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possible, the transformation of the merchant vessel. It will be seen that all reference to the place of transformation was thus carefully eliminated and a series of unobjectionable and unquestionable resolutions declaratory of the international custom and practice was adopted. Indirectly, the rightfulness or wrongfulness of privateering was concerned, and inasmuch as the United States would not consent to abolish privateering unless the immunity of private property be safeguarded, the American delegation abstained from signing the convention.

The eighth convention relates to the placing of submarine automatic mines of contact, a subject of present and special interest to belligerents; while the interest of the neutral is very general. Warfare permits belligerents to attack and to destroy each other in order to bring about a state of calm and repose which we call peace, but the action of the belligerent should be confined to the belligerents themselves. Neutrals should be, as far as possible, unaffected. Mines break from their moorings and endanger neutral life and property, The conference, therefore, desires to regulate the use of mines in such a way as not to deprive the belligerents of a recognized and legitimate means of warfare, but to restrict, as far as possible, the damage to the immediate belligerents. The following articles were therefore agreed to:

Article 1. It is forbidden: 1. to use unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they are so constructed as to become innocuous at the latest one hour after control over them has been lost; 2. to place anchored automatic contact mines which do not become innocuous on carrying away their moorings; 3. to use torpedoes which do not become innocuous when they have missed their target.

Article 2. It is forbidden to place automatic contact mines in front of the coasts and ports of the adversary with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation.

Article 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are used, all possible precautions should be taken for the safety of public navigation.

The belligerents engage, as far as possible, to provide that these mines shall become innocuous after a limited period of time, and in case they cease to be guarded, to give notice of the dangerous localities, as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to shipping which will also be communicated to the governments through diplomatic channels.

Article 4. Any neutral power which places automatic contact mines in front of its coasts, must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as those which are imposed upon belligerents.

The neutral powers must make known to shipping by previous notice, the regions where automatic contact mines are to be moored. This notice must be communicated speedily, as urgent, to the governments through diplomatic channels.

Article 5. At the close of the war, the contracting powers engage to do everything in their power to remove, each for himself, the mines which it has placed.

As to anchored automatic contact mines which one of the belligerents has placed along the coast of the other, their situation shall be indicated by the power that has placed them to the other party and each power shall proceed in the shortest possible time to remove the mines which are found in its waters.

Article 6. The signatory states which are not yet provided with improved mines, such as are required by this regulation, and which consequently cannot actually conform to the rules established by articles 1 and 3, agree to transform, as soon as possible, their mines, so as to comply with the prescriptions mentioned above.

Article 7. The stipulations of the present regulation are concluded for the duration of seven years or until the end of the Third Peace Conference, if this date is prior.

The contracting powers engage to consider again the question of the use of submarine automatic contact mines six months before the expiration of the period of the seven years, in case it has not been again taken up and decided by the Third Conference of Peace at a previous date.

In the absence of the stipulations of a new convention, the present regulation shall continue in force, unless this convention is denounced. The denunciation shall not take effect (with regard to the notifying power) until six months after the notification.

It was sought, notably by Great Britain, to prevent any nation from placing submarine mines beyond its territorial waters, namely, the three-mile limit. It was objected to this that

It was objected to this that while the offensive use of mines might be limited, it was inadvisable, perhaps unreasonable, at the present time to limit the defensive use of mines. In one case the mines would be used as a means of attack; in the second place as a defense against aggression. The latter view commended itself to the conference, and, after much discussion, it was agreed not to introduce into the convention any provision upon the subject.

The ninth convention forbade the bombardment by naval forces of undefended harbors, villages, towns, or buildings. The presence, however, of military stores would permit bombardment of such ports for the sole purpose of destroying the stores, provided they were not destroyed or delivered up upon request. Notice, however, should be given of the intention to bombard. In like manner, the convention permitted the bombardment of such undefended places if provisions were not supplied upon requisition to the naval force. Bombardment, however, was not allowed for the collection of mere money contributions. It should be said that unoffending property was not to be bombarded or destroyed, and buildings and institutions devoted to a religious, scientific or charitable purpose were expressly excluded from attack.

This convention will undoubtedly subserve a useful purpose and clear up a doubt which seems to have existed. The weight of opinion forbade the bombardment of undefended ports. The fear, however, that such ports might be attacked and held, in order to enforce submission, rendered a convention on this subject, even although declaratory of international usage and custom, of no little moment. We all remember the Spanish-American war and the constant fear, however unfounded, that the Atlantic Coast might be bombarded by the Spanish fleet.

The tenth convention adapted to maritime warfare the principles of the Geneva convention of 1906. It is not necessary to describe this admirable document in detail. We are familiar with the Red Cross and its work, and there exists absolute unanimity of opinion that the sick and wounded upon the battlefield or upon the high seas should be cared for, irrespective of nationality. Humanity demands it and this demand has been carefully complied with. A word of history may, however, be permitted. The first Geneva convention, dealing with land warfare, was drawn up in 1864. The additional articles of 1868, extending the principles of land warfare to naval warfare, failed of adoption. In 1899 the additional articles were made the basis of a convention dealing with this question adopted at the First Hague Convention. Warfare, however, had changed since 1864 and it was felt that the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1864 should keep pace with the changed conditions, so in 1906 the Geneva Convention of 1864 was revised and the present conference adapted the provisions of this revised convention of 1906 to naval warfare. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the importance of this convention. We understand it and are proud of the progress it marks, in succoring the sick and the wounded and mitigating in their extreme rigor the evils necessarily incident to war.

The eleventh convention relates to certain restrictions in the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war. It is a modest document, but is all that was saved from the wreck of the immunity of private property. The American delegation urged the abolition of the right of capture of unoffending enemy private property upon the high seas, but great maritime powers such as Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan were unwilling to relinquish this means of bringing the enemy to terms. A convention negotiated by powers having no great maritime interest might be a moral victory; it would not be of practical importance except as embodying in conventional form the advanced and radical views of this subject. But to return to the present convention. Chapter 1 frees from capture mail upon a vessel if not directed to or coming from a blockaded port. Chapter 2 frees from capture fishing smacks devoted solely to coastal fishing and small vessels engaged in local navigation. It is pleasing to note that the conference made the basis of its action the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the well-known case of The Paquette Habana, 1899, 175 U. S. 677. Chapter 3 regulated the legal condition of the crew of an enemy merchant vessel by providing that subjects of neutral states were exempt from capture and that subjects of the enemy state were likewise exempt from capture, provided they gave an oath not to serve during the continuance of the war. These provisions are indeed modest when we consider the vast subject involved. They are, however, humaritarian, and therefore to be commended.

The twelfth convention sought to establish an international court of prize, and there only remains the ratification of this convention by the contracting powers in order to call into being this great and beneficent institution. For years, enlightened opinion has protested against the right of belligerents to pass final judgment upon the lawfulness of the capture of neutral property, and it is a pleasure to be able to state that the interests of the neutrals in the neutral prize are henceforward to be placed in the hands of neutral judges with a manent court of arbitration, composed of permanent judges, versed in the existing systems of law of the modern civilized world. The conference was unable to agree upon the precise method of appointing the judges for the court, but recommended that this court be established upon the basis of the project approved by it and annexed to the recommendation as soon as the signatory powers should agree upon the method of appointing judges. The number of powers necessary is not specified, nor is the number of judges determined, as in the court of prize. It therefore follows that any number of powers may agree to make the project the basis of the court and the court is established. It would thus seem that we are in the presence of the realization of centuries of hope.

The fate of the court was long in suspense. The opposition to it was bitter at times. It was more difficult to carry than the prize court, because there was no international court of prize whereas there is a permanent court of arbitration — The Hague Court — although permanent in name only and constituted from a list of judges for each case submitted to it. The existence, however, of the permanent court made it more difficult to establish the new one, and it was not until the last day but one of the conference that the project was adopted and referred to the powers by the unanimous vote of the nations present and voting. Perhaps it would be advisable to quote the first paragraph of the project in order that the exact nature of the court may be evident. It is as follows:

In order to further the cause of arbitration, the contracting powers agree to organize, without injury to the permanent court of arbitration, a court of arbitral justice, free and easy of access, composed of judges representing the juridical systems of the world and capable of assuring the continuity of arbitral jurisprudence.

It is proper to state that the project was essentially an American project, although presented conjointly by Germany and Great Britain, and the establishment of the court in the near future will be an American triumph. President Roosevelt, in his recent message to Congress, commented as follows upon this recommendation:

Substantial progress was also made towards the creation of a permanent judicial tribunal for the determination of international causes.

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