had freely chosen to stay outside the union. They failed to explain that every man working in the mines of the large corporations knew that if he made union connections he did so at the risk of his job. They did not explain how it happened that when the strike was called ninety-five per cent. of the men struck in spite of the protection which the state of Colorado was ready to afford all men who helped to break the strike.

The mine owners, it was apparent, had good ground for insisting that union recognition and the union shop were in Colorado virtually one and the same thing; they knew that if the men were free they would seek the protection of the union against the exploitation of the company and the anarchy of state officials; they knew that there was not a miner in Colorado who would not prefer to work under the regulations which the United Mine Workers had established in other coal-producing states rather than under the conditions imposed by the coal corporations of Colorado.

As the strike advanced it became rather difficult for the operators to convince the public that miners who were free would prefer to work ten hours instead of eight; that they would prefer to accept the report of an operators' representative to one of their own as to the amount of coal they mined per day; that they chose to work ten per cent. below the scale of wages fixed by the unon; that they welcomed restrictions as to where they should or should not

make personal purchases; that it was their pleasure to erect timbers, and hew out unmarketable material for the corporations without pay. A representative of the corporations, testifying before a Congressional Commission, assured that commission that the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company would spend millions of dollars to protect the miners of Colorado and other American workingmen in their freedom to follow their preference for the conditions enumerated. For reasons which did not seem strange, not one miner out of the thousands of "loyal" and "faithful" servants raised a voice of gratitude for the proposed protection.

Before the strike was over it was possible for everyone in the United States to realize once and forever that the operators of Colorado fought union recognition because they knew that that would open the door to the miners to choose freely, and they knew what their choice would be. They also knew that, where the miners had freed themselves from the domination of the corporations, safety in mining increased; that higher wages were paid; that hours of work were shortened.

During the strike, Professor E. R. A. Seligman asked why Colorado mining should be exempt from the generally accepted practice of determining the working conditions of miners through union conference with operators. He called attention to the development of the practice of such conferences in other states. He stated that during the sixties, the sev

enties, and the eighties there were local organizations and local strikes in the bituminous coal fields of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania; that the demands during that period were recognition of the union, increase in wages, decrease in hours, abolition of company stores, right of unions to supervise the weighing of the coal mined. These demands, the same as those the miners were making in Colorado in 1914, were finally secured, and collective bargaining was established. In 1894 a general business depression interrupted contractural relations between miners and operators, and in the first general strike occurring at that time the miners lost ground. In the second general strike, in 1897, interstate joint conferences with the operators were secured, together with the eight-hour day, an increase in wages, and a system for settling disputes over interpretations of contracts. In 1899-1900, in the coal fields of Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, a strike resulted in the recognition of the union, the establishment of a scale of wages, the inauguration of another interstate joint conference. Between 1899-1914 systems of joint agreements extended to Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Michigan, Iowa, Wyoming, Montana, Washington, and British Columbia. It is against a union with such a regard for establishing collective bargaining that the coal operators of Colorado have waged their war and for the extinction of he union have defied the laws of the state.

The strike of the cloak makers in New York in 1910 resulted in popularizing a modification of the idea of the union shop. As a compromise proposition an agreement based on a preferential shop was adopted. In a preferential shop an employer agrees to give preference to union members. As a matter of fact, the preferential shop is the union shop where a union is strong and it is an open shop where the union

is weak.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNION LABEL

Purpose of the A. F. of L. label-Ground of employers' acceptance-Claims for the label as a method of organizationAs used by the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union-Why it is successful in some trades and not in others-Not a business proposition, but a moral obligation-Inter-union label difficulties-Ethical and educational proposition.

THE use of a label as a union emblem is advocated by both the American Federation and the Industrial Workers. It has not been developed by the latter organization, but it has been put to the test as a method of organization by the Federation.

Its purpose in the hands of the Federation is to give an opportunity to every man and woman as a consumer to uphold the organizations of the Federation by demanding union-label goods.

The label is a guarantee to the interested consumer that the goods he purchases are made under union conditions, mutually agreed to by the employer and the union. In exchange for these concessions to the workers, the union promises the employer to encourage the patronage of union members and friends.

The label agreement may follow or precede the organization of workers in a shop. That is, an em