spection, repair, operation or use of trains, locomotives, cars, or other equipment of said railway companies, or any of them, and from preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons from freely entering into or continuing in the employment of said railway companies, or any of them for the construction, inspection, repair, operation or use of locomotives, cars, rolling stock, or other equipment;

(b) In any manner conspiring, combining, confederating, agreeing and arranging with each other or with any other person or persons, organizations or associations to injure or interfere with or hinder said railway companies, or any of them, in the conduct of their lawful business of transportation of passengers and property in interstate commerce and the carriage of the mails;

(c) Loitering or being unnecessarily in the vicinity of the points and places of ingress or egress of the employees of said railway companies, or any of them, to and from such premises in connection with their said employment, for the purpose of doing any of the things herein prohibited, or aiding, abetting, directing or encouraging any person or persons, organization, or association, by letters, telegrams, telephone, word of mouth, or otherwise, to do any of the acts heretofore described in this and preceding paragraphs; trespassing, entering or going upon the premises of the said railway companies, or any of them, at any place or in the vicinity of any place where the employees of said companies, or any of them, are engaged in constructing, inspecting, overhauling, or repairing locomotives, cars, or other equipment, or where such employees customarily perform such duties or at any other place on the premises of said railway companies, or any of them, except where the public generally are invited to come to transact business with said railway companies as common carriers of passengers and property in interstate commerce;

(d) Inducing or attempting to induce, with intent to further said conspiracy, by the use of threats, violent or abusive language, opprobrious epithets, physical violence or threats thereof, intimidation, displays of force or numbers, jeers, entreaties, argument, persuasion, reward, or otherwise, any person or persons to abandon the employment of said railway companies, or any of them, or to refrain from entering such employment;

(e) Engaging, directing or procuring others to engage in the practice commonly known as picketing, that is to say, assembling or causing to be assembled numbers of the members of said Fed

erated Shop Crafts, or others in sympathy with them, in the vicinity of where the employees of said railway companies, or any of them, are required to work and perform their duties, or at or near the places of ingress or egress, or along the ways traveled by said employees thereto or therefrom, and by threats, persuasion, jeers, violent or abusive language, violence or threats of violence, taunts, entreaties or argument, or by any similar acts preventing or attempting to prevent any of the employees of said railway companies, or any of them, from entering upon or continuing in their duties as such employees, or so preventing, or attempting to prevent, any other person or persons from entering or continuing in the employment of said railway companies, or any of them; and aiding, abetting, ordering, assisting, directing, or encouraging in any way any person or persons in the commission of any of said acts;

(f) Congregating or maintaining, or directing, aiding, or encouraging the congregating or maintaining upon, at or near any of the yards, shops, depots, terminals, tracks, waylands, roadbeds, or premises of said railway companies, or any of them, of any guards, pickets, or persons to perform any act of guarding, picketing, or patroling any such yards, shops, depots, terminals or other premises of said railway companies, or any of them; . . .

(g) Doing or causing, or in any manner conspiring, combining, directing, commanding or encouraging the doing or causing the doing by any person or persons of any injury or bodily harm to any of the servants, agents or employees of said railway companies, or any of them; going singly or collectively to the home, abode, or place of residence of any employee of the said railway companies, or any of them, for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, or coercing such employee or member of his family, or in any manner by violence or threats of violence, intimidation, opprobrious epithets, persuasion, or other acts of like character, directed towards any said employee or member of his family, for the purpose of inducing or attempting to induce such employee to refuse to perform his duties as an employee of said railway companies, or any of them; or so attempting to prevent any person or persons from entering the employ of any of said railway companies, or aiding, encouraging, directing, commanding or causing any person or persons so to do;

(h) In any manner directly or indirectly hindering, obstructing, or impeding the operation of any train or trains of said rail

way companies, or any of them, in the movement and transportation of passengers and property in interstate commerce or in the carriage of the United States mails, or in the performance of any other duty as common carriers. . . .

(i) In any manner, with intent to further said conspiracy by letters, printed or other circulars, telegrams, telephones, word of mouth, oral persuasion or communication, or through interviews published in newspapers, or other similar acts, encouraging, directing or commanding any person, whether a member of any or either of said labor organizations or associations defendant herein, to abandon the employment of said railway companies, or any of them, or to refrain from entering the service of said railway companies, or any of them;

(2) That you the said defendants, Bert M. Jewell, John Scott, and each of you, as officers as aforesaid and as individuals, do absolutely desist and refrain from

(a) Issuing any instructions, or making any requests, public statements or communications heretofore enjoined and restrained in this writ to any defendant herein, or to any officer or member of any said labor organizations constituting the said Federated Shop Crafts, or to any officer or member of any system federation thereof.

(b) Using, or causing to be used, or consenting to the use of any of the funds or moneys of said labor organizations in aid of or to promote or encourage the doing of any of the matters or things herein before restrained and enjoined;

Until this Honorable Court, in Chancery sitting, shall make other order to the contrary. Hereof fail not, under the penalty of what the law directs.

But nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the use of funds or moneys of any of said labor organizations for any lawful purpose, and nothing contained in this order shall be construed to prohibit the expression of an opinion or argument not intended to aid or encourage the doing of any of the acts hereinbefore enjoined, or not calculated to maintain or prolong a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails.

To all Marshals of the United States to whom this writ may come to execute and return in due form of law.

WITNESS, the Honorable James H. Wilkerson, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illi

nois, at Chicago, in said District, this 25th day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the 147th year.

SEAL OF

DIST. COURT

U.S. NORTHERN

DIST. ILLINOIS

1855

JOHN H. R. JAMAR,

Clerk.

30. The Child Labor Tax Case

1

Congress first attempted to suppress child labor by prohibiting commodities made by children from passing through interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held an act of this nature void; 1 whereupon an attempt was made to prohibit the employment of children by levying a tax on the profits of persons or corporations using their services.2 The act provided for an excise tax of ten per cent. of the net profits of all individuals or companies permitting children under fourteen years of age to work in their establishments. The same tax was to be imposed if children between fourteen and sixteen years of age were required or allowed to work more than eight hours per day. It was expected that this tax would so penalize companies employing children that it would be cheaper to hire adult labor in their place.

The Drexel Furniture Company ignored the act and continued to employ children in its factory in North Carólina. J. W. Bailey, the internal revenue collector, accordingly assessed a tax of $6,312.74 against it for having permitted children to work during the year 1919. The company paid this impost under protest and subsequently demanded that the collector refund the money. When Bailey refused to comply, the company brought a suit in the Federal District Court for the sum indicated. The

1Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. (1918) 251. An extract from this case is given on pp. 189-97.

Act of Feb. 24, 1919. 40 U. S. Stat. at Large, 1057.

Court held the act of Congress void and ordered the money returned to the company. But the collector of internal revenue appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States. The resulting opinion follows:

SOURCE-Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, 259 U. S. (1922) 20; 42 S. Ct. 449; 66 L. Ed. 817.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the court.

The law is attacked on the ground that it is a regulation of the employment of child labor in the States-an exclusively state function under the Federal Constitution and within the reservations of the Tenth Amendment. It is defended on the ground that it is a mere excise tax levied by the Congress of the United States under its broad power of taxation conferred by § 8, Article I, of the Federal Constitution. We must construe the law and interpret the intent and meaning of Congress from the language of the act. The words are to be given their ordinary meaning unless the context shows that they are differently used. Does this law impose a tax with only that incidental restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve? Or does it regulate by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty? If a tax, it is clearly an excise. If it were an excise on a commodity or other thing of value we might not be permitted under previous decisions of this court to infer solely from its heavy burden that the act intends a prohibition instead of a tax. But this act is more. It provides a heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed and specified course of conduct in business. That course of business is that employers shall employ in mines and quarries, children of an age greater than sixteen years; in mills and factories, children of an age greater than fourteen years, and shall prevent children of less than sixteen years in mills and factories from working more than eight hours a day or six days in the week. If an employer departs from this prescribed course of business, he is to pay the Government one-tenth of his entire net income in the business for a full year. The amount is not to be proportioned in any degree to the extent or frequency of the departures, but is to be paid by the employer in full measure whether he employs five hundred children for a year, or employs only one for a day. Moreover, if he does not know the child is within the named age limit, he is not to pay; that is to say, it is only where he knowingly departs from the prescribed course that payment is to be