armies which required months to mobilize and march to gathered together, despatched by rail in as many sma viried against the opposing force in a sharp and decisive mements. In short, a war of thirty years, or even of won mars, is now an impossibility. Defeat, too, is often so much ms that no time is given for recuperation, and the fate of ns may be decided in the first general battle. Under such mstances, and with such numerous possibilities, wars are underan with great reluctance, and a matter which would have been nsbered a casus belli a century ago is now treated as a proper subject for arbitration. It is safe to say that the beauty of a modern Helen will never be the occasion of another ten years' war. If the progress made in the art of war and the equipment of armies during the last half century be continued for another, it is easy to imagine the result in the total annihilation of one or possibly both of the opposing forces-a contingency which no nation, however belligerent, would care to face, except in a last effort to save its own existence.

Fortunately, the moral progress of the world during the past century contains in itself an assurance that a war will not be undertaken without a substantial cause, and until every effort of diplomacy has been exhausted to avert it. As individuals advance in civilization and refinement, they are less likely to resort to violent methods to redress real or fancied wrongs. As with individuals, so with nations. In the face of much discouragement and disappointment at the result of legislation, which sometimes has a directly contrary effect from that intended, or raises up new evils as serious as those it is designed to suppress, no intelligent man can review the history of the nineteenth century without being convinced of a substantial progress in the tone of political action and public sentiment, and a gradual elevation of the race, which must redound to the general peace of the world.

The slave trade and slavery itself has been abolished; lotteries and public gambling houses suppressed; the rights of women enlarged; the sale of intoxicating liquors largely restricted; the right of suffrage extended even beyond the limits of prudence; the spoils system,

which began with the Administration of Jackson and continued with ever-increasing effrontery to the close of Johnson's, finally became abashed at its own audacity, and a reform set in which bids fair to exterminate the whole system and establish the saner policy which prevailed in the earlier days of the Republic. The same tendency is not less manifest abroad. Germany and Italy have been unified, and Japan raised from what, in the schoolbooks of our boyhood, was described as a semi-barbarous people to a civilized and powerful State. The hardships of war have been greatly ameliorated by more humane methods in the care of the wounded, and by the ninth convention of the Hague conference forbidding the bombardment of undefended harbors, villages, towns, or buildings.

The policy of arbitration which seems to have obtained to a very limited extent among Grecian States, and to have been much discussed by publicists during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, took definite shape in the nineteenth, and was erected into an international policy by the Geneva Convention. Since then resort has been had to it with increasing frequency, and a permanent tribunal established at The Hague, to which all nations are invited to submit their disputes. It is now proposed to extend their scope by creating a court with compulsory jurisdiction of certain causes arising in time of war. If the convention establishing this court meets with the general acceptance of the powers, and the court should prove equal to the emergencies of the next great naval war, we may reasonably look forward to an extension of the same system to international claims for pecuniary damages, the adjustment of disputed boundary lines, as in the San Juan case, the rights of fishery in territorial waters, the interpretation and application of treaties, the forfeiture of concessions or franchises, and in general to all such bona fide controversies as are solvable between individuals in a court of law or equity. As there are among individuals certain personal or family dissensions involving the respective standing or honor of the parties, which can not be settled by the courts, there will probably always arise as between nations certain questions which can only be settled by the arbitrament of the sword. Where there is a predetermination to fight, as in the Franco-Prussian war, a slight

pretext is sufficient, and no court can possibly prevent it by peaceful

methods.

Our own experience in international arbitrations has been such as to encourage the belief that they will in time supersede the necessity, except in a limited class of cases, of resorting to coercive measures for the redress of international grievances. True, victory has not always perched upon our flag. Nor can this be expected in

any form of enforcing a litigious right. But while we may think that in a particular case their conclusion may be erroneous, I have never known a serious charge of incapacity, corruption, or partiality to attach to their action.

Prior to the Civil War most of our disputes were with Great Britain, and concerned the long boundary line between the Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic and the Straits of Georgia on the Pacific Ocean. Some of these were adjusted by commissioners appointed by the two Powers, sometimes with a third commissioner as umpire, and once, at least, by the arbitration of a foreign potentate. The first, decided in 1798, turned upon the identification of the St. Croix River, constituting a part of the boundary line under the original treaty of 1783, and was settled by three commissioners, one appointed by each party, and the third an American chosen by the other two. The line seems to have been fixed by unanimous decision according to the British contention. A further dispute arose

in 1817, regarding the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, and was referred to two commissioners, one from each Power, and a compromise judgment rendered.

The northeast boundary between the State of Maine and the British possessions was the subject of two arbitrations, the first of which, submitted to two commissioners - one from each Powerresulted in a disagreement in 1821, and a second covering the same subject was referred to the King of the Netherlands, who made an award which was subsequently waived by both parties and the line established by a new treaty.

Of two arbitrations arising in the settlement of the boundary line through the Great Lakes, one was determined in 1822 by the award of two commissioners, and in the other, the commissioners disagree

ing, the matter was finally adjusted and incorporated into the Ashburton Treaty of 1842.

The northwestern boundary between British Columbia and the present State of Washington was not less fertile of disputes. The line east of the Rocky Mountains had been fixed in 1818 by convention at the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude; but from that time until 1846 the line west of the Rocky Mountains was contested in a series of negotiations which at one time threatened a between the two countries, but finally, by treaty of 1846, the fortyninth parallel was extended to the middle of the channel between the continent and Vancouver Island. But certain islands in this channel - notably that of San Juan still remained in dispute, and were at one time jointly occupied by British and American troops. Finally, by the treaty of 1871, the matter was referred to the Emperor of Germany, as arbitrator, who made an award in favor of the United States.

The Geneva Convention of 1872 was the beginning of a new era in the history of international arbitration. Whether we consider the dignity of the two Powers interested, the gravity of the questions involved, the learning and eminence of the members of the convention, the interest displayed in its deliberations by the great powers of Europe, as well as the ability of counsel upon both sides, we can not avoid the conclusion that this was the greatest judicial tribunal of modern times. The foundation of this convention was laid in the treaty of 1871, whereby by Article I it was agreed that five arbitrators be appointed — two by the Powers interested, one by the King of Italy, one by the President of the Swiss Confederation, and one by the Emperor of Brazil - who should consider the question. whether due diligence had been used in preventing the fitting out of Confederate vessels within British jurisdiction, and also of preventing the departure from such jurisdiction of any vessel intended. to carry on war against the United States. The decision of this tribunal, holding that due diligence had not been used, and awarding a gross sum of $15,500,000, was a matter of great historical importance. The agreement upon this convention probably averted a war with the mother country.

..we are less concerned with these so-called Alabama claims

the claims of British subjects against the United States, interclaims of citizens of the United States against Great d-inct from the Alabama claims. The British claims Free classes:

Injuries inflicted by the Confederacy or its citizens; 2 growing out of captures by United States cruisers; Cams for arbitrary arrests, compulsory military service, and d violations of the personal rights of British subjects. claims were, under Articles XII to XVII of the treaty of referred to three commissioners one by each Power, and be appointed by the President and Her Britannic Majesty jointly. Count Corti, the Italian Minister at Washington, was agreed upon as the third commissioner.

der the provisions of the treaty, four hundred and seventyBritish and nineteen American claims were laid before the ecmission. The British claims, with interest, amounted to $2,000,000, and the American claims to less than $1,000,000, all of which latter were rejected. One hundred and eighty-one British claims were allowed, at less than $2,000,000 - a liberal deduction from the original amount claimed.

Many of these claims had been adjudicated by the prize courts of this country, and in a great majority of these cases the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court was sustained by the commissioners, although in three cases, The Hiawatha (2 Black 635), The Circassian (2 Wall. 135), in both of which there had been a strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Nelson, his view was adopted, and in the third case, The Sir William Peele (5 Wall. 517), the commissioners disagreed with the Supreme Court upon a subordinate point.

Many of these controversies with Great Britain turned upon questions of territorial rights, the respective duties of belligerents and neutrals in time of war; and had either country been less conciliatory in its spirit these controversies might have led into an open rupture. As it was, there were several occasions in which it seemed as though war was inevitable. But the good sense of the Anglo