416. Butler v. Shearer. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. Judgment affirmed. No report.

419.. Pepple et al. v. Pierce et al. Error to the District Court of Auglaize county. Dismissed for want of preparation.

434. Armstrong v. Garrett et al.

Error to the District Court of Franklin County. Dismissed for want of preparation.

442. Selman et al. v. Selman. Error to the District Court of Brown County. Dismissed for want of preparation.

443. Smith et al. v. Barnum. Error to the District Court of Brown County. Dismissed for want of preparation.

444. Smith et al. v. Manchester. Error to the District Court of Brown County. Dismissed for want of preparation.

MOTION DOCKET.

35. Bowen v. Rice. Motion to re-instate cause No. 276, General Docket. An inspection of the record discloses no ground sufficient to disturb the judgment below. Motion overruled. No report.

57. Bills et al. v. Bills, administrator, &c. Motion to re-instate cause No. 338, General Docket. Motion granted.

DIGEST OF CASES.

Bank Deposit-Applying Deposit on Note-Bank Check-What is.—A banker has no right to apply money on deposit in his bank to the payment of a note of the depositor payable at the bank, without the order of the depositor. 2. An instrument drawn by a depositor on a bank in the following form after giving the date and the name of the bank: “Pay to A and B for account of C & Co., ten hundred and eighteen and 23-100 dollars," and signed by the depositor, is a valid bank check and will operate to transfer to the payees an amount of the drawers' funds, on deposit, equal to the sum named on its face. The words " for account of C. & Co." do not change its character as a check.

3. In Name of Trustee.—A bank check payable to attorneys on account of a debt due from the drawers to the clients of the attorneys vests the legal title in the payees named as trustees for the clients, and a suit thereon against the bank is properly brought in the names of the payees. Ridgely Nat'l Bank v. Patten. Sup. Ct. Ill., March 26, 1884.

Corporation-Foreign-Imposition of License Constitutional.-A corporation incorporated under the laws of another state is a "foreign corporation" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Revenue Act of June 7, 1879, which requires a licensee to have an office in this commonwealth. The said act imposing such license is not in conflict with the constitution of the United States nor that of this state. Pembina Consolidated Mining & Milling Co. v. The Commonwealth. Sup. Ct. Pa. Pitts. Leg. Jour., May 21, 1884.

Carrier-Railroad as Intermediate Carrier-Responsibility.—The defendant railroad was an intermediate carrier on a through route of connecting carriers. Its obligations therefore were only those belonging to an intermediate carrier arising out of the implied contract springing from the receipt of the goods. These bound it for safe carriage over its own line, and for delivery or tender to the next carrier beyond within reasonable time. Defendant received cotton and transported it safely and promptly to Norfolk, and tendered it to the steamship company, the next link in the chain of connecting carriers. The steamship company, owing to the unusual press of business, was unable to receive or forward it, and requested defendant company to store the cotton on one of its own wharves, and to insure it, and promised to charter an extra steamer and send it to the railroad wharf to load, within a short time. This was done. There was a delay in the arrival of the steamer, and before it was sent the cotton was destroyed by fire. Held. That defendant company had done everything that could be done, and that it was in no wise liable, it being shown that there was no other way of forwarding the cotton over other lines open to the defendant company. Deming et al. v. The Norfolk and Western R. R. C. U. S. C. C., E. D. Pa. Phila, Leg. Int., May 30, 1884.

Garnishment of Common Carrier for Goods in Transit.—When an officer of the company was served with garnishee summons at 5 A. M., of March 2, 1882, at Milwaukee, at which time the property in question was already in transit and without the limits of the state, and within two and a half hours thereafter was delivered to the person entitled to receive it under the contract by which the company held possession when the summons was served at Chicago, Ills., held, that as a question of law the service was insufficient to charge the company as garnishee. Held, notwithstanding the general language in the statute, section 2,752, that the personal property or real estate in his possession or under his control must be limited to personal property or real estate within this state, and in absence of fraud or connivance on the part of the garnishee to aid the debtor in defrauding creditors, personal property or real estate lawfully in possession or under control of the garnishes is not subject to garnishment. Held, a common carrier is not liable upon a garnishee summons for personal chattels in its possession, in actual transit at the time the summons is served. Bates v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., as garnishee of Cunningham. Sup. Ct. Wis. 16 Chic. L. N. 596.

Practice Withdrawing Case from Jury-Life Insurance-Insanity— Suicide-Evidence.-The rule re-affirmed that a case should not be withdrawn from the jury unless the testimony be of such a conclusive character as to compel the court, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion, to set aside a verdict in opposition to it. Upon an issue, in a suit upon a life policy, as to the insanity of the insured at the time he took his own life, the opinion of a non-professional witness as to his mental condition, in connection with a statement of the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, upon which that opinion is based, is competent evidence. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, Adm'r. U. 8. S. Ct. Ch. Leg. News, May 17, 1884.

Mr. Justice Matthews, sitting in Circuit Court at Cleveland, the other day, in the case of John C. Lake, on a petition for habeas corpus, decided that Sec. 6993, R. S. O., requiring that every note given for patent right must bear the inscription, "Given for a Patent Right," is in conflict with Sec. 8, Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. (See Todd v. Wick, 36 O. S. R., 370, contra.)

From a somewhat extended review of the subject of attachments in United States courts, the following conclusions are adduced:

1. The property of a non-resident may be attached contemporaneous with or after service of personal process upon him.

2. The properety of a resident may be attached at the suit of a non-resident for the causes stated in the attachment act other than that of non-residence.

3. Attachments in aid of a suit upon personal service may be maintained against a non-resident.

4. Attachments wrongfully commenced against non-residents may, upon the authority of Chittenden v. Darden, 2 Woods 437, be discharged upon special motion, without thereby giving the court jurisdiction by appearance, or giving the plaintiff the right to serve the defendant with personal process, when he comes into the district for the special purpose of quashing the illegal attachment.

NOTES OF CASES.

POSSESSION AS EVIDENCE OF TITLE.

In the case of Rowe v. Ream, decided March 17, 1884 (1 Lan. L. Rev., 149), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the possession of land is sufficient notice to the world of every title under which the occupant claims it, to put a purchaser or mortgagee on inquiry; unless the occupant has put a title on record inconsistent with his possession.

Sterrett, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said that equitable titles, resting in parol, are always more or less insecure, even when the beneficial owner is in actual and exclusive possession; that

"The general principle undoubtedly is, that such possession, when distinct and unequivocal, puts purchasers and mortgagees on inquiry, and thus visits them with notice of the occupant's title. Since Le Neve v. Le Neve, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 35, this principle has been recognized in many cases, among which are the following: Billington's Lessee v. Welsh, 5 Bin., 128-32; Sailor v. Hertzog. 4 Whart., 259; Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts, 282-4; McCulloch v. Crowher, 5 W. & S., 427-9; Patton v. Hollidaysburg, 4 Wright, 206; Mechan v. Williams, 12 Id., 238; Jamison v. Dimock et ux., 14 Norris, 52-6; Hottenstein v. Lerch, 39 Legal Intelligencer, 393. While the principle is differently stated in some of these cases, it is substantially the same in all. In Woods v. Farmere, supra, Chief Justice Gibson, speaking of the unlimited effect given by the English courts to possession as an index to title, says 'the duty of inquiring into the foundation of a notorious possession, is not a grievous one, and it is soon performed. Why, then, should a purchaser be suffered to act on probabilities as facts, at the risk of any one but himself, when a moment's share of attention would prevent misconception or loss? The doctrine of constructive notice is undoubtedly a sharp one; but it is not more so in regard to a notorious possession than it is in regard to a registry. Nor is it less reasonable; for it certainly evinces as much carelessness to purchase without having viewed the premises as it does to purchase without having searched the register.' In the language of Woodward, P. J., adopted by this court in McCulloch v. Crowher, supra, the possession of

land is notice to the world of every title under which the occupant claims it, unless he has put a title on record inconsistent with his possession. When, as in this case, an individual is in possession under no recorded title, his possession is notice of every title which he can set up to protect himself, sufficient at least to put a purchaser on inquiry.' A full discussion of the subject by our brother Green may also be found in Hottenstein v. Lerch, supra. The constructive notice spoken of in these cases is in the nature of evidence of notice, the presumptions of which are so violent that they cannot be controverted. It is that notice which the law imputes to a person without regard to whether he has actual knowledge or not. In other words, when inquiry becomes a duty, the means of knowledge which it affords is regarded as the legal equivalent of actual notice."

GROWING GRASS-VALUE of probABLE CUTTINGS DURING YEAR AS MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

In King v. Reynolds, (Chic. Leg. News, June 7), the Supr. Ct. of Alabama held, that in an action by the lessee for a breach of contract for the lease of a meadow, on which there was a standing crop of Johnson grass ready for cutting at the time possession should have been delivered, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages, the value of that standing crop; and not having received possession during the entire term, he is equally entitled to recover the value of the several cuttings or crops which the grass would ordinarily produce during the season. The court say:

"We have said that damages, to be the subject of substantial recovery, must not be the remote, collateral or accidental consequence of the breach complained of. They must be the proximate and natural result; in the regular course of events, in the synonym of the word natural, as employed above. They must not be speculative. This does not mean that such damages are not the natural and proximate consequences of the breach complained of. It is because human testimony can furnish no reliable basis for ascertaining their amount, with any proximate certainty-because, in the very nature of the question, it rests in conjecture, and can be reduced to no general rule-because it has no reliable predicate or premises, and therefore no reliable conclusion can be drawn.