pable of judicial determination, it becomes interesting to discover the process by which the Supreme Court of the United States has been evolved. It may be that by tracing this line of development, some light may be thrown upon the questions which are now presenting themselves in regard to the proposed international court.

The institutions of a people are in part the expressions of their political, social, and economic beliefs, and in part the result of experiments made by them and of improvements upon institutions which have stood the test of experiment. It is necessary, therefore, in this inquiry, to examine first the nature of the political, social, and economic beliefs of the founders of the American commonwealth; then, to investigate their experience in the working of those institutions set over them by England as their mother country, or established by themselves, which bore an analogy to the Supreme Court of modern times, and to ascertain the process by which these early institutions were improved and adapted to the changing environment.

In our search for the political doctrine held by the American colonists which may reasonably be thought to have manifested itself in our Supreme Court, we perhaps may find a clue in a remark made by Grotius in his "Three Books of Peace and War." Describing the power which a State ought to exercise over its colonies (lib. i, cap. iii, sec. 21), he says that while the Latins described the power of the mother city or state by the word imperare, to command, and regarded it as having the imperium, or empire, over the colonies, the Greeks "more modestly" described the power of the mother city by the word tάooey, to dispose or set in order, and regarded the mother city as having the reuovla that is, the hegemony, leadership in judgment or su

preme jurisdiction. The American colonists regarded England, their mother country, as the Greek colonists regarded their mother city. They recognized that England had a leadership in judgment and hence a supreme jurisdiction over the Colonies for the purpose of disposing and setting in order their affairs to the extent that might be necessary for the common defense and for the general welfare, but they denied its power to command. They insisted that the execution of the judgments of the mother country was of right in the Colonies and that, in extreme cases, where its decisions were palpably unjust, the Colonies might refuse to adopt or execute them.

The American colonists went farther, and denied to their own governments and to all governments the power of absolute command, holding that government in every form is essentially leadership in judgment. To place it beyond doubt that their governments did not have the imperium of the Latins, but only the hegemony of the Greeks, they adopted the custom of binding their governments by written constitutions regarded as emanating from the people, limiting the powers which the government was authorized to exercise and placing it in the position of an authorized agent of the people. Their representative assemblies they called, in some cases, general courts; and they held the members of such assemblies responsible as members of a supreme tribunal. Every act of government they regarded as an act of judgment, and they considered that the persons appointed to govern were but the leaders in the judgment. They held that the final judgment rested in the whole people, who confirmed by their acquiescence and conformity those acts of government which by common consent were regarded as necessary and just, and who ultimately nullified such acts of govern

ment as by common consent were regarded as unnecessary and unjust. With regard to every governmental act, the question in their minds was, whether the act in question appealed to their reasons and consciences as necessary and just under the circumstances. If the general consensus was that the act of government was necessary and just, the people executed it as a matter of choice and free will. Governmental commands and prohibitions, in their view, thus derived their force from the judgments on which they were based and on the general acquiescence in the judgment as necessary and just.

The social ideas of the American colonists were based upon Christianity. The people were thus at the same time individualists and humanitarians and sought to find the middle ground between selfishness and altruism. They believed in the equality of all men before God by reason of the common and equal creation of all men by God, and held to the conception of a law of nature imposed by God, which is supreme over all human action and relationship and to which all men, states, and peoples are equally subject. This law of nature was to their mind composed of those principles of natural justice, based primarily on the equal right and duty of self-protection and self-preservation, which are implanted in man by God, and which are in part revealed and in part discoverable by the enlightened reason and conscience. All governmental acts they believed were to be judged by the people according to this supreme law.

The economic ideas of the American colonists were similar to their social ideas. As individualists they opposed monopoly and caste and believed in the fundamental rights of self-protection and self-preservation, called the rights of life, liberty, and property. As hu

manitarians they believed that trade, commerce, and intercourse ought to be free and universal, limited only by the necessities of self-protection and self-preservation.

Holding these views, the American colonists regarded the colonies as commonwealths and free states, and at the same time thought it not inconsistent that these free states and commonwealths should be parts of the English empire and the English commonwealth. They willingly assented to those provisions of the colonial charters which required that the governmental acts of the colonies should be consistent and harmonious with the governmental acts of England. The effect of this was, to make the law of England a supreme law of the colonies, governing, not only the people of the colonies, but the colonies themselves. But to this law they could not yield absolute supremacy consistently with their conception of a supreme and universal law of nature emanating from God. They therefore regarded the English empire and commonwealth, and each of the constituent states, as subject in the first instance to the law of England as a supreme law, but as also subject in the last resort to the law of nature. The English and colonial courts and governments also recognized the law of nations, composed of the principles of international conduct and relationship agreed upon by independent states and manifested in treaties or in their political action, though even this law the American colonists regarded as subordinate to the law of nature. Disputes between the states forming the English empire and commonwealth, involving questions capable of judicial determination, were thus to be decided by courts. The local law of the colony was applied in cases where it was solely applicable, and the law of England or the law of nations were also applied where applicable, the one or the other being supreme according

to the nature of the case; the law of nature governing all cases not covered by the other laws and being supreme over all.

Realizing, however, that there were disputes between states, as between individuals, involving dignity or vital interests, which were not susceptible of decision by the cold and dispassionate methods of investigation and adjudication, and which could only be settled by methods taking into account passions, sentiments and prejudices, they believed that the settlement of disputes between the states composing the English empire and commonealth ought to be in the charge of a specially constituted tribunal fitted by training to act judicially where the judicial method was applicable and to act diplomatically where the judicial method was inapplicable. Yielding reasonable deference to England as the mother country, they were willing to entrust her with the duty of establishing and maintaining such a tribunal. During the colonial period, the people of the colonies consented that the arbitration or adjudication of disputes between the colonies or between one or more of the colonies and England should be conducted before tribunals in England established by the English government for that purpose. When by the Revolution there ceased to be a mother country to act as arbitrator and judge between the American States, it was inevitable that their political, social, and economic beliefs should find expression in a system of their own for carrying on such arbitrations and adjudications.

Having thus attempted to form some conclusion concerning the development of the doctrine of jurisdiction of courts over states as a matter of political, social and economic belief, it becomes necessary to examine the experience of the Americans in the work