Morning Session, April 24.

President's address: The Sanctions of International Law.

Topic: Should the violation of treaties be made a Federal offense?

Afternoon Session, April 24.

Topic: In how far should neutrals and neutral property in belligerent territory be freed from supporting the charges of military operations?

How far should loans raised in neutral nations for the use of belligerents be considered a violation of neutrality?

Evening Session, April 24.

Topic: To what extent and under what conditions is a nation justified in renouncing the reserves of independence, vital interests, and honor in general and special arbitration treaties?

Morning Session, April 25.

Topic: Codification: Do international, particularly neutral, interests require the codification of international law, more especially the codification of international maritime law?

Are the practices of nations sufficiently general to permit this codification, for example, in the matters of contraband, blockade, etc.?

Afternoon Session, April 25.

Topic: The Prize Court. The organization, jurisdiction, and procedure of an international court of prize.

Possible additional question: The influence of the Supreme Court in the development of international law.

The session will end with a banquet at the New Willard Hotel, at which informal and unreported addresses will be delivered by various members of the Society and invited guests.

It will be noted that the questions selected for discussion have been largely suggested by the recent Hague conference, although the Society does not limit itself to the work of the conference. Two of the questions, and not the least important, were not discussed at the conference, and indeed one of them is so peculiarly American that consideration of it would have been out of place in that august assembly. Reference is made to the topic "Should the violation of treaties be made a Federal offense?" To state the question is at once to show the importance and difficulty of the subject. A nation should not be responsible for that which it cannot prevent, and yet internal and local difficulties are not a good plea to the breach of an international duty. The attention of

Congress has frequently been called to the need of some such sanction to international agreements, and it is not improbable that some action. will ultimately be taken.

The second question deals with loans raised in neutral nations for the use of belligerents. If provisions destined to a point of military equipment and arms and ammunition destined to enemy territory be considered contraband, the question not unnaturally presents itself, "Should not loans raised in neutral nations for the use of belligerents be a violation of neutrality?"

The subject of neutrals and neutral property in belligerent territory was considered at the recent Hague conference, but the conflict between. the principles of nationality and domicile prevented substantial agreement, although the subject was very thoroughly discussed.

Not merely was arbitration accepted, but the nations represented at The Hague recognized unanimously the principle of obligatory arbitration. The incorporation of this abstract principle in the concrete form of a treaty proved impossible, owing to the opposition of a determined minority against a general arbitration treaty, although substantially all the representatives approved the negotiation of special treaties.

The reserves of independence, vital interests, and honor were discussed at great length and subjected to an examination such as they probably had never before received. It is improbable that the question will be less interesting to the Society than it was to the conference.

The questions of codifying maritime international law and the establishment of a prize court are so intimately connected that many believe that the court can not well be established without previous codification of the law to be administered. The conflict between continental and Anglo-American jurisprudence will doubtless lead to an interesting exchange of views.

It is well known by layman as well as lawyer that the Supreme Court of the United States passes upon international law necessarily involved in judicial questions presented to it, but the rôle which the Supreme Court has played in the development of a sound and rational body of international law is known only to the specialist. A careful consideration of the Supreme Court in the matter of international law will show that in many respects it is not only a national court as far as the United States is concerned, but that its decisions involving international law have gone far to remove doubt and lend precision to much of the accepted international law of the present day.

The publication of the proceedings of the first meeting has been delayed by the prolonged absence of the managing editor, but they are in press and will be distributed to the members of the Society before the second annual meeting. It is not too much to say that they are valuable in themselves and in not a few instances are contributions to the subjects under discussion. It is hoped that the proceedings of the second annual meeting will be equally valuable.

EXPATRIATION AND PROTECTION OF NATURALIZED AMERICANS ABROAD AND IN TURKISH DOMINIONS

The act of March 2, 1907 (see Supplement, I:258), dealing with "The Expatriation of Citizens and their Protection Abroad, 1907," provided, in section 2:

That any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.

When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the place of his general abode shall be deemed his place of residence during said years: Provided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe: And provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.

The intent of this section is clear, namely, to free the Government from the onerous duty of protecting indefinitely naturalized citizens who take up their abode permanently in foreign parts. The duty of state and citizen is mutual- the state protects the citizen, and the citizen protects the state. Should the citizen withdraw himself from the state of his adoption it becomes difficult or impossible for him to render to the state those services for which the state in return guarantees and protects him at home and abroad. He ceases to contribute to the state; he becomes a drain upon the state, and looks to it only or chiefly when in trouble in foreign parts he needs the aid of the government from which he has withdrawn himself and his property.

The statute does not and can not mean that a naturalized citizen shall not leave this country. It does and must mean that on leaving this country he should have the animus revertendi. When he has renounced

the intent to return it is only fair to permit the state to renounce the duty to protect. If the naturalized citizen expatriates himself by naturalization in a foreign state or when he takes an oath of allegiance to a foreign state he determines expressly his relationship to the country he has left, but he may by a less public and unequivocal renunciation of allegiance forfeit his claim to American citizenship.

The experience of the past half century teaches that hordes of foreigners come to this country to become naturalized with the intent to return to the country of their origin in order to enjoy in the home country the protection of American citizenship. The naturalization of such persons in no wise adds to the strength or greatness of this country, and their presence in the country of their origin is undesirable and irritating.

The so-called "Bancroft treaties" of 1868 provided that:

If a German naturalized in America renews his residence in North Germany without the intent to return to America, he shall be held to have renounced his naturalization in the United States. Reciprocally: if an American naturalized in North Germany renews his residence in the United States, without the intent to return to North Germany he shall be held to have renounced his naturalization in North Germany. The intent not to return may be held to exist when the person naturalized in the one country resides more than two years in the other country. (Treaties in Force, p. 593.)

In such a case the citizenship is forfeited by the residence without an opportunity to show the ultimate intent to return. This provision enables the home country to protect itself from the fraud committed upon it by naturalization in a foreign country for the express purpose of enjoying upon return immunities and exemptions from the duties incident to citizenship. A fraud is likewise perpetrated upon the United States, and there is no reason why this Government should protect a renegade.

It may often happen that a foreigner comes to this country, is naturalized, and after naturalization takes up a permanent residence in a state other than the country of his origin. In such a case the naturalized citizen not only renounces allegiance to the home county, but he withdraws himself from the United States; he ceases to contribute to it and it would seem that in so doing he commits a fraud upon the country of his naturalization. He might have emigrated in the first place to the land of his permanent abode, but in such case he would have had. the protection of the home country; not the protection of the country.

in which he was naturalized. He thus chooses protection, not citizenship, and there seems no reason why such a one should be carried indefinitely upon the rolls of American citizenship.

Residence abroad forfeits citizenship, and the forfeiture is the act of the naturalized citizen, not an act of administration. He is made a citizen in a judicial proceeding; he is not deprived of his citizenship by an act of administration. It is his own act, and the statute allows administrative tribunals to safeguard and protect his citizenship, provided he overcomes the presumption of continued residence by satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States that his residence abroad is not meant to be permanent or of such a nature as to forfeit American citizenship.

When a naturalized citizen of the United States has resided for two years in the country of his origin, or for five years in any other country, this fact creates a presumption that he has ceased to be an American citizen, but the presumption may be overcome by his presenting to a diplomatic or consular officer proof establishing the followings facts:

(a) That his residence abroad is solely as a representative of American trade and commerce, and that he intends eventually to return to the United States permanently to reside; or,

(b) That his residence abroad is in good faith for reasons of health or for education, and that he intends eventually to return to the United States to reside; or,

(c) That some unforeseen and controlling exigency beyond his power to foresee has prevented his carrying out a bona fide intention to return to the United States within the time limited by law, and that it is his intention to return and reside in the United States immediately upon the removal of the preventing cause.

The evidence required to overcome the presumption must be of the specific facts and circumstances which bring the alleged citizen under one of the foregoing heads, and mere assertions, even under oath, that any of the enumerated reasons exist will not be accepted as sufficient. (Circular of the Department of State, April 19, 1907.)

The residence of the naturalized citizen in foreign parts is bound to give rise to complications and seeming hardship, but the solution is infinitely more complicated by naturalization in the United States of subjects of countries in which the United States claims and exercises extraterritorial rights, for a citizen of the United States in taking up his residence in an extraterritorial country is regarded, at least for certain purposes, as residing within the United States and being subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to the exclusion wholly or in part of