charge boldly, and to counteract the present Eastern designs, procured the passage of resolves by the legislature at Albany sustaining firmly the national policy. The present proof of such a plot was, however, scanty, and its production at this time served chiefly to make those implicated more circumspect in their movements.*

Now that the honest people of New England had been led so nearly to the point of rebellious outbreak, partly through the irreparable injury they suffered in property, but more, perhaps, by exasperating and persistent misrepresentations received from Washington as to the President's motives, a singular proof of the inconstancy of parties and party men was furnished. Federalism had swung over to State and reserved rights, Republicanism to a central authority, for the present emergency almost despotic. Pickering, who as Secretary of State would have put a halter about Logan's neck for his self-constituted embassy to France, is seen, when a minority Senator, interfering with foreign relations far more outrageously. Gallatin, once the secretary of a back-county convention in Pennsylvania which used language like that of the Boston town-meeting, is now the soul of the Force Act. Massachusetts stands where Virginia and Kentucky stood in 1798. One party resists the invasion of private rights of property just as the other had the infringement of personal rights. After all, in politics there are no positive maxims; or, rather, political maxims must yield to circumstances and the common-sense of each new exigency. That common-sense must be, after all, the conserving force under a constitutional mechanism so complicated as ours. The fundamentals in which American political parties differ remain a standing source of perplexity to monarchies, yet of those differences, whether reason or prejudice guides, we all partake. In one respect, at least, the majority of 1809 proved wiser than that of 1799; less obstinate and imperious, they quickly abandoned the untenable, and made the sacrifice of pride much lighter by making it in good season.

The downfall of this forcible embargo we must attribute most of all to the panic New England produced at Washing

* See supra, p. 60.

1809.

DOWNFALL OF EMBARGO.

195

ton. Eggs of sedition" was the angry epithet Governor Lincoln bestowed upon the insubordinate town-meetings of his own State. How the resolutions of these New England towns pelted and pattered upon the bewildered administration Jef ferson never forgot. On the coach-box through the blinding storm, but with the reins handed over already to his successor, he played the anxious spectator, though still responsible, and blamed others for doing that which he himself saw no means of preventing. Congress caught the horses by the head and the mild Madison pulled up. New Cabinet combinations had influenced this result, combinations hostile to Gallatin, and which would gladly have left him under the load. In a Congress responsive to the voice of constituents, Lyon, Sloan, Story, Macon, and other House members, who were reckoned among the supporters of the administration, had, even in advance of the Force Bill, shown themselves decidedly opposed to anything like a permanent embargo; and soon after the passage of that bill appeared decided symptoms in Nicholas and others of a disposition to get rid early of the whole harsh policy, with, perhaps, the issue of letters of marque and reprisal, or, as Bacon, of Massachusetts, suggested, the arming of merchant vessels instead.* An early session of the next Congress was fixed upon, to commence May 22d, which seemed to prolong the present experiment, not without reckoning a point of final limitation at which offensive retaliation would begin, if neither belligerent gave way. But so rapid was the revolution of opinion, chiefly among the New England and New York members, that Madison could not hold his party in Congress to their earlier resolve. The alarm of a New England insurrection and Junto plots was spread by Story and young Adams, the ex-Senator first communicating with Giles and others in correspondence, and afterwards in confidential personal interviews, upon arriving at Washington. Feb. 2, 3. Members suddenly changed. The administration was defeated in the House by 73 to 40 on the test of fixing June 1st as the day for removing the embargo; March 4th was substituted. Caucuses now ensued, by which

* The Adamses had favored this same arming of merchant vessels. See John Adams's Works; John Quincy Adams's Diary.

the Republican majority rallied under Giles's efforts to a sort of compromise. Violent remedies, like letters of marque and reprisal, were discountenanced; the embargo was to be raised early in March, except as to Great Britain and France; the war preparation to continue; non-intercourse to be established with both Great Britain and France. Laws were passed accordingly. And thus did Congress hold to a policy of neutral retaliation by restrictions, while forsaking an experiment which had caused much sacrifice of American capital, but whose actual infliction is not to be judged without estimating what losses our mercantile marine must inevitably have suffered without it.*

Whatever unpardonable weakness our government might have displayed by retreating as if panic-stricken from the embargo policy, the new Non-intercourse Act substituted certainly two desirable features. It put both belligerents under the same ban (thus disposing of the pretence that France and the United States had leagued against Great Britain) and permitted the President to suspend prohibitions as to either nation. For the Erskine negotiations, now in progress, of which the public were ignorant, this policy, though not of Madison's first choice, promised favorably. By reopening trade furthermore with the rest of Europe it was believed that foreign powers, neutral at heart, would be encouraged to assert themselves. Nor were there friends of embargo wanting who thought that if our merchants wanted so much to dare all the risks of capture, it was better to indulge them until foreign spoliations should chastise them into an American spirit.†

Both Jefferson and Madison, conscious as they were of maintaining in fact, as they certainly had in theory, neutrality and the rights of the American carrying trade, thought this enterprise too much bloated, too protuberant, for the peace of the nation, exposing us from foreign rivalry to constant menace and insult. Jefferson felt convinced that Great Britain meant

* See Annals of Congress; Jefferson's Works, February, 1809; 6 Hildreth; Acts of January 30th, 1809; March 1st, 1809. The raising of embargo took effect March 15th.

† See Madison's reasons given to Pinkney in detail; Madison's Writings, February 11th, 1809.

1809.

AMERICAN CARRYING TRADE.

197

to drive that trade from the ocean. He did not think American agriculture and manufactures ought to be sacrificed for commerce, but that a just balance should be preserved between the three. His present idea was to encourage home manufactures to the extent of our own consumption, assured that our surplus agriculture would still give commerce enough employment.* To New Englanders of that day this might have seemed a Chinese policy, but their posterity became converts. John Adams, stirred to the liveliest interest in passing events, had given some valuable advice from the storehouse of his own experience. He agreed with Congress in resisting the arbitrary edicts of France and England against our neutral commerce, and more still in reprobating the British impressment of our seamen, the most groundless European pretension of all. He thought we had received from Britain greater injuries than from France; but, in his opinion, non-intercourse and the like coercive expedients would not answer expectations. It was a national error to rely so much upon them, and those much-vaunted measures of 1774 had been chiefly valuable in uniting the American people. Our navy, he thought, ought to be strengthened at this time and fastsailing frigates built, for America could never be respected by foreign powers until they and their commerce were impressed by our resources.†

It was still exceedingly difficult, however, to persuade a Republican Congress to launch into outlay or provide warlike means commensurate with the ends proposed. Story made a forcible speech in the House for the increase of the navy; but Congress only consented, and that with reluctance, to the fittingout and manning of four frigates. It mattered little that foreign commerce had been the great source of our national revenue, and that to protect that commerce the present navy was utterly inadequate. The plain preference was to fight Great Britain by land; to penetrate Canada, if it became needful to fight her at all. Expenditures and heavy loans

* See Madison's and Jefferson's Works, November, 1808; February, 1809.

† John Adams's Works, December 26th, 1808, to Speaker Varnum. Act of January 31st, 1809.

were postponed in view of the approaching extra session of a new Congress. The Senate reduced considerably the House appropriation for works of defence, and suppressed the bill for 50,000 volunteers.*

For better accommodation the Senate came into the new Representatives' Chamber, in the detached south wing, on occasion of this electoral count; the Speaker preserving the dignity of the popular body by relinquishing his chair of accord to the President of the Senate, so as to avoid all punctilio as to rightful precedence. Madison and Clinton were declared elected to their respective places.†

So much of this animated session of Congress had been absorbed by the embargo policy that only one domestic act of consequence passed, namely, for dividing the Indiana Territory, so as to establish two separate governments, all that part west of the Wabash River to be thenceforth known as the Territory of Illinois.‡

In the retiring President's message was noted the turn our commercial suspension had given to American industry by encouraging the investment of capital in home manufactures; a new condition of things, which, with cheaper materials and protecting duties, he thought might be made permanent.§ A halo of prosperity encircled this administration to the last. Revenue losses by the embargo falling, as they would, under the next annual account, the receipts for 1808 showed a total of nearly $18,000,000. This was the culminating point of our national income, in fact, until wars were fought and ended. Under Jefferson's rule about $33,580,000 of the public debt had been paid. The year 1809 opened with a handsome surplus in the treasury above all the public indebtedness capable at present of being cancelled; a surplus, alas, soon to disappear. Upon what new era of magnificent internal improve

* Annals of Congress.

† lb. John Randolph was very strenuous that the House should not yield here its dignity to that of the Senate.

Act of February 3d, 1809.

Numerous petitions for protection to specified mining and manu facturing interests were presented at this session, but not acted upon.