ropolitan nation or of the colonies would thus be judged of by the nation, by the colonies, and by the world at large as an act of jurisdiction, and the relations of the different parts of the empire would be based upon justice, reason, and mutual interest.

A second safeguard would be the establishment of a department of imperial affairs in the executive government of the nation. Assuming that the relations between a nation and its colonies are under imperial law and that those between it and other nations are under international law, it results that the affairs of nations having colonies fall into three great classes internal affairs, imperial affairs, and foreign affairs. To imperial affairs, therefore, it would seem that the separate secretariat should be appropriated.

A third safeguard would be the establishment of special councils in the metropolitan nation, advisory to the executive and legislature, composed of men who are familiar with the local circumstances of the colonies and with the history, the principles, and the practice of imperial government, whose advice might be taken on proposed governmental action, and from whom investigating boards for imperial purposes and tribunals of imperial arbitration might be selected. This method of safeguarding the action of the executive and legislature, when either is exercising the power of the nation in the empire, is already adopted to a greater or less extent in the British and European empires.

A fourth safeguard would be the institution of imperial conferences, at which commissioners of the nation, together with its secretary for imperial affairs, may confer with commissioners of the colonies for the purpose of reaching by agreement a decision of complicated and difficult questions arising in the empire or growing out of the relations between the empire and the rest of the world. By the action of the imperial conference of the British Empire held at London in 1907, imperial conferences at regular periods were recognized as a part of the government of the Empire.

A fifth safeguard is the institution, within the nation, of tribunals of imperial arbitration, by whose decisions upon imperial questions the nation and the colonies will hold themselves to be bound, but who would not be called upon to act except when imperial conferences failed to agree unanimously.

With these various safeguards thrown about the exercise of power in the empire by the Congress and the President of the United States, and with the additional safeguard for the life, liberty, and property of the individual given through the exercise by the Supreme Court of jurisdiction throughout the American empire in all cases in which these rights are claimed to be violated, it seems that no danger to the institutions of the country is to be feared. The system of federalistic imperialism which has been outlined above preserves all the American principles -the principle of political unity throughout the regions under American jurisdiction, with states' rights universally recognized and protected; the principle of governmental power universally limited by a supreme law, with these limitations enforced by adequate safeguards; and the principle of protection by the courts of the individual's fundamental rights against the Government.

Another question which is becoming serious in the British Empire and may very likely become serious in the American empire is, What are the rights of commerce and intercourse between the different states of the empire, growing out of the imperial citizenship which follows from the recognition of the federalistic unity of the empire?

In answer to this, it is to be considered that the federalistic empire of the future is probably to vary from the federally united political organisms like the United States in the direction of internationalism. That is to say, the powers exercised by the United States for the common purposes of the empire and the powers exercised by the colonies within themselves are probably always to have somewhat the aspect that they would have if the United States and its colonies were an alliance and the United States were the leader of the alliance. Somewhere in the direction of federal union, between the two extremes of alliance and strict unity, the line is to be drawn by which the details of government in the empire will be determined. Imperial citizenship probably will not, therefore, carry with it the same rights of unrestricted commerce and intercourse within the empire that citizenship of the United States carries within the American Union. The relations between the different states of the empire and the relations of each state with the

metropolitan nation will doubtless always have an aspect somewhat international. The inhabitants of each colony, as a state of the empire, will no doubt be recognized as having an imperial citizenship by virtue of their state citizenship, which will carry some rights in each other state of the empire different from those which they would enjoy in a foreign nation. But each colony, as a state of the empire, must be permitted to exercise such rights as are properly necessary for its self-preservation and for the highest development of itself, the empire, and the world at large; and therefore each colony must, it would seem, be permitted, within limits, and subject to the control of imperial conference and imperial arbitration, to regulate not only its commerce but also its intercourse with the other parts of the empire, even perhaps in extreme cases to the point of prohibiting such trade and immigration proceeding from within the empire itself as is incompatible with the self-preservation of the colony.

Another and most important question which suggests itself is, How are all parts of an empire justly to contribute the funds which it is necessary for the metropolitan nation to use for the common defense and welfare of the empire?

The conception of a federalistic empire negates the idea of a common congress or parliament of the empire in which each state of the empire, and its population, are represented; hence, there can be no taxation for the common purposes of the empire. It also negates the idea of the metropolitan nation exploiting the colonies for its own benefit, and thus obtaining indirectly from the colonies the resources with which to pay the debts incurred by it for the common defense and welfare. In the federalistic empire, therefore, the money to meet the expenses incurred in the common defense and for the common welfare must be obtained by the contribution of the colonies. These contributions will naturally be determined by imperial conferences, or, on failure of the conferences to agree, by imperial arbitration.

The greatest expenses which the metropolitan nation will have to incur in the exercise of power for the common purposes of the states of the empire will no doubt be those arising from the defense of empire and from the establishing of communication between the

different parts of the empire. The wide separation of the parts of the empire requires the maintenance of a large fleet for imperial defense and of cables and other modes of communication. To these expenses it seems clear that the colonies should contribute justly. But as some wars made by the nation may be aggressive, or may concern the metropolitan nation exclusively, it seems not impossible that, as the federalistic nature of the empire comes to be recognized, a rule of international law may be established permitting neutrality, in some cases, to a colony not contributing to the expenses of war waged by the nation, upon proper conditions.

From what has been said, it has, it is hoped, been made clear that imperialism is not a policy which implies "ownership" of peoples or "rule over subject-peoples," and that in the last three decades the character of imperial policy has so much changed that it may not be unreasonable to believe that the policy is evolving into a science. As there is a recognized science of international relations and another recognized science of the internal relations of nations and states, there may yet perhaps be recognized a science of imperial relations.

Unlike the policy of "neutralization," imperialism preserves the status quo, and involves no change in the existing relationships of the nations and states of the world; as an American policy it is wholly consistent with the permanent maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. It does not imply extension of power by aggression; on the contrary, it accepts the existing situation as respects nations and their colonies, and seeks to ascertain the just principles applicable to the relationship, on the theory that the peace of nations and states, as of individuals, depends upon the establishment of just principles, which, by general recognition and adoption, determine the relations of each to the other. The empire thus established, in which individual rights, state rights, and republican institutions are secured and guaranteed to the fullest extent possible, has a benevolent purpose which might not exist in an alliance of great powers doing “police duty" over "neutralized" states.

As the simpler, juster, more practicable, and more useful policy, therefore, it seems that imperialism is to be preferred to "neutralization."

ALPHEUS HENRY SNOW.

THE HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

II

THE CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Although the Constitution did not provide in terms for the creation of Executive Departments of the Government, it spoke of them as things which would be established as a matter of course. Article II, section 2, in treating of the powers of the President, said: “He may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices;" and further in the same section: "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments."

Under the old Government Congress had provided Departments of Finance and War, as well as Foreign Affairs, and in the Constitutional Convention it was shown that the framers had in mind the creation of more effective Executive Departments to take their place. Alexander Hamilton's plan of government contemplated a supreme executive "to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers of the Departments of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs." Oliver Ellsworth proposed that there be an executive council to consist of the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, "and the ministers as they might be established for the department of foreign and domestic affairs, war, finance and marine, who shall advise but not conclude the President." 2 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, seconded by Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, submitted the following:

1

To assist the President in conducting the Public affairs there shall be a Council of State composed of the following officers 1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall from time to time recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the U. S. as may in

1 Writings of Madison (Hunt), III, 195.

2 Ibid., IV, 234.