The case at bar is distinguishable from that case in at least two important respects: (1) That was the proclamation of the President by virtue of an act of Congress; (2) this was a military order of the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, to be enforced in a foreign country under our military control.

That every citizen is presumed to know the laws of his own country, or the country in which he transacts business, and is bound at his peril to obey them, is elementary; and it follows as a corollary to this rule that he is presumed to have knowledge of all such laws from the day they take effect. When we take into consideration the fact that the greatest judges and best lawyers are ignorant of a large percentage of the laws, this rule seems to be a harsh one, and it often does work great injustice. It is a law of necessity, however, and a little thought shows that no other rule would be safe. The antithesis of this rule is also equally well established, that ignorance of a law of a foreign country is merely ignorance of a fact which no one can conclusively be presumed to know; and, when necessary, foreign laws are put in issue in pleadings and proven the same as any other fact.

In the leading case of Cross v. Harrison (16 How., 180) one of the questions involved was the right of the plaintiffs to recover customs duties paid by them at the port of San Francisco during the time from the date of the treaty of Hidalgo and the time when official notice of the treaty was received in California, a period of about two months. During the Mexican war San Francisco was seized and taken possession of by our military forces, and customs duties were levied and collected by them in the exercise of belligerent rights; and the rate of duty thus prescribed was collected until notice of the treaty of peace and the cession to us of California was received, whereupon this war tariff was abandoned and duties were afterwards levied in conformity with the tariff laws applicable to other ports of the United States.

That action was brought to recover all of the duties paid by the plaintiffs between February 3, 1848, the date of the treaty of peace, and November 13, 1849, the date the collector at San Francisco entered on the duties of his office; but in the decision of the case the court distinguishes the duties paid after such notice. It appears, inferentially at least, that the rate of duties collected under the war tariff was different from the rate under our general tariff laws then in force. (Ibid., 189.) The court, in considering the duties paid during that period, decided that they were properly collected at the rate and in pursuance of the war

tariff until notice of the ratification of the treaty of Hidalgo had been received in California.

In Burke v. Miltenberger (19 Wall., 519) one of the questions involved was whether a military order issued May 17, 1865, by General Banks, then commanding the Headquarters of the Gulf, operated as an injunction upon the proceedings of the marshal who had made a sale pursuant to a judgment rendered in a provisional court then existing in the State of Louisiana during the civil war, it appearing that said order was never brought to the notice of either of the courts of Louisiana engaged in the decision of the case.

The court

force in the It may be Louisiana at

decided this order, under the circumstances, to have no courts, and said:

that the courts of the country would take judicial notice that the time mentioned was in the military occupation of our forces under General Banks, but we know of no rule of law or practice requiring this or any other court to take notice of the various orders issued by a military commander in the exercise of the authority conferred upon him. (Ibid., 526.)

It is unquestioned that upon the occupation by our military forces of the port of Manila it was their duty to respect and assist in enforcing the municipal laws then in force there until the same might be changed by order of the military commander, called for by the necessities of war. (Hall's International Law, 4th ed., sec. 155; Taylor's International Law, secs. 576, 578.)

The commander of our forces had the right to take possession of the machinery for the collection of the revenue within the occupied district, and to make such collections. (Hall's International Law, sec. 158; Taylor's International Law, sec. 531.) It was therefore well within the authority of General Merritt to make the order he dia, continuing the Spanish tariff in force at that port until the same might be changed by higher military authority.

While our occupation of Manila became permanent by subsequent treaty, our possession at the time of the collection of these duties was temporary only, and in point of law was no different from the usual military occupation of belligerent territory. It was foreign territory in our temporary possession, and during such possession we were exercising there the restricted rights of a belligerent. If the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, had issued an order here in Washington which had affected the personal conduct of Spanish subjects in Manila, we do not think it could be reasonably contended that those

subjects would be presumed to have knowledge of the contents of such order before it had been received and promulgated there.

words, such an order would not be in force at Manila till it had been received and made known there. If this position is right, it would seem to follow that our military forces there would act in the enforcement of belligerent rights, under the orders of the officer in immediate command, until such time as actual notice of different orders had been received from some superior officer.

For all practical purposes it was foreign territory, and our military forces there were governing under the rules of international law, and in a sense legislating under such rules until receiving notice of different legislation by a superior power. It was a government de facto, military in character, and subject only to higher military authority actually put in force.

Taking this view of the case, we do not believe that any order of the President providing a tariff schedule for the Philippine Islands would have the effect of modifying any existing tariff regulations there until actually received and promulgated.

Hence, it is the judgment of the court that the petition be dismissed.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Law of Private Property in War, with a Chapter on Conquest. (Being the Yorke Prize Essay for 1906.) By Norman Bentwich. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 1907. pp. xii., 151.

This work is a brief statement of the law at the time of its publication, and makes no pretense of originality or of exhaustive treatment. It is clearly written and is of much value because it presents the law regarding private property as a unit, unencumbered with the discussion of other subjects.

Although the author cites some continental treatises, his work is almost entirely based upon English and American authorities, and in most cases. he supports the English position upon questions of international law. This is not true, however, with reference to the English and American doctrine that the domicile of the owner determines the fate of private property captured at sea. Bentwich here advocates the French principle of nationality as one which in its practical operation is better than the principle of domicile.

The discussion of the British position against the exemption from capture of private property at sea is a good one, and the distinction between private property on land and private property at sea is well made, but the author's argument hardly sustains his position. The destruction of maritime commerce is, as he says, one of the most effective weapons for bringing an enemy to terms; but so also were devastation of territory and confiscation of private property on land effective means of warfare, but these practices are now forbidden. He seems to be right. in his statement that the continental European powers advocate the exemption of private property at sea because of their own interests, and that it is to England's interest to maintain the present rule.

The author thinks, however, that the losses resulting from captures of private property at sea should not be allowed to fall upon the owners of the captured vessels and cargoes. He says that "when vessels and cargo at sea are confiscated it would seem consistent with general principles that the state whose citizen has suffered should compensate him for his loss, which has been largely insured on behalf of the whole body,"

and cites the practice which prevails, at least to a certain extent, with reference to land warfare, that each nation should at the end of a war make the burden as far as possible a national one by reimbursing its citizens who have suffered losses of property. In another respect, also, he favors the development away from the close connection of warlike operations with individual interests: "The present custom of dividing among the captors the proceeds of sale after adjudication by a prize court preserves in maritime war that taint of belligerent greed and of interested attack upon private property which is against the spirit of modern warfare, and which has been declared illegal in land operations." In this connection it is gratifying to recall that the United States has been one of the first countries to abolish the predatory institution of 'prize money."

Unfortunately, the Second Hague Conference made no great changes in the substantive law for the protection of private property at sea, and Bentwich's work still forms an excellent statement of existing law. In using this book, however, the reader should have in mind the provisions of the final act of the Second Hague Conference which relate to the exemption from capture of mail vessels and of vessels engaged in local commerce and in inshore fishing, to the establishment of a definite rule against the bonbardment of unfortified places by naval vessels, to the exemption from capture of merchant vessels found in the ports of an enemy at the time hostilities begin, to the transformation of merchant vessels into war vessels, to the placing of submarine mines, and to the establishment of an international prize court.

The literary style of the work is good, although use is occasionally made of such awkward words as "bindingness." Numerous typographical errors attest the fact that the proofreading was not carefully done. W. F. DODD.

Some Neglected Aspects of War. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1907.

Under this title Captain Mahan has republished in book form several articles of his own which have appeared in magazines, together with an article by Henry S. Pritchett, entitled "The Power that Makes for Peace," and one by Julian S. Corbett on the "Capture of Private Property at Sea." The opinions of the three writers blend harmoniously together and the result is a most convenient little book in defense of