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will result in war rather than in peace, thus bringing judicial settlement into disrepute. The existing treaties have been successful. The only reason urged for changing them is, that they do not go far enough to have an apparent effect in reducing war expenditure, and in preventing the loss of productive energy caused by war and the preparation for war. They are supported by the general public sentiment. Though they have not been ratified by the whole Government of each of the contracting nations, they can, if necessary, be so ratified without delay. The question of their constitutionality, so far as this nation is concerned, is not likely to be raised, and the reservation of broad discretionary power to withdraw cases from arbitration goes far to remove both constitutional objections and objections based on general principles. They afford us a safe ground on which to rest while we are considering what should be the next step. It seems that it will be wiser, before moving from our present secure position, to take time to consider our next step, waiting until we can have the benefit of the discussion and action of the next Hague Conference, so that when next we move, we may do so with confidence and unanimity, in the conviction that we are moving in the right direction.
COOPERATION VERSUS COMPULSION IN
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SO
CIETY OF NATIONS
Reprinted from the Report of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. Delivered May 18th, 1916.
URING the past two years, perhaps as a result of
the war, a plan has been seriously advanced and
widely supported, for organizing a League of Nations on a compulsive basis; and within the same period, a plan of wider scope has been brought forward with equal seriousness and with a considerable following, for organizing the whole society of nations on a compulsive basis.
One plan is that of the League to Enforce Peace. The other is that of the Fabian Society of London. The latter is a proposal for organizing all the nations compulsively under what is called a "supernational authority." This "supernational authority” is to have conciliative, judicial, legislative, and executive functions and organs, and is to enforce its decisions by means of an international police and by economic force. The plan recognizes and provides for large district unions of nations after the manner of the Pan-American Union each district union cooperating with the others to uphold the society of nations and the supernational authority. The eight great powers are to occupy a special position in thė whole organization, evidently as an Inner League to Enforce Peace. Such movements, so elaborated and so supported, challenge our attention and consideration. It is our duty to examine them, and either to support them or to state our reasons for opposing them when suitable opportunity is given. For myself, I wish to say that my objections are not based on any notion or belief that the use of force is not justifiable in any case. The experience of mankind has, I believe, abundantly proved that in some kinds of organization, the use of force is necessary, and therefore justifiable. Whether force ought to be used in a particular political organization depends upon whether it is possible to use it in that political society so as to effect the object of that society. In the society of nations, or in any League of nations, it seems to me that the use of force is impracticable, and therefore unjustifiable. I shall therefore attempt to base my objections on accepted principles of political science, and on considerations of practical politics.
The plan of constitution of the proposed League to Enforce Peace consists of a contracting clause and four articles. By the contracting clause, the United States and some other nations—evidently less than all—are to constitute themselves into a political union, described as a "League," the members binding themselves to the observance of the four articles. No object is stated, no fundamental principles of individual and national right and duty are declared, no constitutional prohibitions designed to safeguard these fundamental principles are to be accepted by the signatory nations, no legal limitations of any kind upon the processes and organs provided for in the four articles are established.
The first article obligates the signatories to use the process of judicial settlement as respects all "justifiable" questions, subject only to the limitations of treatiesthat is to say, in conformity with particular or general