Lectures on Game TheoryWestview Press, 1989 - Počet stran: 120 |
Obsah
Zermelos Theorem | 1 |
Noncooperative Games | 7 |
The Shapley Value | 26 |
Autorská práva | |
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0-1 normalized 3-person Assertion Aumann B-core bargaining game Bargaining Set black can force Bondareva-Shapley theorem chess condition Consider the game continuous function counterobject Definition Diagram equilibrium point Euclidean space Example force a win force at least game defined game N,v game theory h¹(s¹,s² Hence justified objection Kernel least a draw Lemma lower e.p. market game matching pennies minimal winning coalition minimax value mixed extension mixed strategy move N-M solution n-tuple non-empty core Nucleolus outcome payoff matrix payoff to player payoff vector play Princeton prove pure strategy randomized strategy randomized super-strategy Remark Repeated Games resp set of payoffs Shapley value Stochastic Games Strategies of Black strategies of player strategies of white strategy equilibrium strictly competitive subgame subset superadditive supergame Suppose symmetry two-person u(xg upper e.p. veto player weighted majority game white can force Zermelo's theorem