In naval as well as military equipment, Clay advocated the most liberal provision, rising, like Cheves and Lowndes, superior to the narrow prejudices of his party in that respect. One strong reason, and perhaps the only strong one, against engaging in a war with England at this time to vindicate American rights and character was the inadequacy of American resources. Quincy, after supporting the most lavish expenditures in the direction of war, was not free to allege this; while Randolph had been too plentiful in unsound objections to give to a sound one anything like its just force. They, of course, whose minds were set on a spirited resentment, were too willing to believe our national resources boundless, and to let the troublesome burden of providing supplies rest on Gallatin's broad shoulders. Gallatin himself had lately committed an error of judgment neither unnatural nor unpardonable in a statesman holding by the American tenure. Like the President himself he dreaded war, but more still the danger of drowning should he buffet the current. Recent dealings with the legislature had disposed him to cultivate and not to provoke. His report, therefore, at the opening of the session, favored the prevailing temper as much as possible. A short season of open trade had so increased the receipts of the Treasury that current demands for 1811 could be met, with a surplus of over $5,000,000 besides. Non-intercourse would lessen the next year's revenue, however, 1811, Nov. 25. stroyed the commerce and trampled on the rights of every nation; when she has attempted to annihilate every vestige of the public maritime code of which she professes to be the champion? Shall we bear the cuffs and scoffs of British arrogance because we may entertain chimerical fears of French subjugation? . . . We cannot secure our independence of one power by a dastardly submission to the will of another. . . . . When did submission to one wrong induce an adversary to cease his encroachments on the party submitting? But we are told that we ought only to go to war when our territory is invaded. How much better than invasion is the blocking of our very ports and harbors, insulting our towns, plundering our merchants, and scouring our coasts? If our fields are surrounded, are they in a better condition than if invaded? When the murderer is at our doors, shall we meanly skulk to our cells, or shall we boldly oppose him at the entrance?”-Annals of Congress, December, 1811; January, 1812. 1812. GALLATIN'S ESTIMATES. 345 while the new armaments must necessarily have enhanced the expenditures; but for this and future deficiencies the customs might be increased one-half. The impression conveyed by Gallatin's report was that, with this moderate increase of burdens, he could meet by loans any extraordinary expenses, even those of war itself. 1812. Jan. 10-20. But when the Secretary saw how rapidly the war spirit was rising throughout the Union, he felt compelled to reconsider these estimates and explain points where the House Committee on Ways and Means had swept far beyond his meaning. The project of prosecuting war by loans only, as he now informed that committee, had reference to a former state of things, and particularly to the continuance of the national bank. Interest on loans must be annually met, while war would reduce the receipts of customs. After doubling the impost, reimposing the old duty on salt, and allowing for sales of the public lands, the net revenue for war times must fall short of the immediate annual requirements, in the present state of the national finances, by upward of $4,000,000. To cover such deficiencies, internal taxation must be resorted to. This revised estimate, reported to the House, produced great consternation, and for a moment the war party was thrown quite out of gear. The Secretary's personal enemies were furious against him. lent party papers declared him feeble, decrepit, cowardly, and a sly opponent of spirited measures against England. But figures are stubborn, and soon the House leaders prepared to take Gallatin at his word. Plans of internal revenue were considered, but, with Gallatin's concurrence, the subject was finally postponed until after the recess. Meanwhile, custom duties were doubled,* Treasury notes bearing interest were authorized to the amount of $5,000,000,† and, first of all, a six per cent. loan of $11,000,000 was granted, which the Treasury, deprived of its accustomed agency, found no little difficulty in placing.§ Jan. 20. The vio Resolutions, emphatically sustaining Congress and the na * Act of July 1st, 1812. Act of March 14th, 1812. See Act of July 6th, 1812, c. 136. tional government in its bold attitude, came from every quarter of the Union. The several State legislatures, assembling in fall or winter session, began to place the militia on a war footing,-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee all pledging support to the general government, whatever its measure of resistance. The governors of the great States, with scarcely an exception, exhibited the heartiest zeal in the common cause.* March 9. Madison, not quite at ease in his chimney corner, stirred the blaze, communicating to Congress, as occasion offered, the latest news from abroad, and fresh letters as they passed between Monroe and Foster. Great Britain was tenacious of its points during this diplomatic contest, and no change for the better appeared. In March, a batch of documents 1812, was laid before Congress, which John Henry, an Irish adventurer, whose claims for remuneration the Perceval ministry had lightly regarded, sold, in a soured frame of mind, to our Executive, for $50,000, from the secret service funds. These documents revealed a confidential mission to Boston, undertaken by him early in 1809, in the midst of the embargo excitement, at the request of Sir James Craig, the British Governor of Canada. In the letter of instructions, Craig expressed the official belief that the Eastern Federalists meant to bring about a separation of the American States, should they prevail at the approaching elections; and Henry was directed to ascertain how far in such an event they would be disposed to look to England for assistance, or enter into connections with the mother country. To this extent Henry was fully accredited, and, moreover, for the purpose of learning the true political state of affairs in New England. Henry's correspondence showed that he proceeded upon this mission, reaching Boston March 5th, and remaining in that March 5. vicinity about three months, when, on account of 1809. the Erskine arrangement, he was recalled. His numerous letters, addressed to Craig's secretary, embodied the opinion that the Massachusetts legislature, in case of war, would invite a Congress from the adjoining States * See Niles's Register, September, 1811, to March, 1812. 1809. THE HENRY DISCLOSURES. 347 and take the lead in setting up a northern confederacy, but that Federalists were wary, as a body, and the idea of withdrawing from the Union so unpopular that it could only be contemplated as a last resort. Henry's letters named no person, and only conveyed general impressions. It was notorious that much of his time had been spent in disreputable haunts at Boston. As an exposure, therefore, of Eastern separatists, by one conversant with their counsels, this correspondence fell short of the effect which might have been anticipated. The loyalty of New England Federalists in the mass was indisputable. Leaders of the party, now most prominent at the East, hastened to disavow all connection with the plot; the Essex Junto, however, who had been thrown lately into the background, keeping silence, and permitting friends less suspected to answer for them. A British spy who could sell official secrets to his country's foes was easily discredited. But Henry's disclosures had a value in establishing the fact of a British intrigue to promote the disunion of the American States. Craig's instructions were undoubtedly genuine, and these documents showed that Henry's reports had been officially transmitted by way of Canada to the home government. Would the Governor of Canada have taken a step like this without the knowledge or privity of the British ministry? Craig was now dead, and upon a dead man the living ministry bestowed all the obloquy of the mission when pressed in Parliament for an explanation. It was under Canning, however, that Henry's mission had been sanctioned, if at all. And the British ministerial party used every pretext to stifle inquiry; refusing in the House of Lords, by a large majority, to have the correspondence produced. Lord Holland declared, and with truth, that until such an investigation should be had, the fact that Great Britain bad entered into a dishonorable and atrocious intrigue against a friendly power would stand unrefuted.* 1812, May. * See Annals of Congress; 6 Hildreth; Lossing, 219. It is absurd to suppose that Sir James Craig's reference to New England's plans for a separation, in his letter of instructions to Henry, had no basis whatWe are justified in looking back to page 182 for such a basis. ever. All things hurried now so rapidly to war that the President had either to lead or be left behind. Amiable though he was and a skilful tactician, Madison had not the energy and decision requisite either for inspiring or sustaining the public at this grave crisis. The imperious majority in the House grew impatient while he vacillated. His cabinet, on the whole, was more prudent than daring. Monroe, alone, smacked of the soldierly instinct. Eustis, the worthy Secretary of War, had been bred a physician, and taught to heal not to kill, nor could crutches make of such a sire an ablebodied man. Paul Hamilton's calibre was adapted to the management of our navy on its peace establishment, and for that lesser task he had been selected. The war party in Congress, with Clay at their head, and popular enthusiasm cheering them on, resolved to bring the executive to the plunge. The time approached for nominating the next President in caucus. They laid the British programme they had arranged before Madison and his cabinet. This programme contemplated a short embargo to be followed by war.* It is related that Madison acceded to the plan, or rather pledged himself to recommend war, for the sake of Here we find direct overtures from the "Pickering party" to Rose as early as 1808. The chain of communication was probably from Pickering to Rose, from Rose to Canning, from Canning to Craig, and from Craig back again to the "Pickering party." Few Federalists probably were in the secret of this plot. Jefferson's suspicions had taken such a direction. See 6 Jefferson's Works, 50, April 20th, 1812. And one particular of these overtures may have been that the Eastern States were not to formally separate from the Union (a measure much too strong for Eastern people to consent to), but to take a neutral stand in consideration of peace and a free commerce with Great Britain. Ib.; and see Adams's New England Federalism. Erskine and Jackson, while in this country as ministers, appear to have studied into New England Federalism, in pursuance, probably, of the same line of British policy. See Niles's Register, March 9th, 1812. * Clay's formal proposal to Monroe (after a morning's conversation) may be found in the Monroe Correspondence, March 15th, 1812. A thirty days' embargo would, he thought, be good notification, and by the time it expired the Hornet would return from Europe with good news or bad. |