The more important naval powers have agreements with the steamship companies under which in time of need certain vessels may be taken into the public service.

The place of conversion is a matter of utmost importance, and this subject by specific declaration remains outside the convention.

In general, a merchant vessel might be converted into a war vessel in a home port, on the high sea, or in a neutral port, and under exceptional circumstances within the jurisdiction of the other belligerent.

To conversion in a home port, followed by prompt notification as provided for in article 6 of the convention, little objection could be raised.

In the exceptional case of conversion within an enemy's jurisdiction there might arise a question of the exercise of good faith if a merchant vessel should forthwith be converted into a war vessel after it had been allowed to take on cargo or make repairs in an enemy's port during the days of grace allowed for departure of enemy vessels at the outbreak of war. It would seem that a regulation should be adopted by which vessels allowed such a privilege should retain their merchant character, at least until converted in a home port.

The main questions arise, however, in regard to conversion on the high seas, which the convention excludes because the powers can not reach an agreement, and conversion within neutral jurisdiction, which the convention does not mention.

The discussion during the Russo-Japanese war in regard to the conversion of the Smolensk and Peterburg of the Russian volunteer fleet after they had passed the Dardanelles, closed to war vessels, and were upon the open sea is too recent to need review. It showed the necessity of some international understanding in order to avoid friction. There is no provision at present which prevents change of character from time to time from merchant to war ship or vice versâ, unless it be article 6 of the convention, which provides that "a belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a war ship must, as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of war ships." It would seem that to render this article 6 definite there should be an additional clause to the effect that a vessel thus placed

in the list of war ships should retain this status to the end of the war, as some of the delegates contended.

A neutral state has a right to demand that the status of a vessel be not changed from that of a merchant vessel to that of a war vessel in such manner as to render the preservation of neutrality unnecessarily difficult. It is evident that questions as to the observance of neutrality might arise if a merchant vessel should enter a neutral port and load with supplies which would render the vessel of immediate service in war and after taking on such supplies assume a war status. What a war vessel in time of war may do in a neutral port is usually strictly prescribed. It may remain only for a specified period, take on a specified amount of coal, etc. A merchant vessel has almost unlimited freedom so long at it observes ordinary port regulations. If a merchant vessel may change to a war vessel immediately after leaving the neutral port or even within the port, a neutral may unwittingly allow such a vessel to prepare within the neutral jurisdiction to prey on the neutral's own commerce. A neutral port might become practically an enemy's base. Many contingencies might arise which would emphasize the need of the provisions which the seventh convention did not cover though recognized as desirable and considered to some extent by the delegates.

This convention embodies and makes more definite the principles which have been generally followed in practice since 1870, when Germany made her propositions in regard to a voluntary naval force. It regulates somewhat more carefully the use of such vessels after they are enrolled in the public forces. Many questions arose at the Hague conference of 1907 which made impossible the formulation of generally acceptable rules on all points in regard to the conversion of merchant ships into war ships. Some of the delegates were absolutely opposed to conversion except in a home port. While some of the delegates were generally opposed to conversion on the high seas, they wished to make exceptions in favor of merchant vessels which had left national ports before the outbreak of hostilities and in favor of the conversion of merchant vessels captured from the enemy on the high sea and adapted to warlike use. Some thought that the abolition of capture of private property at sea would lead a

belligerent to change a ship from a war status to a merchant status if in danger of capture in order to bring it under the exemption. Great freedom of conversion and reconversion was favored by a few of the delegates. The need that the character of a vessel be clear to a neutral was generally maintained.

Upon the question justly regarded as the most difficult," the question whether the conversion of a merchant ship into a war ship may take place upon the high seas," the contracting powers have been unable to come to an agreement. As the preamble of the seventh convention states, "the question of the place where such conversion is effected remains outside of the scope of this agreement" and is in no way affected by its rules. Thus, it is evident that while provision is made for the abolition of the evils of privateering, there remains for a later conference the agreement upon such difficult questions as those of conditions under which a converted vessel may be reconverted into a war vessel and the place where conversion and reconversion may be allowed.

THE USE OF SUBMARINE MINES AND TORPEDOES IN TIME OF WAR

This subject, which was brought so forcibly to the attention of the civilized world by the operations of the Russo-Japanese war in the vicinity of Port Arthur, was one of the questions at the Hague conference last year, being thus brought for the first time to the attention of an international conference.

In making this statement I do not ignore the fact that the Institute of International Law had previously discussed this question and formulated some ideas upon the matter, but this Institute, no matter how valuable its academic discussions may be, is in no sense an authoritative organization or, in the proper and official sense, an international conference.

When the invitation, however, was formally given by the Russian Government for the Second Peace Conference at The Hague the question of submarine mines was among those duly enumerated in the official program of the conference. Its bearing upon the free navigation of the seas and upon the safety of those being carried thereupon brought the matter within the scope of the rights of neutrals as well as within the domain of common humanity.

It may be well to state that the floating means of defense and offense referred to in this article can be differentiated into three classes:

1. Automobile torpedoes, which are projected both from shore stations and from vessels of various sizes against the vessels of the enemy in the course of a naval action.

2. Submarine mines which float in water-tight cases and are anchored along the coasts and in and off harbors, and which are generally exploded at will from shore by electrical apparatus and cables.

3. Submarine mines which are floating, either anchored or drifting, whose explosion is caused automatically by contact.

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This latter type can be placed rapidly in large numbers and the mines are intended to be exploded by a simple shock arising from the contact with an enemy's vessel. It is this type which is so dangerous to friend as well as to foe, and submarine mines of this class were especially the subject of the discussion at The Hague. Such floating contact mines, when beyond the control of the belligerent using them, or which have broken adrift from their moorings, carry great danger with them on the high seas to neutral and pacific commerce and lives. This sea area should be free and all nations and its liberty has been definitely established by common consent and the law of nations for centuries. In this way, directly and indirectly, has arisen a conflict between the new conditions of sea warfare and national defense and the principles of the freedom of the seas. No subject assigned to the Hague conference seems to have required a settlement and reconciliation more than this one, with its two varying requirements. The dangers arising from the use of these automatic contact submarine mines are not of an imaginary nature. In the operations about the Liaotung Peninsula, previously referred to, the fatalities from such mines not only extended to a great distance from the actual scene of operations, but in time outlasted these operations and also the duration of the war. The delegation representing China at The Hague stated that at the time they addressed the conference upon the subject their country was still obliged to furnish their coasting vessels with apparatus to raise and destroy floating mines, which were found in quantities both in the open sea and in their own territorial waters. Notwithstanding all of the care taken in this respect, a very considerable number of merchant vessels, fishing boats, junks, and sampans had been sunk, and between five and six hundred of their countrymen, while innocently and peaceably employed, had cruelly lost their lives from this cause alone.

It will, however, have to be considered that submarine mines constitute not only an effective but a comparatively inexpensive means of defense for nations possessing extensive coast lines and small navies as against great naval powers. This system of maritime defense appeals in consequence to the less powerful countries as a