes could be utilized, and thus the necessity of entering into treaties could be avoided, unless it should be considered necessary under the Constitution that the Senate should supervise the "special agreement" in each case.

Such an offer by the United States might well constitute a basis for the consideration by the next Hague Conference of the question of legal limitation of arbitral tribunals; for it seems clear that the success or failure of arbitration of the disputes of nations depends on whether or not the arbitral tribunals act under legal limitations. Only by making the society of nations a fact of practical politics, it would seem, can such legal limitations exist. Leadership by the United States in the movement to recognize and establish the society of nations and to institute a general practice of advisory arbitration under the reasonable customary law of that society, would be consistent with the policy of selfregarding altruism which Washington advised when in his Farewell Address he said:

"Harmony, and a liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest."

If, however, this course should seem presumptuous on the part of this nation, or likely to be interpreted as an attempt to force the American system on the rest of the world, two other courses are open-either to adopt the pending treaties with the clause omitted which attempts to delegate the power of decision regarding justiciability to a Joint High Commission, as the majority of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations propose, adding, out of caution, the reservation proposed by the minority of the Committee, withdrawing from arbitration "any question which depends upon or involves the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, or other purely governmental policy"; or to renew the existing treaties until a date some time after the close of the next Hague Conference. The latter course seems the safer one. The pending treaties, even if amended so as to reserve to the President and Senate power to withdraw cases