that the right to such institutions is universal to the fullest extent possible, and that they are therefore to be extended throughout the empire. The metropolitan nation is to extend its own representative and republican institutions under its own Constitution by incorporating into its body-politic such contiguous lands and communities as it deems best, after preparing them for participation in its inner life. The colonies, which are so distant that they can never be incorporated in this body-politic, it protects and develops into selfgoverning states as rapidly as possible, having for its ultimate object the evolution of a federalistic empire composed of itself and a body of self-governing states, connected and united by bonds of interest and amity, of which empire it shall be the representative and head.

This new federalistic empire is, as has been said, based on different principles from those which govern a strict federal union like the United States. There are several important questions regarding the organization of such an empire which have been discussed and in answer to which it is possible now to state with some confidence the principles on which this new form of political organism is to proceed.

The first of these questions is, How are Congress and the President to exercise the power of the nation over the colonies, and what is to be the relation of each to the other in exercising this power?

The answer seems not to be difficult when the difference between the power of a nation exercised within itself and the power exercised by it externally over its colonies is considered. When the government of a nation acts internally, it exercises a power which is partly legislative, partly executive, and partly judicial. The principle of "distribution of powers" applies, and the three functions of government are placed in different hands. When the government of a nation acts externally over the colonies, it wields the power of the nation as a unit over other political units, in a way somewhat similar to that in which it acts when it exercises the treaty-making power or the war power: the power exercised by the nation is essentially one of superintendence for the purpose of standardizing the political units constituting the empire and unifying them, which

necessitates investigation and adjudication concerning political objects external to the nation. The exercise of this power results in acts of the government of the nation which have the effect of legislative, executive, and judicial acts in the colonies, but the superintending power exercised by a nation in its empire is as indivisible in its nature as the treaty-making power or the war power. Whenever power is exercised by two persons non-concurrently, either one must act and the other advise, or one must act in the first instance and the other in the final instance with power to overrule and supersede. In the latter case, the one first acting is bound by all the previous rulings of the other, and his action may be modified, overruled, or superseded by the other. The experience of all nations in the management of the relations with their colonies points to the latter arrangement being the proper one to apply to such a case. The executive of the nation acts in the first instance, being bound by all the rulings of the legislature, and his action is subject to be modified, overruled, and in some cases to be superseded by the action of the legislature. This principle has been recognized by Congress and the Supreme Court. Congress has authorized the President to exercise all political powers over annexed territory, and the Supreme Court has upheld its action. If the power of Congress over such territory were strict legislative power, it could not delegate the power. It is not settled by the Supreme Court whether the President exercises power over the colonies wholly by delegation of Congress. The latest intimation of the opinion of the court is that he may exercise civil power without authority of Congress, in cases of new acquisitions, though of course in this case, as in all others, the action of Congress when taken, and the precedents established by Congress and the Supreme Court in other cases, bind the President. Thus, there is no danger of the President becoming an "emperor." The imperialism of the present day leaves the legislature of the metropolitan nation as the final tribunal and arbiter of the empire, controlling by its decision the executive. Any exercise by the President of the power of the nation over the colonies is as an official or tribunal of first instance; so that he exercises this power under the authority or subject to the disapproval of Congress, and subject also to its power to modify, overrule, or supersede his action.

The advantage in having the President exercise the power of the nation over the colonies in the first instance is that the Executive Departments of the Government can usually act more effectively in matters which require an investigation of facts external to the United States than can the Congress; and while Congress must, in matters of great importance, make such investigations and adjudicate and finally determine the great questions arising in the course of our relations with our colonies, the power of the nation over the colonies will, it would seem, probably be most justly exercised if the President exercises it in the first instance in all matters not of great importance, and Congress confines itself to supervising his action and determining questions of great importance.

Another question which has been much discussed is, How are the powers of the metropolitan nation in its empire, regarding the empire as federalistic, to be legally limited?

The difficulty with every federalistic conception of empire is to find some principle by which the powers of the metropolitan nation in the empire may be legally limited. It is productive only of confusion to speak of an organism as federal or even federalistic, when as a matter of fact the limitations upon the power of the central government are in their last analysis only self-limitations. Three theories have been suggested concerning the basis upon which the limitation of the powers of a metropolitan nation in its empire may be regarded as legally limited. The first is the theory of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the power of the Congress of the United States over the colonies is limited by all the "applicable provisions" of the Constitution of the United States. This theory furnishes a basis for legal limitations upon governmental power as respects individuals, and enables the courts to protect the rights of the individual in cases arising in or with relation to the colonies; but it seems to afford no basis for legal limitations upon the purely political powers of the metropolitan nation and the colonies. The Supreme Court can determine what provisions of the Constitution are applicable in cases involving the rights of individuals; but even though all concerned agree that the relations between the United States and the colonies are to be determined by applying the ap

plicable provisions of the Constitution of the United States, there is still lacking a basis on which to decide the question of applicability in those purely political disputes which are outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Another theory of the manner in which the powers of a metropolitan nation in its empire are limited is that these limitations are under an unwritten constitution theoretically established by all the people of the empire, but actually not existent except as formulated by the act of imperial conferences, by imperial arbitrations, and by imperial legislation. But this is indefinite, and all limitations of this kind would seem to be in their last analysis self-limitations. A third and perhaps the most reasonable theory is that the powers of a metropolitan nation in its empire are limited by an imperial law common to all empires, nations, states, and colonies, which is based, like international law, on the common juridical sentiment of the civilized world and upon the actual policy and practice of civilized nations.

The supposition of the existence of such an imperial law seems at first sight violent, but it is a less difficult conception than was that of international law in the time of Grotius. Anyone who attempts to study the relations between nations and colonies or the methods of colonial administration immediately finds it necessary to study the theory and practice of all nations and all colonies, because the necessities of the situation are in a general way the same in the case. of one nation and its colonies as in the case of all other nations and their colonies. It is true that there will probably always be disputes arising between nations and their colonies which can not be settled by the application of known principles; but the same is true concerning disputes of nations with other nations, and yet this is not considered to militate against the existence of international law. The supposition of an imperial law makes it possible to understand the tendency toward the solution by imperial conference and imperial arbitration of questions arising in the course of the relations between Great Britain and its colonies. According to the federalistic conception of empire, the relations between the member-states of the empire have an international aspect, and these relations are properly settled by conference between the states within the empire, or,

in case of failure of the conference to agree unanimously, by arbitration within the empire. Conference or arbitration supposes the existence of a law by which the political units who join in the conference or who submit to arbitration recognize themselves to be bound.

The supposition of an imperial law determining the relations between nations and their colonies is opposed to any conception of world empire. It is essential to the conception of such an imperial law that there should always exist several empires, as well as nations without colonies, by whose theory and practice the principles of such a law would be determined.

On the theory of a federalistic empire under imperial law, non-selfgoverning or partially self-governing colonies are regarded as states of the empire equally with self-governing colonies, and are entitled to participate in imperial conferences and to submit their questions to imperial arbitration. Officials appointed by the United States to participate in the local government of colonies are not in the position of rulers of the colony, but of substitutes for citizens of the colonies in the offices held by them; and such substitution is to last only so long as necessary in order that there may be a just and stable local government.

It seems, therefore, that in the federalistic American empire formed of the United States as metropolitan nation and the insular · countries as member-states, it is possible to find, in this imperial law, if recognized and acted upon, a basis for legal limitations upon the powers of the United States when exercising power for the common purposes of the empire, and upon the powers of the insular countries when exercising power for local purposes.

Another question which is beginning to be discussed is, How shall the exercise of the power of the metropolitan nation in its empire, by the legislature, and by the executive with the authority or subject to the disapproval of the legislature, be safeguarded?

The first safeguard would seem to be the recognition by the legislature and the executive of the nation and by the people of the nation and of the empire, that all imperial matters are regulated by imperial law. By such a recognition, all danger of absolutism in the empire may, it would seem, be avoided. Every act of the met