1809. ERSKINE IS RECALLED. 289 for doubt on that point. Erskine was rebuked by his government for permitting reparation to be promised for the Chesapeake, after the turn the American Secretary had given to that correspondence; and as for withdrawal of Orders in Council, apart from the positive conditions stated, or in return for merely removing the embargo and non-intercourse, that was wholly inadequate recompense. Not to exasperate the United States, however, to the point of war, which of course was undesirable, the British ministry raised the obnoxious Orders so far as to absolve American property already shipped on the faith of this unfortunate misunderstanding, but recalling Erskine at the same time, and sending another minister in his place. The President had no choice but to restore immediately the suspension of intercourse, with, of course, a corresponding indulgence to British vessels which had been misled by Erskine's blunder, and, so far as the legislation of Congress would permit, to return to the Jefferson anchorage. This he did upon cabinet advice, making proclamation accordingly; and, having done so, the Executive waited until Congress should reassemble. August 9. But meantime Erskine's successor arrived in September. Gallatin was not wrong in surmising that this functionary's mission would be "to amuse and divide;"* and, indeed, Francis James Jackson, whom Canning dispatched for that purpose, did not belie the reputation he had acquired in Denmark diplomacy as an edge-tool against neutrals. His business was sounded and disposed of very soon after his arrival in Washington; for bringing with him neither explanations to our government, nor authority to substitute new proposals in place of those rejected by Canning, and treating the Chesapeake outrage as though the first step toward adjustment ought to come from the United States, his correspondence soon turned to insolence, and Nov. 13. Secretary Smith cut it short. The British ministry * Adams's Gallatin, 397. † Jackson's offence consisted in reiterating a charge which the Canning ministry inspired, that Madison's cabinet knew the limits of Erskine's instructions in the first place, and had willingly led that minister on to transcend them. On the other hand the belief was strong on this side of the water that Canning had played upon the credulity of the VOL. II. 25 would wisely have sustained the just compact of Erskine, or at least offered the best possible in its place, but they were too closely bound up in the sordid schemes of London merchants not to substitute for the rightful commerce of neutrals, as Madison has expressed it, "an illicit commerce of their own.”* Our new administration was in a sad quandary; with no casus belli, on the one hand, sufficient to unite the resources of this country against Great Britain, and on the other not the slightest assurance that peace could be procured short of selfabasement. That Madison would gladly have accepted the olive branch from England is evident from his temperament and the whole tenor of his official conduct at this period, and already had he postponed impressment for the sake of closing with Erskine upon the other delicate points at issue. His predecessor had fulminated by proclamation, and favored every other peaceful expedient not dishonorable far sooner than plunge into the "maniac war" now raging abroad. Less inclined to theorize, Madison followed in Jefferson's path, anxiously consulting him; and both had constantly admitted that while American policy should be to avoid war by fair neutrality and the settlement of differences, this failing, war would have to come, and American rights be maintained by force. But now how was war practicable? The events of the past winter had shown that the Eastern States would endure neither embargo nor immediate war. Non-intercourse was contemptible at best; and now that the cage-door had been flung open on the Erskine settlement, the flown bird of comUnited States, and, after ascertaining how far our government would go, abandoned the minister whose frankness first elicited our confidence. Neither of these charges, probably, had just foundation. See President's opening message at second session and documents accompanying. Jackson's character and temper are disclosed in Bath Archives, cited in Adams's Gallatin, 394. * See Madison's Writings, January 17th, 1810. † See Jefferson's Works passim, March-July, 1809; Madison, ibid.; and more particularly Madison to Monroe, March 26, 1811 (among the Monroe Papers), which states that in this latter respect there had been entire concurrence in the councils since 1800. Jefferson wrote Kosciusko, February, 1810, that ever since the Chesapeake affair the United States had been preparing for war. Jefferson's Works. 1809. THE WAR-CLOUD RETURNS. 291 merce would not willingly return. "We are not so well prepared for resistance," wrote Gallatin in July, "as we were one year ago. All, or almost all, our mercantile wealth was safe at home, our resources entire, and our finances sufficient to carry us through during the first year of the contest. Our property is now all afloat. England, relieved by our relaxations, might stand two years of privation with ease. We have wasted our resources without any national utility, and our treasury being exhausted, we must begin our plan of resistance with considerable and therefore unpopular loans."* France had not lent a helping hand in this dilemma. Upon news that the Erskine settlement had failed the Emperor, now in the plenitude of renown and influence, and flushed with the victory of Wagram, sought to direct American resentment against Great Britain, as the first and sole aggressor upon neutral rights. "Let England revoke her blockade of France," wrote Champagny, somewhat disdainfully, to Armstrong, "and France will recall her decree of blockade against England; let England revoke her Orders of November, 1807, and the Milan Decree will expire of itself." Yet all the while Bonaparte was encouraging spoliations of every kind, scarcely tolerating, in fact, a commerce which did not subserve his ambition. Danish and French privateers scoured together the northern seas, and imperial notice was given that the continental ports of Europe would not be permitted to enjoy any commercial advantages of which France herself was deprived.‡ Nov. 27. It was a discouraging picture of foreign relations that Madison had to present to Congress at its second session. But he sketched the situation soberly, and referred the whole subject, with its accompanying correspondence, to the wisdom of that body. Nov. 29. Of wisdom, at this unlooked-for juncture, Congress, unfortunately, had little to impart. Its councils now appeared as distracted as they had lately been harmonious. The session opened with personal quarrels and duels, drifted along through * Gallatin's Works, July 27th, 1809. Ibid. prolix and purposeless debates, and finally reached the state of utter stagnation and imbecility. The Executive will, which had gently shaped the course of a mediocre legislature these many years, was missed, and the times no longer permitted the two houses to do nothing, and then happily adjourn. Cliques and jealousies cropped out everywhere, and nothing was so conspicuous as the absence of administration leaders from the floor. Aside from Randolph, who now staid away until a late stage of the session, the talented opposition in the Representatives' wing showed a formidable array, their plan of operations being the simple one, to annoy and prevent legislation. For though in the new shock with Great Britain both parties had been thrown from their pivot, the Federalists in authority fairly agreed in asking that American commerce be let alone and left to adjust its own foreign relations, a policy which could mean nothing but practical submission to England. Republicans and the uncommercial classes on the other hand, like their national representatives, were sadly divided; some, directed by presses like the Aurora and the inveterate haters of England, were for waging an immediate and open war with that country; but against such counsels a deficit in the national treasury-which Gallatin's report now exhibited for the first time under his stewardship*was a cogent argument, besides the danger of becoming entangled with an Emperor who kept even allies in abject terror. Many would now have returned to the embargo had they dared; but most were for half-way measures of some sort, such as they felt, nevertheless, incapable of originating. The mass of our people were patriotic but bewildered, and, as commonly happens at the initial point, looking for some miraculous deliverance, as though cabinets and functionaries had a more accommodating spirit than ordinary mortals. The foreign portion of the President's Message was referred, in each branch, to a select committee, as usual, Giles heading the Senate committee, Macon that of the House. Giles pres This was the tardy though temporary effect of the embargo. The annual expenses of the government, exclusive of payments on account of the principal of the debt, had exceeded the annual receipts by nearly $1,300,000. 1810. CONGRESS DEBATES ANGRILY. 293 Dec. 11. ently reported to the Senate a resolve which reprobated the conduct of Jackson, the British minister, and commended the Executive for refusing to hold further intercourse with him. After a spirited speech, in which Giles entreated all to make their own government the rallying point, the resolve passed the Senate without debate, by an expression nearly unanimous, only the Massachusetts and Connecticut Senators recording their votes against it. But in the House this resolve met with a persistent opposition from the Federalists, led by Quincy, Dana, Pitkin, and Gardenier, whose tactics were first to gain time by calling for information, next to talk it down. Every dilatory expedient was tried against the majority, and every argument, smooth or irritating, employed, until, after tedious days of debate, terminating in a consecutive session of nineteen hours, the main question was taken, and the resolution passed by 72 to 41. It was this unpleasant experience, following that of the embargo force act discussion, a year earlier, which first led the House seriously to consider whether the previous question ought not to have the effect of stopping debate, a parliamentary rule too obnoxious to free speech to be carried until provocation was once more given.* 1810. Jan. 4. Jan. Widely as this debate had laid open various personal controversies respecting the British rejection of Erskine's arrangement, controversies which Erskine's published letters to his government had initiated by seeming to exhibit Madison and Gallatin, just after the Presidential election, as parties willing to ingratiate themselves with Canning at Jefferson's loss,†the resolve after all amounted to nothing, so far as fixing a policy was concerned. A bill which Giles meant should accompany it, authorizing the President to send offending ministers out of the country, after being carried through the Senate with difficulty was smothered in the House. * Annals of Congress, December, 1809-January, 1810. In February, 1811, after the desperate effort of a minority to defeat the new Non-intercourse Act, this new rule was established. This reflection was thrown chiefly upon Gallatin, who cleared himself to Jefferson's entire satisfaction, as doubtless did Madison. Adams's Gallatin. |