tions arising on contract may be joined with actions arising out of tort: Pomeroy's Rights, Remedies, and Practice, sec. 463. It would seem that while the causes of action must affect all the parties to a suit, it is not necessary that they should affect all of them equally or in the same manner. It seems to us that the "transaction" out of which both causes of action arose in this case was the alleged wrongful payment by the bank to the association of the funds (or part of them) left there on deposit. The association wrongfully collected from the plaintiffs more than was due on the bond, and the bank participated in and aided such collection by paying to the association the money of the plaintiffs so deposited. The first cause of action is the wrongful collection of the money by the association from the bank; the second cause of action is the wrongful paying of the money by the bank to the association, both arising out of the same transaction, i. e., the payment and receipt of the $1,293.43. We think there was no error in the order appealed from on this ground.

3. It is claimed that there could be no cause of action against the Bank of Cheraw until the accounts between the plaintiffs and the defendant association are adjusted. Without again repeating the facts out of which this case arose, it is sufficient to say that such contention would probably be true, if the Bank of Cheraw had not adjusted and determined for itself the amount due, and in violation of the agreement paid the money over to the association.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

CORPORATIONS-FOREIGN-SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON. When a corporatien organized and doing business under the law of one state contracts a debt through its authorized agent in another state, he is so far its managing agent there that service of summons upon him for the debt while he is temporarily within the state will bind the corporation: Klopp v. Crescent City etc. Waterworks Co. 34 Neb. 808; 33 Am. St. Rep. 666. See Aldrich v. Anchor Coal etc. Co., 24 Or. 32; 41 Am. St. Rep. 831, and note; extended note to Hampson v. Weare, 66 Am. Dec. 121.

CORPORATIONS-FOREIGN--SERVICE OF PROCESS WHEN AGENCY TO RECEIVE TERMINATES.-A corporation that transacts business in another state, and appoints an agent to receive service of process there, pursuant to a statute of that state requiring this, is bound by service of process on that agent at any time before the party causing the service has notice of the termination of the agency: Capen v. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co., 25 N. J. L. 67; 64 Am. Dec. 412, and note.

PLEADING-DEMURRER-JURISDICTION.-A demurrer to a complaint can be interposed only for objections appearing on its face: Mitchell v. Thorne, 134 N. Y. 536; 30 Am. St. Rep. 699. See Iron Age etc. Co. v. Union Tel. Co., 83 Ala. 498; 3 Am. St. Rep. 758; Winston v. Taylor, 28 Mo. 82;.75 Am Dec. 112.

PLEADING-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.-Many causes of action under the code practice may be joined in one petition: Mooney v. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551; 61 Am. Dec. 576. In California, a cause of action in tort may be united with a cause of action on contract, if both arise out of the same transaction: Jones v. Steamship Cortes, 17 Cal. 487; 79 Am. Dec. 142. See Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal 632; 87 Am. Dec. 142.

GRAHAM V. FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.

[48 SOUTH CAROLINA, 195.]

INSURANCE-EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF INSURED PROPERTY.--When a policy of insurance on personal property has been issued to A B, providing that the loss should be payable to C D as his interest may appear, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that C D was the owner of the property, but that it was in possession of A B at the time he effected the insurance thereon, who was interested in the preservation of the property, for the reason that he was in possession as superintendent of C D, and entitled to profits resulting from the use of the property in the business in which he was employed.

INSURANCE-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY, FAILURE TO CORRECTLY DISCLOSE.-Where a policy of insurance purports to be in favor of A B, loss payable to C D as his interest may appear, parol evidence is admissible to prove what were the respective interests of A B and C D, and that the latter was the owner of the property, but the former was in possession as superintendent or agent, and as such had some insurable interest therein.

INSURANCE- ESTOPPEL TO DENY LIABILITY - EVI DENCE.-Where a policy of insurance issues to A B, loss, if any, payable to C D as his interest may appear, evidence is properly received for the purpose of showing that the insurer is estopped from defending on the ground that C D's ownership was not disclosed in the policy, to prove that the agents of the insurer, after the loss occurred and they were notified of C D's ownership, required him to repair to his home in another state in order that he might furnish proofs of loss from his own books, and that, after inspecting proofs made from such books, they directed further proofs of loss to be made by the insured.

INSURANCE-NOTICE GIVEN TO AGENT.-Evidence is properly received of directions given by the insured to his agent to procure a policy for him, if it further appears that such directions were communicated to an agent of the insured.

INSURANCE EVIDENCE OF NOTICE TO AGENT OR AGENT'S CLERK.-If an agent issuing a policy of insurance has notice of facts which by conditions therein specified make it void when issued, the insurer must be deemed to have waived those conditions. As tending to prove such notice, evidence may be received that it was given to a clerk of the agent, and that the agent soon afterward issued a policy, and of the subsequent canceling of the policy, after which he as agent of another insurance corporation, issued another policy on terms which tended to prove that in issuing it he had in his mind the information received as agent before issuing the prior policy as the agent of another insurer.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS OF AGENTS.-For the purpose of proving that an insurance corporation had notice of the ownership of property insured at the time of issuing a policy thereon, evi

dence is admissible that the agent who issued such policy admitted that he had such notice.

INSURANCE - ESTOPPEL - WAIVER.-THE DEFENSE that the insured was not the sole and unconditional owner of the property cannot be made where it appears that the agent of the insufer was informed that the true ownership of the property was in one C D at the time the insurance was effected, and thereupon issued the policy payable to the insured instead of to C D, but making the loss payable to C D as his interest may appear.

INSURANCE-ESTOPPEL AGAINST INSURED.-One receiving and retaining a policy of insurance is not estopped thereby from proving that his interest or ownership is different from that therein disclosed, if, before receiving the policy, he truly stated such interest and ownership to an agent of the insurer.

INSURABLE INTEREST.-One in whose possession property is as superintendent for its owner, and who has agreed to have it insured, and who has a contract to be employed as such superintendent for a term of years, and whose family, in the event of his death before the expiration of that term, may be entitled to an annual salary from such owner, has an insurable interest in the property.

Action by John M. Graham and G. H. Tilton against the American Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia. The judge presiding at the trial instructed the jury that anyone having an interest against the loss of property by fire might insure such interest that an insurable interest existed in favor of every person who might fairly be said to have a reasonable expectation of deriving pecuniary advantage from the preservation of the subject matter of the insurance, whether such advantage inured to him personally or as representing the rights or interests of another, and that persons chargeable, either by law, custom, or contract, with the duty of caring for and protecting property in behalf of others, or having a right to so protect such property, though not bound thereto by law, or who would receive a benefit from the continued existence of the property, whether they had any title or lien upon, or possession of it, or not, had an insurable interest therein, The court refused the request of defendant's counsel to instruct the jury that Graham did not have an insurable interest in the property, and stated that it so refused because it appeared from the contract received in evidence that Graham had been appointed by Tilton as superintendent to take charge of and to protect and preserve the property; and the court granted the request of the plaintiffs that the jury be charged that if they believed from the evidence that Tilton put Graham in possession of the property as his agent or superintendent for the purpose of dealing with it in the ordinary course of business, and if Graham was under contract with Tilton to insure the property, then that Graham had an insurable interest therein; and the court further charged that if Graham had possession of the property and sus

tained such relation to it that he might suffer pecuniary loss from its destruction by fire, that he had an insurable interest therein. The court further instructed the jury that the burden was upon plaintiffs to prove that the insurance company had notice of the relations existing with reference to the property between Tilton and Graham, but that if the jury had concluded from the evidence that Mr. Jones had knowledge as an agent of the defendant of such relation, and the company, knowing these facts, accepted the premium upon the policy and issued it in the form in which it was issued, then that the insurer could not successfully defend on the ground that the true ownership of the property was not disclosed in the policy. The court also instructed the jury that notice to an agent was notice to his principal, and, if they believed from the evidence that Allen Jones was the agent of the defendant in issuing and delivering the policy sued upon, then that the defendant was chargeable with notice of such facts as were then known to said Jones. With respect to the claim made by the plaintiffs that the insurer, after learning through its adjuster of the facts upon which it now sought to defend, led the insured to believe that it still recognized the validity of the policy by inducing and encouraging them to incur expense and troul le in preparing and furnishing proofs of loss, the jury was instructed that then the insurer is estopped from insisting upon any ground of objection then known to it as a defense to the action. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs; the defendant appealed.

Trenholm, Rhett and Miller and John T. Sloan, for the appel

lants.

J. S. Muller and John T. Seibels, contra.

214 POPE, J. The defendant, on the fifth day of April, 1894, issued to the plaintiff, John M. Graham, its policy of insurance, wherein, for a premium of fifteen dollars, it agreed to indemnify against loss by fire "his stock of material for 215 the manufacture of cotton and woolen hosiery, raw, wrought, and in process thereof, while contained in the two-story brick and shingle roof building situated within the walls of the South Carolina Penitentiary, at Columbia, South Carolina. Any loss that may be ascertained and proved due the assured shall be payable to G. H. Tilton, as his interest may appear." The policy contained the usual printed stipulations of those issued on personal property. Two of these, however, were in these words: "This policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or misrepresented, in writing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstance

concerning this insurance, or the subject thereof, or if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated herein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after loss. . . . . This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void. . . . if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership." On the twentyfifth day of April, 1894, the stock of material, valued at more than five thousand dollars, was destroyed by fire, except about six hundred dollars' worth; thus the loss was about four thousand four hundred dollars. There was concurrent insurance—three policies each for one thousand dollars, which latter was the amount named in the policy issued by defendant. Soon after the fire an agent of the defendant, with agents of the companies which had issued concurrent insurance, were on hand to adjust the loss, or rather losses. G. H. Tilton also appeared on the scene; his home was in the state of New Hampshire. John M. Graham informed the insurance companies at once that G. H. Tilton was the sole owner of the material insured, and that his (Graham's) connection with the hosiery manufactory was superintendent. After some time proofs of loss were submitted. Three of the companies paid up in full, but the defendant company declined to do so. Hence this suit. The complaint alleges the ownership of the property destroyed by fire to be in G. H. Tilton, but that the 216 same was in the sole custody and control of John M. Graham, under a contract therefor between Graham and Tilton, which included the insurance of the property against loss and damage by fire; that under said contract the said Graham was to receive from said Tilton an annual compensation for his services so long as said contract was of force, and that the said Graham was pecuniarily interested in the preservation and continued existence of said property. The contract for insurance was set out, inclusive of the policy itself, as part of the complaint. In the fourth clause of the complaint was set out the allegation that the insurance company was aware that Tilton owned the property, but that the same was in the exclusive possession of said Graham, and that he had a pecuniary interest in the preservation of said property, and that the policy of insurance was is sued by the defendant in the name of the plaintiff, J. M. Graham, with the indorsement in favor of said G. H. Tilton, as his interest might appear, primarily for the benefit of Tilton, but also for the benefit of said Graham as aforesaid, and that the