or until your arrival within Our said Province of New York. And if upon such Death, or absence there bee noe person upon the place Commissioned or appointed by us to bee Commander in Cheif, Our will and pleasure is That the then present Council of that our Province doe take upon them the Administration of the Government, and execute this Commission and the several powers and Authoritys herein contained, And that the first Councilor, who shall be at the time of Your Death or absence residing within Our Province of New York, doe preside in Our said Council, with such powers and prehemenencies as any former president hath used and enjoyed within Our said Province or any other our Plantations in America, untill our pleasure bee further known, or your arrival as aforesaid.

And lastly wee doe hereby declare, ordain and appoint That you the said Thomas Dongan shall and may hold, execute and enjoy the office and Place of Captain General and Governor in Cheif in and Over our Province of New York and the Territorys depending thereon, together with all and singular the powers and Authoritys hereby granted unto you for and during Our will and pleasure. In witness &c

Great Seale, dated 10 June 1686 in

ye second year of the King.

2. James Madison on the Republican Character of the

Constitution

THE Contest for the ratification of the Constitution of 1787 yielded a flood of controversial publications on both sides. This literature ranges all the way from flaming handbills, which aimed to play on the passions and emotions of the reader, to carefully reasoned arguments calculated to appeal to thoughtful men. By far the best example of the latter type of persuasion was a series of articles published in New York in the Independent Journal, the Packet, and the Daily Advertiser, and subsequently collected under the title of "The Federalist." Madison's account of the genesis and authorship of these essays is as follows:

"The papers under the Title of 'Federalist' and signature of 'publius' were written by A[lexander] H[amilton,]

J[ames] M[adison,] and J[ohn] J[ay] in the latter part of the year 1787—and the former part of the year 1788. The immediate object of them was to vindicate and recommend the new Constitution to the State of N.Y. whose ratification of the instrument, was doubtful as well as important. The undertaking was proposed by A.H. (who had probably consulted with Mr. Jay and others) to J.M. who agreed to take a part in it. The papers were originally 'addressed to the people of N.Y. under the signature of a Citizen of N.Y.' This was changed for that of 'Publius,' the first name of Valerius Publicola. A reason for the change was that one of the Writers was not a citizen of that State: another that the publication had diffused itself among most of the other States. The papers were first published at N.Y. in a Newspaper printed by Francis Childs at the rate during great part of the time at least of four numbers a week; and notwithstanding this exertion, they were not compleated till a large proportion of the States had decided on the Constitution. They were edited as soon as possible in two small vols. the preface to the 1st vol: drawn up by Mr. H bearing date N. York Mar 1788....

MONTPELIER July 28, 1818.''1

J:M.

It seems probable that the influence of these papers on the attitude of the people of New York toward the new Constitution has been overestimated. "A good Federalist could only say of the work of 'Publius' that 'he is certainly a judicious and ingenious writer, though not well calculated for the common people.' As for the Antifederalists, they made no pretense of regarding the arguments. 'The Federalist' as he terms himself, wrote one, or 'Publius' puts me in mind of some of the gentlemen of the long robe when hard pressed, in a bad cause with a rich client. They frequently say a good deal which does not apply; but yet if it will not convince the judge and jury, may perhaps, help to make them forget some part of the evidence-embarrass their opponents, and make the audience stare.'

'P. L. Ford [ed.], The Federalist (New York, 1898), pp. xlix-l.

"The New York elections for delegates to the state convention well proved that 'Publius' had written in vain, for only one-third of the men chosen were Federalists-making the contest one of the most crushing defeats ever experienced.'

991

The importance of the Federalist lies, therefore, in the fact that it was the ablest exposition of the meaning of the new Constitution, rather than in its influence upon the masses. Its prestige steadily increased after the ratification of the Constitution by New York in 1788, and since that time it has passed through some twenty editions. For many years it was used as the principal text-book and commentary on the new Constitution, as well it might be. As was said by Noah Webster, "It would be difficult to find a treatise which, in so small a compass, contains so much valuable political information, or in which the true principles of republican government are unfolded with such precision." Indeed, so cogent was the reasoning of many of the numbers, that some of them have been followed almost literally by the United States Supreme Court. Taken as a whole, the work "presents the political science of the new system as conceived by three of the profoundest thinkers of the period." 3

4

The three numbers chosen for reprint in this volume (39, 48, 70) have been selected to illustrate not only the literary style and method of reasoning of the authors, but also to summarize their philosophy of government, as far as this is possible in so small a compass. Number 39, written by James Madison, contains one of the most lucid analyses of the meaning of "republican government' to be found anywhere, and is the most frequently quoted of all of Madison's contributions to the series. The text followed Ibid., pp. xxiv-xxv.

American Magazine, March, 1788, quoted by Ford, op. cit., p. xxviii.

C. A. Beard, Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York, 1913), 153.

Were it not for the fact that the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison, 3 Cranch (U. S. 1803), 137 (post., p. 41) is taken directly from The Federalist, Number 78 by Hamilton, that number would also have been included. It is probably the most quoted essay ever written by the first Secretary of the Treasury.

in all cases is that of P. L. Ford in his excellent edition of the Federalist published in 1898.

SOURCE-The Federalist, No. 39. First published in the Independent Journal, Jan. 16, 1788. Text from P. L. Ford [ed.], The Federalist (New York, 1898), 245-252.

To the People of the State of New York: ...

The first question that offers itself is whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.

What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers to the constitutions of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.

If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived

from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.

On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves. The duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard and to the model of State constitutions. The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and