Thomas v. Town of Butler et al. ready mentioned, thus making it liable to a greater aggregate rate of taxation than other property within the corporation. Thus it is that the peculiar wording of the first act, if literally carried out, would defeat what must have been the original purpose of the Legislature. It must have been the purpose and intent of the revising act of 1881 to remove the possibility of such a result, and make it clear and plain that such property could not be taxed at a higher rate for all purposes in the aggregate than it would have been subject to had it never been brought within the corporate limits. The chief object of the new act was to accomplish that result. That clearly was a revision of the old act by stating it in a corrected or improved form, and was clearly intended to take the place of the old act. Nothing could be farther from a rational intent on the part of the Legislature than that both acts should stand as the law. It is true, as stated by some of the authorities above mentioned and cited by appellant, that so far as any operative part of the old act has been brought forward and reenacted by the new act, it is not repealed, and is, as stated by Sutherland, continued in operation, as it may operate in the connection in which it is reenacted. It has been frequently held in this and other courts, that the reënactment of a statute does not operate as a repeal of the former law, but that the effect of the new act is to continue the old act in force. Gorley v. Sewell, 77 Ind. 316, and cases there cited; Reynolds, Aud., v. Bowen, Admr., 138 Ind. 434, and numerous authorities there cited. And that is the very contention of the appellant. But how does it continue the old act in force? It is contin ued in force in the new act, and not in the old. Other wise there could be no revision of a law or laws without interminable confusion as to what the law is at any given time. Thomas v. Town of Butler et al. In the revision of laws it is often essential to bring forward into the new act many operative portions of the old statute without change or modification, and it is often of the utmost importance to public and private interests that the continuity of the operation of the reënacted statute shall not be broken by the reënactment thereof. To hold the operation of the reënacted statute broken by the reënactment is to hold, in many cases, that public interests and private rights are swept away beyond the possibility of repair. The principle upon which the continuity of operation of the reënacted statute rests is the manifest legislative intention. It would be exceedingly unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature, in reënacting operative portions of a statute, intended thereby to break the continuity of its operation. When they bring forward into the new act such operative portions of the old act, they thereby indicate the legislative will and intent that such provision shall continue to be the law, not that it shall cease to operate, but that its operation as the law shall continue. as before. But that does not indicate an intention to continue it in force in the old law, but to continue it in force in the new law as the only rule in the cases covered by the new act. The old law has been superseded and displaced, and as such has been repealed by the new act. Therefore, all of the act of 1879, left in force by the act of 1881, was merged in and formed a part of the latter act, and when it was expressly and unconditionally repealed, as we have seen, by the act of 1891 both acts were effectually repealed and extinguished. There was, therefore, no law in force making a different rule for the assessment of appellant's farm lands within the corporate limits of the town of Butler than that applicable to other property within such limits at the time the assessment complained of was made. This Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Co. v. West, Treasurer, et al. leads to the conclusion that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The judgment is affirmed. Filed Nov. 15, 1894. No. 16,880. EVANSVILLE AND TERRE HAUTE RAILROAD COMPANY v. TAXES.-Law of 1891.-Constitutionality of Act.-State Tax Board.- From the Gibson Circuit Court. Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Co. v. West, Treasurer, et al. J. E. Iglehart and E. Taylor, for appellant. A. G. Smith, Attorney-General, J. W. Kern, L. 0. Bailey, W. A. Ketcham, S. R. Hamill, W. W. Ireland, W. D. Robinson, J. T. Beasley and A. B. Williams, for appellees. HACKNEY, C. J.-The appellant sued the appellees, James A. West, treasurer of Gibson county, John F. Saunders, treasurer of Vanderburg county, John Walz, treasurer of Posey county, G. W. Donaldson, treasurer of Knox county, Jonathan Scott, treasurer of Sullivan county, Gus A. Conzman, treasurer of Vigo county, Ernest Mueller, treasurer of Clay county, F. H. Hoffman, treasurer of the city of Vincennes, W. W. Hauck, treasurer of the city of Terre Haute, A. C. Fogas, treasurer of the city of Mt. Vernon and John McDonough, treasurer of the city of Evansville, and sought to enjoin the enforcement of such taxes as were levied, computed and placed upon the tax duplicates of the several counties and cities named, upon the basis of valuations by the State Board of Tax Commissioners of the railroad and rolling stock of the appellant in said several counties and cities as made September 8, 1891, and in so far as the same was in excess of the valuations thereof returned by the appellant. The lower court sustained the demurrers of the appellees to the complaint, and judgment was rendered in their favor upon failure by the appellant to plead further. That ruling is the only error presented by the record. Upon the appeal herein, this court granted a restraining order by which the enforcement of the taxes complained of was stayed until ordered otherwise. The appellees now move the dissolution of this restraining order. The questions presented by the complaint are identical Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Co. v. West, Treasurer, et al. with those fully considered and decided by this court, as to the powers, duties, privileges and procedure of the State Board of Tax Commissioners, created and imposed by the act of the Legislature of Indiana, approved March 6, 1891 (Acts 1891, p. 199), and as to the constitutionality of said act, in the cases of Cleveland, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, Treas., 133 Ind. 513; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, Treas., 133 Ind. 609; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, Treas., 133 Ind. 625, and as confirmed in said cases, upon certification to the Supreme Court of the United States, May 1894. Upon the authority of those cases this case must be affirmed and the restraining order dissolved. In addition to the questions originally presented by the complaint the parties now present for consideration certain questions as to the proper penalties or penalties and interest collectible from the appellant upon its several delinquencies in the payment of the taxes involved in this suit. It is alleged that in some instances it is proposed to compound penalties; that in others penalties of ten percentum and of six per centum, with interest added, are demanded; that in still others such penalties, with interest compounded, are claimed, and in still others, and where, before delinquencies, payments were made, equal to or in excess of the first installment, with directions to apply the sums paid "on account," it is claimed that such installment became delinquent and that penalties. attached on account thereof.' Section 152 of the tax law, Acts 1891, p. 260, is as follows: "Any person or taxpayer charged with taxes. on the tax duplicate in the hands of a county treasurer may pay the full amount of such taxes on or before the third Monday in April, or may, at his option, pay the first installment on or before such third Monday, and |