pleased, at fundry times and in divers manners, to discover ana enforce it's laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their confequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowlege of these truths was attainable by reason, in it's present corrupted state; fince we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the fame original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinfic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is (humanly speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expreffly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the afsistance of human reafson, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

UPON these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to fuch points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in fubordination to, the former. To instance in the cafe of murder: this is expreffly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arifes the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase it's moral guilt, or fuperadd any fresh obligation in foro confcientiae to abstain from it's perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or injoin us to commit it, we are bound to tranfgrefs that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; fuch, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legiflature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not fo.

IF man were to live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occafion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist; for a law always supposes some superior who is to make it; and in a state of nature we are all equal, without any other fuperior but him who is the author of our being. But man was formed for fociety; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject, is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great fociety, they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arifes a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called "the law of "nations;" which, as none of these states will acknowlege a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to refort to, but the law of nature; being the only one to which both communities are equally subject: and therefore the civil law very justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines conftituit, vocatur jus gentium.

THUS much I thought it necessary to premise concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before. Puffendorf, 1.7. c. 1. compared with Barbeyrac's commentary.

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I proceeded to treat more fully of the principal subject of this section, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by Juftinian, "jus civile est quod quisque fibi populus con"ftituit." I call it municipal law, in compliance with common speech; for, tho' strictly that expreffion denotes the particular customs of one single municipium or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the fame laws and customs.

MUNICIPAL law, thus understood, is properly defined to be "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in "a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is "wrong." Let us endeavour to explain it's several properties, as they arise out of this definition.

AND, first, it is a rule; not a transient sudden order from a fuperior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law : for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a fentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be deemed high treason; this has permanency, uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counfel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we fee proper; and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing advised. Whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counsel is only matter of perfuafion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling also.

It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, “I "will, or will not, do this;" that of a law is, "thou shalt, or "shalt not, do it." It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of confcience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act, without ourselves determining or promifing any thing at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be " a rule."

MUNICIPAL law is also "a rule of civil conduct." This diftinguishes municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of moral conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour, confidered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his neighbour, than those of mere nature and religion : duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to the fubfiftence and peace of the society.

Іт is likewise "a rule prescribed." Because a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legiflator, without manifesting itself. by some external fign, can never be properly a law. It is requifite that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the cafe of the common law of England. It may be notified, viva voce, by officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such acts of parliament

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as are appointed to be publicly read in churches and other affemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the most public and perfpicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to Dio Caffius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex poft facto; when after an action is committed, the legiflator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the perfon who has committed it; here it is impoffible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a fubfequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of confequence be cruel and unjust. All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term "prescribed." But when this rule is in the usual manner notified, or prescribed, it is then the fubject's business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance, of what he might know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.

BUT farther: municipal law is " a rule of civil conduct pre"fcribed by the fupreme power in a state." For legislature, as was before observed, is the greatest act of fuperiority that can be exercised by one being over another. Wherefore it is requifite to the very effence of a law, that it be made by the fupreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot fubfift without the other.

• Such laws among the Romans were denominated privilegia, or private laws, of which Cicero de leg. 3. 19. and in his oration pro domo, 17. thus speaks; "Vetant leges “jacratae, vetant duodecim tabulae, leges pri

“vatis hominibus irrogarı; id enim eft privi "legium. Nemo unquam tulit, nihil eft crudelius, “nihil perniciofius, nihil quod minus haec civi"tas ferre poffit.”

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