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CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, State University of Iowa.
ROBERT LANSING, Watertown, N. Y.
John BASSETT MOORE, Columbia University.
WILLIAM W. MORROW, San Francisco, Cal.
LEO S. Rowe, University of Pennsylvania.
OSCAR S. STRAUS, Washington, D. C.
GEORGE G. Wilson, Brown University.
THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, Yale University.
DAVID J. HILL, The Hague, European Editor.

Managing Editor,
JAMES BROWN Scott, George Washington University.



On December 10, 1907, the Nobel Prize was awarded to M. Louis Renault, of France, and Ernesto Teodore Moneta, of Italy, President of the Peace Society of Italy.

By his will Alfred B. Nobel, the inventor of dynamite,' bequeathed his fortune, estimated at $9,000,000, as a fund, the interest of which should be distributed yearly to those who had signally contributed to the good of humanity. The interest is divided into five equal shares, of which one is awarded “to the person who in the domain of physics has made the most important discovery or invention, one to the person who has made the most important chemical discovery or invention, one to the person who has made the most important discovery in the domain of medicine or physiology, one to the person who in literature has provided the most excellent work of an idealistic tendency, and one to the person who has worked most or best for the fraternization of nations and the abolition or reduction of standing armies and the calling in and propagating of peace congresses.”

The peace prize, with which this note is concerned, has been awarded, since the institution of the prize, as follows: In 1901, to Henri Dunant (Swiss) and Frédéric Passy (French); 1902, to Elie Ducommun and Albert Gobat (both Swiss) ; 1903, to W. R. Cremer (English; Sir William Randall Cremer, M. P., created Kt., 1907); 1904, to The Institute of International Law, the first award to an institution ; 1905, to Barone ss Bertha von Suttner (Austrian) ; 1906, to Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States; and in 1907 it was divided between Louis Renault (French) and Ernesto Teodore Moneta (Italian).

While the recipients of the prize have in various fields of activity amply justified the great honor conferred upon them, the award of 1907 appeals with peculiar interest to students of international law, for it is the first award made to a professor of the science, thereby justifying the claim of its votaries that international law makes for peace.

More fortunate than Grotius, the founder of international law, who, driven from his home, found honor and employment in Sweden, the recognized head of our modern science has not only come to honor in Sweden, as did the founder, but is idolized by his fellow-countrymen at


The year 1907 has been a year full of honor for Louis Renault. On the 10th of March, 1907, his colleagues and friends, students and former students of the Faculty of Law of Paris and of the Free School of Political Sciences, presented him with a beautiful medallion bearing upon the one side the portrait of the gentle and genial teacher and friend, and on the other the inscription, “ To Louis Renault, in testimony of services rendered in the teaching and practice of international law: his students, his colleagues, his friends.”

A few months later to be accurate, from the 15th day of June to the 18th day of October — he dominated the Second Hague Conference, not as a Frenchman or as a member of the French delegation, but as a citizen of the world, the trusted friend and adviser of his colleagues.

On the 10th day of December the Nobel prize committee publicly proclaimed him the friend of humanity.



The American Society of International Law will hold its second annual meeting at Washington in the New Willard Hotel, on April 24 and 25, 1908. The tentative program adopted by the Executive Committee


Morning Session, April 24.
President's address: The Sanctions of International Law.
Topic: Should the violation of treaties be made a Federal offense ?

Afternoon Session, April 24. Topic: In how far should neutrals and neutral property in belligerent territory

be freed from supporting the charges of military operations ? How far should loans raised in neutral nations for the use of belligerents

be considered a violation of neutrality?

Evening Session, April 24. Topic: To what extent and under what conditions is a nation justified in re

nouncing the reserves of independence, vital interests, and honor in general and special arbitration treaties?

Morning Session, April 25. Topic: Codification: Do international, particularly neutral, interests require

the codification of international law, more especially the codification

of international maritime law ? Are the practices of nations sufficiently general to permit this codifica

tion, for example, in the matters of contraband, blockade, etc.?

Afternoon Session, April 25. Topic: The Prize Court. The organization, jurisdiction, and procedure of an

international court of prize.


Possible additional question: The influence of the Supreme Court in the develop

ment of international law.

The session will end with a banquet at the New Willard Hotel, at which informal and unreported addresses will be delivered by various members of the Society and invited guests.

It will be noted that the questions selected for discussion have been largely suggested by the recent Hague conference, although the Society does not limit itself to the work of the conference. Two of the questions, and not the least important, were not discussed at the conference, and indeed one of them is so peculiarly American that consideration of it would have been out of place in that august assembly. Reference is made to the topic “Should the violation of treaties be made a Federal

“ offense?” To state the question is at once to show the importance and difficulty of the subject. A nation should not be responsible for that which it cannot prevent, and yet internal and local difficulties are not a good plea to the breach of an international duty. The attention of Congress has frequently been called to the need of some such sanction to international agreements, and it is not improbable that some action will ultimately be taken.

The second question deals with loans raised in neutral nations for the use of belligerents. If provisions destined to a point of military equipment and arms and ammunition destined to enemy territory be considered contraband, the question not unnaturally presents itself,“ Should not loans raised in neutral nations for the use of belligerents be a violation of neutrality ? ”

The subject of neutrals and neutral property in belligerent territory was considered at the recent Hague conference, but the conflict between the principles of nationality and domicile prevented substantial agreement, although the subject was very thoroughly discussed.

Not merely was arbitration accepted, but the nations represented at The Hague recognized unanimously the principle of obligatory arbitration. The incorporation of this abstract principle in the concrete form of a treaty proved impossible, owing to the opposition of a determined minority against a general arbitration treaty, although substantially all the representatives approved the negotiation of special treaties.

The reserves of independence, vital interests, and honor were discussed at great length and subjected to an examination such as they probably had never before received. It is improbable that the question will be less interesting to the Society than it was to the conference.

The questions of codifying maritime international law and the establishment of a prize court are so intimately connected that many believe that the court can not well be established without previous codification of the law to be administered. The conflict between continental and Anglo-American jurisprudence will doubtless lead to an interesting exchange of views.

It is well known by layman as well as lawyer that the Supreme Court of the United States passes upon international law necessarily involved in judicial questions presented to it, but the rôle which the Supreme Court has played in the development of a sound and rational body of international law is known only to the specialist. A careful consideration of the Supreme Court in the matter of international law will show that in many respects it is not only a national court as far as the United States is concerned, but that its decisions involving international law have gone far to remove doubt and lend precision to much of the accepted international law of the present day.

The publication of the proceedings of the first meeting has been delayed by the prolonged absence of the managing editor, but they are in press and will be distributed to the members of the Society before the second annual meeting. It is not too much to say that they are valuable in themselves and in not a few instances are contributions to the subjects under discussion. It is hoped that the proceedings of the second annual meeting will be equally valuable.



The act of March 2, 1907 (see Supplement, 1:258), dealing with “ The Expatriation of Citizens and their Protection Abroad, 1907," provided, in section 2:

That any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.

When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the place of his general abode shall be deemed his place of residence during said years: Provided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe: And provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.

The intent of this section is clear, namely, to free the Government from the onerous duty of protecting indefinitely naturalized citizens who take up their abode permanently in foreign parts. The duty of state and citizen is mutual — the state protects the citizen, and the citizen protects the state. Should the citizen withdraw himself from the state of his adoption it becomes difficult or impossible for him to render to the state those services for which the state in return guarantees and protects him at home and abroad. He ceases to contribute to the state; he becomes a drain upon the state, and looks to it only or chiefly when in trouble in foreign parts he needs the aid of the government from which he has withdrawn himself and his property.

The statute does not and can not mean that a naturalized citizen shall not leave this country. It does and must mean that on leaving this country he should have the animus revertendi. When he has renounced

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