ready and economical defense against arbitrary naval strength, and considering, therefore, the fact that in the Hague conference of 1907 the membership was mostly held by weak naval powers it is not to be wondered that considerable opposition and conservatism was shown with respect to the propositions of Great Britain 'as a representative of great maritime power. On the other hand, the Colombian proposition to restrict the use of subhane contact mines for defensive purposes alone naturally came more nearly within the range of success. It is very probable that if were possible to differentiate exactly between offensive and defensive operations of this nature the employment of such mines would have been so restricted. The endeavor to substitute for submarine contact mines those exploded only at will by means of electricity met with failure also, both on account of the want of readiness in the placing of such mines and the restricted distance from the shore at which such mines could be effectively used. Vessels of the enemy lying beyond their placement could easily, with the range of modern weapons, destroy or injure by gun fire in safety the shipping, resources, and defenses of the ports under attack.

The delegation from Great Britain was apparently the only one ready with a definite project formulated for discussion at the beginning of the conference. What might be called amendments to the British proposition or to its several articles were presented by Italy, Japan, Holland, Brazil, Spain, Germany, Russia, and the United States. A formal proposition on the part of the United States was offered at the session of the subcommission on the 11th of July, too late to be printed, distributed, and discussed by that subcommission before its reference to the preliminary committee of examination and drafting. Consequently, it appears as an amendment to the British proposition and is given further on.

It is to be regretted that better preparations generally were not made before the assembling of the conference, and the following suggestions of Dr. Lawrence, the well-known English publicist, should be considered before the next meeting of the Hague or any similar conference. These suggestions are that:

1. Any power or groups of powers to be represented at the next conference shall have the right of proposing subjects for discussion.

2. Such proposals shall take the form of draft articles for an international code, and shall be sent to the International Bureau at The Hague at least six months before the date fixed for the assembling of the next conference.

3. Five months before that date the proposals received shall be communicated in a classified and digested form by the International Bureau to the governments of all the powers who are to take part in the conference.

4. Three months before that date any amendments which any power or group of powers may desire to bring forward shall be sent to the International Bureau.

5. Two months before that date the International Bureau shall communicate to the powers the proposals and amendments duly classified and arranged under appropriate headings.

6. As soon as the conference assembles it shall elect a small committee, which shall have power to fix the order of discussion and to admit any new subject for which at least three powers demand emergency.

Before mentioning the purport of the British propositions which were taken as the foundation of the discussion it may be well to state that Great Britain has practically abandoned the use of submarine mines for the defense of its ports and is trusting to projected automobile torpedoes of the Whitehead and other types in connection with submarine boats for the defense of its seaports. Hence, and in connection with this, the fact that her fleet, both naval and maritime, is the greatest in the world never greater or more efficient than now this Power represents the extreme school against the use of submarine mines exploded by contact. The British propositions stated concisely are:

1. That the use of all submarine mines exploded automatically by contact and not anchored should be forbidden.

2. That any such mines anchored that do not become harmless upon breaking adrift should also be forbidden.

3. That the use of floating contact mines to establish or maintain a commercial blockade should be forbidden.

4. That such contact mines should only be anchored and established within the territorial waters of the belligerents except in case of operations against military or naval ports.

In addition, it was proposed that all contact mines should be so constructed that after a certain period they would become harmless,

and also that after the war was over both belligerents should mutually work together to remove or destroy all mines remaining in their territorial waters.

The proposition of the United States was:

1. Unanchored automatic contact mines are prohibited.

2. Anchored automatic contact mines which do not become innocuous on getting adrift are prohibited.

3. If anchored automatic contact mines are used within belligerent jurisdiction or within the area of immediate belligerent activities, due precautions shall be taken for the safety of neutrals.

The leading power in opposition to the British proposition seems to have been Germany, aided in some of the final votes by France. The German propositions or amendments had a tendency to lessen the cogency of the articles as proposed at the earlier commissions, and from their vague nature would have tended to lessen the effectiveness of the rule and to widen the sphere of the use of submarine mines of all kinds. A reservation was made by Germany in the final vote upon article 2 which forbids the placing of automatic mines of contact before the coasts and forts of the adversary with the sole purpose of intercepting commercial shipping. Although the failure to vote favorably for this proposition was explained by Baron Marschall de Bieberstein on account of the use of the word "seal" and the introduction of a subjective element or an evasion, an impression has been formed, probably unjustly, that Germany, from its action here and upon other propositions, looked favorably upon a commercial blockade of an enemy's port by submarine mines alone. This, of course, would be in contravention of the Declaration of Paris and mark a retrogression in maritime warfare.

The rules as finally adopted by the full conference follow, with a brief statement of the votes upon each rule or article. I follow generally the English translation of the articles as officially published, the American text not having come to hand in time for this article:

It is forbidden:

ARTICLE 1.

1. To lay unanchored submarine mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after they have escaped from the control of the person who laid them;

2. To lay anchored submarine mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings;

3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark.

As to this article, Germany, which had previously reserved its vote with respect to the first paragraph in the full conference and final vote, withdrew its reserve and accepted the paragraph as it stood.

The Turkish delegation was not ready to accept the article and enter into an engagement because the systems of rendering mines harmless were not universally known.

Russia and Siam accepted the article with a reserve as to the first paragraph.

ARTICLE 2.

It is forbidden to lay submarine mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of interrupting commercial navigation.

Upon this article Germany and France reserved their vote on account of possibility of evasion.

ARTICLE 3.

When anchored submarine mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.

The belligerents undertake to see, in as far as it is possible, that these mines become harmless within a certain interval, and in case they should cease to be looked after, to notify, as soon as military exigencies permit, those engaged in navigation, and the governments through the diplomatic channel, of the danger zones.

To this article the only dissenting voice was that of Turkey. The Turkish delegate stated that in view of the exceptional situation. created by treaties now in force with regard to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, straits which are integral parts of its territory, the Turkish Government would not assume any engagement whatever that would restrict the means of defense that it might judge to be necessary for these straits in case of war, or for the purpose of causing respect for their neutrality.

ARTICLE 4.

Neutral powers which lay submarine mines off their coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents.

The neutral powers must inform shipowners, by a notice issued in advance, where submarine mines have been laid. This notice must be communicated at once to the governments through the diplomatic channel.

ARTICLE 5.

At the close of the war, the contracting powers undertake to do their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each one removing those which it has laid.

As regards anchored submarine mines laid by one of the belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the power which laid them, and each power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters.

ARTICLE 6.

The contracting powers which have not yet perfected mines such as the present convention has in view, and which, consequently, could not at present carry out the rules laid down in articles 1 and 3, undertake to transform these mines as soon as possible, so as to bring them into conformity with the foregoing requirements.

The Turkish delegation repeated their inability to undertake any engagement for the present with respect to the transformation of mines required by article 6.

The provisions of the present convention are concluded for a period of seven years or until the end of the Third Peace Conference, if that date is earlier.

The contracting powers engage themselves to reopen the question of the employment of the automatic contact submarine mines six months before the expiration of the period of seven years or in case where it has not been reopened and settled by the Third Peace Conference at an earlier date.

Failing the arrangement of a new convention, the present rules will continue to remain in force, except by denunciation of the present convention. The denunciation will not be effective (with respect to the power which has notified) until six months after the notification.